>> Don't forget to disable sftp in your sshd_config >Doing `strace -fp $(pgrep sshd)` then `sftp userfoo@localhost` in another terminal, I see: [...] >execve("/tmp/custom-shell.sh", ["custom-shell.sh", "-c", "/usr/lib/ssh/sftp-server"]
If your sshd_config had "Subsystem sftp internal-sftp" as a shipped default, then I don't think it would have gone through the user's shell. Not a major issue, but there are just so many little points to be certain are locked down
>I'd love to see a `ssh/sftp userfoo@localhost` call that does something other than call cmd_foo, cmd_bar, or erring out.
The reference to LD_PRELOAD was to hint at that (since if the attacker can get a binary on the system -- e.g. in a git repo or config file) they could change what functions bash is invoking... I'm not a wiley enough attacker, but I bet if you put something valuable behind it and put out a public challenge you'd be impressed with the opensshd vulnerabilities and other interesting features of ssh/tty/environment variables.
As you probably guessed, my comment was just listing a few of the things (today) that you're playing whack-a-mole with when it comes to making sure everything is secure. I think your "disprove me with code" approach is a great basis for a discussion.
Writing their own 'ssh server and shell' program is a different set of tradeoffs vs trying to fully lock down programs that are intended to be general-purpose... to be perfectly honest I don't think I'd want to be involved in either route, the stakes are stressfully high... but there sure is a lot less code to audit and test in writing your own ssh+shell than there is trying to secure and keep up-to-date sshd, pam, bash, etc. (especially since they'll be adding features that you explicitly do not want for your purposes)