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Comment by goodpoint | Hacker News Reader

The security benefits are massive. X allows *every* application to take screenshots of the whole screen.

40 comments and nobody pointed out this benefit...

Meanwhile, people who actually have to screen-share are having trouble in Wayland. So maybe this policy of "don't trust any code ever" has some downsides.

It's the usual "convenience vs. security" debate all over again

I've not had any issues with screen sharing in, like, 3 years.

The problem is that people use video chat clients by vendors that don't give a crap about Linux.

The problem is that they don't always have a choice, depending on work context

I do share your dismay at those apps, though (I primarily use Linux)

Even snap/flatpak frequently give flat-out full filesystem access, so the desktop is already insecure as heck and the security advantages are all theoretical.

It's like nitpicking what lock the door has when the window is left wide open.

Speak for yourself, I use proper sandboxing and it works.

> X allows every application to take screenshots of the whole screen.

I have bad news for you: linux allows every application that you run to wipe out your entire home directory.

Not when they are sandboxed, no.

Also no, it's not "linux", it's every OS without per-application MAC or sandboxing.

Doesn't Wayland WMs have to break those "security benefits" constantly to just be able to take a screenshot?

Sensitive features like screenshots, input methods, screen locking and whatnot are behind extensions (or portals). I'm not familiar with the state of GNOME/KDE/Flatpak, but at least on the wlroots side of things it is true that currently these extensions are enabled and accessible by any process that can talk to the Wayland socket (breaking those security benefits, as you say). This is changing with protocols such as security-context that allow a sandbox engine like Flatpak (or your custom scripts) to restrict what features apps can use. (so your browser can't register an input method, or some random app can't lock the screen)

https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/wayland/wayland-protocols/-/m...

https://github.com/swaywm/sway/pull/7648

https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/pull/4920

Until we have proper app sandboxing in Linux desktop, in the sense that third party proprietary programs use it, that's a minor concern.

> proper app sandboxing in Linux desktop, in the sense that third party proprietary programs use it

Proper sandboxing is not something that third-party programs should get to decide to use or not. It should be the users of these programs that decide if they want to sandbox them or not, even if the application is unwilling.

Sandboxing is an operating-system issue, not a packaging issue.

> Until we have proper app sandboxing

We have it and there are multiple tools like bubblewrap and co. You can already restrict applications if you want.

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