Most (all?) protocols conflate the two. But the real world doesn’t speak in phone numbers, ip addresses, and private keys.
Group identities could help though. Let through emails and calls that are signed by a "official medical use" key, or "official federal police use" key. The public keys for those should be publicly available and easily verifiable.
User-level PKI is hard, and trust is shaky. Few well-known signature keys should be much easier. The infrastructure could, of course, be used for whatever other keys you choose to track and trust, e.g. your employer's org, your kid's school, etc. The problem of responsible stewardship remains, but is likely solvable in serious organizations with a dedicated IT department, like a hospital, or a police force.
You're moving closer to a human solution by mapping unstable identifiers (private keys, signatures) to human identifiers.
At the core, humans want to say "ignore everything that isn't from a friend or family member, unless it's an emergency"
Expressing that with technology is hard, especially when people try to solve for identity with technology. Identity is a social construct, it lives outside of cryptographic proof. The systems we build do very little to try and map cryptographic proof back outside the system to identity.
School clubs, hospitals, governments, family, names, friends, etc. are all social constructs. Some social constructs are stronger than others (hospitals and governments have a lot of steps involved in making the social construct!) but they're all still social constructs.
Identity is fiat. There is no way around it.
Spoon boy says it best:
> Do not try to bend the spoon. That is impossible. > Instead, only try to realize the truth. > There is no spoon. > Then you'll see it is not the spoon that bends, it is only yourself
If your kid is lost, tell them to call 911. They'll most likely be able to help more quickly than you will.
I considered your examples to describe two different kinds of scenarios, which might merit different kinds of security measures.
1. Incoming communication from a young child (or a person who is very dependent on you): you'll probably want your phone line to stay fully open. Hopefully in the case of young children, this means that their parents are relatively young and will have grown up with skepticism toward incoming communication from strangers.
2. Incoming communication about a younger, adult relative. Maybe for many people, such communication could bear the introduction of a bit of slowness by security measures. Probably in most cases, there's little that the older relative can do for the younger, temporarily incommunicado relative. They might not need to get a message about them right away. In many cases, the message will be bad news anyway, something that the older parent can do nothing about. Such bad news can probably wait a few hours, even a day or two to be delivered, and it's not too bad for the older relative to be none the wiser for a bit, if such temporary impotence protects them from the increasingly present threat of serious, life-altering scams.
As with all security measures, there's a tradeoff between convenience/immediacy/cost and security. It will likely be hard to design reliable, secure, and accessible emergency communication protocols, but I hope (and optimistically suspect) that it's indeed possible. Attempting to design such protocols is a worthy endeavor for us to undertake, given how many of our loved ones are increasingly vulnerable to randos who have no business getting to their front door so easily.
That right there will be a deal breaker to many.
Your kid gets hit on their bike across town. Maybe you'll find out two days later?!
Or someone has hours left to live, and you're not trying to do anything at all - just be by their side.
Organ donation? High risk operations?
These questions can't wait days.
For many people, the tradeoff--even if in the order of minutes or an hour or two--will be unacceptable and they'll prefer to leave their incoming communication channels completely open and unsecured. However, others people may decide that a small tradeoff is worth it, when weighing their own vulnerability to destructive scams vs. a much lower probability of needing to help a loved one with the catastrophic examples you mentioned. This latter group should not be considered by society to be heartless. Though nobody dies right away when they lose their life savings to a scam, they may very well end up dying or ending up with a very miserable life as a result of that scam. They should not be blamed for reasonably protecting themselves (AND their loved ones, who'd also be affected indirectly by that scam.)