And ultimately keeping private keys secure is extremely easy compared to securing an OS, the app store ecosystem, and messaging app. Finding a zero day there and exfiltrating messages from a phone seems far more likely than a key being lost. We see zero days all the time and the number of lost private keys is something close to 0. If you trust them with the entire chain adding a key to decrypt messages is not a meaningful additional risk.
This is about selling phones and not some moral stand by Apple. They're perfectly happy handing over data to the Chinese government. E2E encryption is denying access to the West with a legal system that provides (somewhat theoretical) legal protection while continuing to hand it over to an autocratic government that has legit concentration camps.
E2E encryption is not a meaningful increase in security and it denies society the legitimate tools it needs to enforce laws. The practical effect is that criminals get away with a lot more crime while legitimate usage is not any safer.
And a technical counterargument would be that even computer science is used to solutions that aren't perfect, but whose likelihood of failure is a function of effort, so they become practically usable once you push the likelihood of failure to the region around "would take more than age of observable universe", etc.
Examples include: efficient primality tests, UUIDs, asymmetric cryptography itself.