This depends on the configuration. If you don't bind the key to PCRs at key creation time kernel updates don't affect the workflow and you still will take advantage of other TPM features such as locking the key after several unsuccessful attempts.
Take a look at the systemd configuration: https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd-cry...
I'm using it on my laptop and it works well.
Instead I’m leaning toward separate boot and root disks, with a root/data disk encrypted with LUKS with a detached header. dm verity on a read only root with a separate data partition also seems simple/appealing. Of course, these all allow attacks full secure boot/tpm/etc avoid, but it’s a balance.
Tldr version is that you'd authorize OS manufacturer's kernel signing key to use the TPM key so that each time your OS vendor signs the kernel it's OK for the TPM.
Sadly I don't think I've seen this deployed in the wild.
[0]: https://ebrary.net/24725/computer_science/quick_loading