Heck, I don't even like that email can be used to recover basically every account.
Someone gets your computer unlocked? They have access to email and everything.
As someone else pointed out, SMS based account recovery is the culprit.
I mean, at least SMS-OTPs are one-time use, i.e. they don't facilitate a compromise if done correctly, but the "done correctly" part here is once again very load-bearing.
Sure, but that is not 2FA. It's 1FA. They could have used e-mail as the recovery mechanism to send a password reset link, then it still would have been SMS 2FA if they then required the SMS factor upon authentication and it would have been secure. This wasn't a problem of SMS 2FA, it was a problem of SMS based account recovery.
Did you mean a TAN for protecting individual transactions? I file this under authorization instead of authentication. But even then a SMS TAN is better than no TAN. I cannot see a scenario where adding SMS authentication makes things less secure.
Well, this could be solved by sending a notification on all transactions. I already get these for my credit card account (I wish they did this on my checking account, too). When paying with Google Pay, I even get three notifications. This was very useful once, when I woke up to a $50 transaction to the XBox store that I supposedly did while sleeping without even owning an XBox.
Abstractly my larger point is that security isn't a monolithic scalar but rather depends on the threat model and what is being secured. Far too often large entities push out features in the name of "security", but what they really mean is their own security at the expense of yours (eg the TSA). A lot of these pushes (eg SMS 2FA) are like that, especially when made mandatory rather than consensual.
No seriously, it is aggravating how much SMS account recovery is a thing. Google even displays banners of "You are missing recovery information" because you set a recovery email but not a recovery phone.