This part in specific only benefits consumers.
1. https://www.ftc.gov/advice-guidance/competition-guidance/gui...
It's no different than Google using ads to subsidize failing ventures in order to gain market share.
Beyond that, I don't think this kind of analysis is meaningful because it fails to account for second order effects. For example, even if retail is breakeven on a net basis, it still subsidizes a gigantic fleet of machines used to power retail from which AWS came from. Negotiating in bulk to build data centers with a significantly larger internal customers leads to better unit economics for the AWS side of the build out even if retail is break even on a first order basis or even has losses. The same argument can be made for ads as well. Amazon is great at monetizing infrastructure /because/ they can sell not just significant volumes of the end product, but and the infrastructure used to deliver it.
I think you could make the same argument for Google, which is that technically, they should be able to use the second order effects of assets they've needed to put together to run search and ads to sell better infrastructure. Theoretically, this should mean that GCP is king, but it doesn't. I'm not sure there's an obvious answer to this question, or even a great clue behind first mover advantage AWS had in cloud.
However, I thing that your last point is not relevant. What-about-ism has no place in the law or it necessarily creates a slippery slope. If Google is also able to do this and purposefully did it in a predatory manner to accomplish a market advantage they both need to be legally pursued - and GCP not succeeding doesn't necessarily mean that Google didn't try underhanded actions to get it to succeed - it either means those actions weren't enough or they were incompetent (but still malicious). Either way each case needs to be judged on its own.
Per-item margin is the metric you need to use to judge whether they're deliberately trying to price out their competitor.
If you sell Widgets and Sprockets, but you have a competitor that only sells Widgets, you can price of your Widgets so low (on 1-2% margins, for example) that the competitor is unable to compete and goes out of business because you can use Sprocket sales to keep your company in business during that time.
Now that the other company is out of business, the price of your Widgets doesn’t matter because you no longer have competition in the market. You’re getting 100% of the potential sales and despite selling on a lower margin, you’re sales volume is now way up making those margins acceptable.
You don’t have to worry about making a better Widget, or improving the Widget making process, because you have no competition. And you’ve priced yours so low, no other company can come in and attempt to enter the market because they can’t compete at your volume and margins.
If there’s a high-demand material needed to make a Widget, you can put pressure on the producer to lower material prices since you are now their primary customer, or purchase the company that produces it and prevent access to the material.
Predatory pricing consolidates market control and can be used to prevent access to the market. Anti-trust laws were designed to prevent this.
Please don't re-define words. This is not what's normally called predatory pricing. Predatory pricing is supposed to involve a corporation raising prices after destroying it's competition. The thing you are describing is nothing more than having a low margin strategy.
Is every dropshipper undermining brand-name (high-margin) apparel?
That is not necessary for the definition of predatory pricing.
I don't like this analogy because you're not comparing items of equal quality. They're not fungible.
Why would you raise prices after? That would just invite competition again. Keep the prices low and competitors away. Maybe raise them to at-cost, but if your Widgets can comfortably cover the cost, then there is no reason to raise prices.
The assumption of predatory pricing is that it's not easy for a competitor to just show up. Supply chains would be destroyed, capital equipment scrapped, etc and replacing them would be time consuming and expensive.
Sometimes that's a reasonable assumption to make, sometimes it's not. Even if the assumptions are unreasonable, many CEOs won't let mere reason stand in their way.
> Maybe raise them to at-cost, but if your Widgets can comfortably cover the cost, then there is no reason to raise prices.
So, the Widget-making capital would just sit there producing 0 ROI? Someone's gonna object to that. A company pursues market dominance to make money.
Nobody can compete with you on the price and it is clear you can unbundle your Widgets from your Sprockets at any time if you ever feel threatened.
I'm OK with a computer making the pricing decision, but like HFT it's the frequency that leads to problems. It's a bit sad that the "free market" has to be regulated like this, but beautiful theories break down when you get to the quantum level.
What problems?
The other party is being tested for cooperation. Amazon raises the price and then reverts if competitors don't follow suit. They didn't revert after seeing sales drop or something, it sounds like they reverted based on a lack of "cooperation" from competitors.
This is tricky stuff to define wrong doing. What if a company wants to see the going rate for a product and just looks to Amazon to get an idea? You know, because a lot of people will shop at Amazon by default unless there is a reason not to, like saving a bit of money. These kind of algorithms become anti-consumer the more they get automated, but they may seem reasonable on the surface or in isolation.
If two algorithms are fine in isolation, but when used together cause overall market prices to rise what should we think of that? In the above example, Amazon would raise their price and the competitor would follow but not quite to the level of Amazon. Then if markets really are competitive (and fast) someone else may step in at a lower price than either, but I don't believe a lot of markets are fast or efficient when it comes to lowering prices.
Now it's possible that there was some separate agreement, for example Amazon and a competitor may have both agreed to raise a price some percentage and then they made small adjustments to look like it was just an automatic response. But the fact that algorithm seems to have accidentally lowered prices on some occasions would seem to suggest it genuinely was acting unilaterally. Or perhaps those failures were a deliberate part of a larger ruse. Ultimately it will be for a jury to decide but the FTC has its work cut out for them.
I'm sorry, huh?
Who exactly do you think is participating in this "market"?