Applying this logic, there is literally nothing NIST could have done here other than not run the competition in the first place; if it's not enough that almost every participant in the competition agrees that it was well conducted --- if the consensus of the whole academic field of post-quantum cryptography doesn't count for anything --- then all you're really saying is that there's no way to create a trustworthy standard.
And, to that, I say: hell yes. Cryptographic standards are, in my view, a force for evil. Nobody uses Blake2 because it's "standardized"; they use it because there's a rough consensus of credible, credentialed cryptographers that it's strong, and it's obviously fast. We can do Internet cryptography without entities like NIST and the IETF.
This is something Bernstein believes as well; he's said it before (I have my view on standards in part because of his own). But he's not being honest about that here: had his submission won, he'd have endorsed the competition, even though the exact same logic holds --- he should, by this logic, trust his own submission less if it wins.
But I also want to be especially candid here: this "NIST is acting as the catspaw of NSA by selecting the weakest standard" argument is also the standard rhetorical fallback for arguers who have just this instant learned that NIST didn't itself design CRYSTALS-Kyber, but don't want to surrender their credibility by admitting it.