Google has contributed lots of fuzzing time and security improvements to eg ffmpeg already.
Of course as the blog post says, just because memory safety bugs are overcome doesn't mean vulnerabilities have stopped; people find other kinds of vulnerability now.
I don't buy that being able to manually copy data into a memory buffer is critical for performance when implementing image codecs. Nor do I accept that, even if we do want to manually copy data into memory, a bounds check at runtime would degrade performance to a noticeable extent.
Though that one's for video; images are simpler but you also have to deploy the code to a lot more platforms.
I don't dispute that these optimizations may have been necessary on older hardware, but I think the current generation of Apple CPUs should have plenty of power to not need these micro optimizations (and the hardware video decoder would take care of this anyway).
The same codebase has to support that (since there's Intel Macs and Intel iOS Simulator), and in this case Apple didn't write the decoder (it's Google's libwebp). I was thinking of an example from ffmpeg in that case.
> and the hardware video decoder would take care of this anyway
…actually, considering that a hardware decoder has to do all the same memory accesses and is written in a combination of C and Verilog, I'm not at all sure it's more secure.