What the hell Microsoft?
What the hell Microsoft?
Yes. Although I will say that ATP runs before safesenders or any other rule applies, and it's been hair trigger lately.
Sadly this is the only way to do business sometimes. Every org has to deal with a couple other organizations that absolutely refuse to get their auth game together. Users just want their mail to work and the particulars don't matter to them. The result is that your contacts can be spoofed.
If I (the admin) push back on this my boss will get a complaint like "jabroni is interfering with my bazillion dollar sale" and any argument to the contrary is obviously just me playing the blame game. So I whitelist it and now that company we are trading PDFs with can be spoofed by anybody and skips security scanning :)
The realist in me realises that there is probably a non-negative number of domains out there with dmarc set to reject but failing absolutely all spf and dkim checks, but this should be their problem, not the receiver's.
> Microsoft confirmed the vulnerabilities (with severity “Important”, the highest severity assigned to email spoofing bugs) and awarded us a bug bounty. They have partially fixed the issues by rejecting spoofed email messages purporting to be from domains that have a DMARC policy of REJECT
However, I could still replicate this on an o365 domain, so this attack would still work if attacker has access to an o365 domain.