EDIT: Crap. You're right. Port forwarding worked... So there's that. `ssh -J userfoo@localhost other-place` also worked... I would imagine that's all able to be disabled, but I see that the user is not fundamentally limited to what the shell allows. That's disappointing. I thought it would wrap everything in `custom-shell.sh -c` calls like it does with the sftp and scp servers. I imagine/hope that under a default configuration one is still not able to touch the contents of the server if the shell doesn't permit it, but being able to use it as a proxy or listen on its ports is not what I expected.
ORIG_REPLY:
> Don't forget to disable sftp in your sshd_config
Doing `strace -fp $(pgrep sshd)` then `sftp userfoo@localhost` in another terminal, I see:
$ sftp userfoo@localhost
Connection closed.
Connection closed
$
then in the `strace` output:
[pid 408173] execve("/tmp/custom-shell.sh", ["custom-shell.sh", "-c", "/usr/lib/ssh/sftp-server"], 0x55c5f3bae0d0 /* 14 vars */) = 0
[pid 408173] write(1, "/usr/lib/ssh/sftp-server: unknown command\n", 42) = 42
As far as I understand, SSH's security of what a user can do is completely based on what the shell permits the user to do.
> are you sure there are no directly/indirectly exploitable bugs/omissions in your script logic for invoking complex commands like git
Including a ssh server in the same executable doesn't save you from such bugs.
> and that your distributed filesystem works quickly across a few million home folders for your authorized_keys files
OpenSSH's sshd seems quite flexible in ways to authenticate users. I don't think having a home folder per user is necessary if you don't want it.
> and hopefully there's no sneaky way that an attacker can push an environment variable to break something like with LD_PRELOAD
SSH's default is to not accept the client's environment, and this shell itself provides no way to manipulate them. They can be nonexistent in the shell's interface if you don't want them.
I put the script so someone can offer some concrete way (as in show me some code) to bypass it in a way that having a custom integrated SSH server would prevent it. I'd love to see a `ssh/sftp userfoo@localhost` call that does something other than call cmd_foo, cmd_bar, or erring out.