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>crashdumps.. Redacting private keys and other sensitive data from these will always be failure-prone

>Not enough log retention in the corp environment to track a 2 year old infiltration.

The two are in conflict. Redaction is a problem for logs as well. A longer retention period implies a more damaging vulnerability.

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I was more talking about the problems of moving data across trust zones rather than retaining it at all. Retaining logs and crashdumps for several years is good, but moving them from a locked-down production environment to a less secure corp account (where they were presumably easier to work with because of the lower security requirements) is why this leak happened.

Moving sensitive data to a less secure environment is of course a mistake, but leaks happen even with locked-down production environments.

It's very unlikely anyway a software company will fix an old crashdump - the software probably moved on a lot. So if there's no specific report/problem it's attached to and it's not a sensitive area, we're better off having it deleted. Same thing for old logs.

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