Indeed. I've read and re-read the article. I don't see a clear explanation of the fallacy that fits into one sentence.
Indeed. I've read and re-read the article. I don't see a clear explanation of the fallacy that fits into one sentence.
Obviously that's not true, people legitimately win the powerball all the time despite the odds. The issue with this logic is judging the odds from the position of a _particular_ person winning vs. the odds of _anybody_ winning. Your individual odds are 1 in 300 million, but since the powerball gets many 100s of millions of entries clearly it's likely that eventually someone will win.
Effectively, the prosecutors fallacy is presenting a very low probability as though that indicates something couldn't have happened. A probability alone is useless without the size of the population that probability is picking from, "low probability" events like winning the lottery happen all the time when your population is large enough.
The other to add is that someone combs a data file for "unlikely events" and finds one event they consider unlikely happened to a given person, you have to consider the probability of any event that looks unlikely occurring at all, not just the probability of that unlikely event happening.
I occasionally get to remind coworkers that at 100 requests per second, one in a million is about 8 times per day [1]. Usually mentioned in the context of handling, understanding, or planning for corner cases.
[1] 100rps*60*60*24/1E6=8.64
There is only one person in the world who is you. Let's say I had a facial recognition system that had a false positive rate of only 1 in a million. If I tried to find you by having the system scan through pictures of literally everyone on earth, how many people would I incorrectly identify as you?
The problem is false positive rates are usually expressed in terms of "what proportion of negative cases will be reported as positive?" which can't answer the question "what proportion of positive results will be wrong?". Answering the latter also depends on how many true positives there are, which may vary, or even be completely unknown. The false negative rate also needs to be factored in.
In other words, it’s asking: “If Bob is guilty of this robbery, what are the chances we'd find his fingerprints at the crime scene?” When you should be asking: “Given that we've found Bob’s fingerprint at the crime scene, what’s the likelihood that he is guilty?"
It's more like saying "the chance of these fingerprints being mistaken for Bob's are 1 in 100000. Therefore there's a 99999 in 100000 Bob is guilty of this robbery.
Does Bob have a motive? Means? A history of crime? Is there evidence he was in the area? Could he have been in the house for another reason?
And the biggie: did he only come under suspicion after police trawled through a database of 100000 fingerprints and matched the prints to Bob? Because you should expect a false positive in a database of that size.
My best effort: If you have a very large imbalance in your population vs. your target group (e.g. everybody in NYC, vs the one person who robbed a bank, or the whole population vs. people with a rare disease), then seemingly strong evidence is much weaker than it appears.
Longer example:
Lets say we've matched the DNA of a bank robber to someone using a test with a 1-in-a-million false positive rate. That, on its own, means there is still over a 95% chance (23/24) that they are innocent given that with 24M people in the NYC area on a given day, we would expect 24 people to match.
The prosecutors fallacy would be saying that there is instead only a 1-in-a-million chance that this person is innocent.
If I flip the switch off, what is the probability that the light turns off?
If the light goes off, what is the probability that I flipped the switch off?
Those probabilities are not identical.
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Imagine that I have been administered a standard FDA-approved HIV test.
If I am HIV-negative, what is the likelihood that the test comes back positive? (I.e., what is the false positive rate?)
If the test comes back positive, what is the likelihood that I am HIV-negative?
Those probabilities are not identical.
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Imagine that your client's DNA is tested against DNA found at a murder scene, comparing the short tandem repeats at 13 locations. There is no other evidence linking your client to the crime scene or to the murder.
If your client was not at the scene, what is the likelihood of all 13 loci being matches?
If all 13 loci are matches, what is the likelihood your client was not at the scene?
Those probabilities are not identical.
Basic example: take a deck of cards and throw them in the air so the cards land in a random arrangement. If someone looks at the arrangement and says, "the odds against these cards landing in this specific arrangement are trillions to one, therefore someone must have arranged them like this deliberately," that's the Prosecutor's Fallacy.
For a tragic example from real life, see the case of Sally Clark[1] who was wrongly convicted for the murder of her two baby sons. At trial, the only other possible explanation given for their deaths was Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS).
A paediatrician testified that the odds of a single baby dying of SIDS were 1 in 8,500, so the probability of two specific babies dying in this way was the square of those odds (1 in 72 million). He concluded that the high improbability of this specific innocent circumstance meant that murder was a more likely explanation.
There were several other problems with this testimony (not to mention the evidence presented), but this demonstrates the Prosecutor's Fallacy: the paediatrician misinterpreted the odds of two specific babies dying from SIDS as the odds of ever seeing SIDS claim a pair of babies. The odds he quoted are in the millions, but the number of two-child families is in the millions too; this means that such events will probably happen eventually, thanks to the Law of Truly Large Numbers[2].
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sally_Clark [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_truly_large_numbers
However, we knew even then that if one baby from a particular pair of parents and a particular environment dies of SIDS, the odds of a second baby dying from SIDS with the same parents & environment increase dramatically. So the odds of two babies in the same household dying from SIDS aren't nearly 1 in 72 million.
The Prosecutor's Fallacy just makes the magnitude of the statistical miscalculation even more absurd.
Sadly, everyone, including her own defense team, thought that the correct "expert witness" for this kind of testimony would be a medical expert, rather than a statistical expert.
When an individual with something to gain asserts some probabilities, disregard that assertion.
Forget about medicine or criminal trials. Think of a sales professional - their assertions are commonly disregarded (rightly) as fluff. But put a white coat or nice suit on and people get deferential. A prosecutor in the courtroom is little different than a car salesman.
What you're describing is closer to "argument from authority".