"Mixed content warning", how I loathe thee
37signals.com
37signals.com
When people see the padlock icon they expect uncompromised security. (that's not something we can provide, strictly speaking, but that's the expectation, just the same) There are innumerable attack vectors that letting part of the traffic avoid SSL and cache controls would enable. Here's what I can think off right off of the top of my head:
1) Unencrypted HTTP snooping Referral header info: base.css being requested by https://secure.lousy.gov/cgi-bin/home.pl?ssn=123-45-6789
2) simple http/https confusion or misconfiguration: http(no-s)://secure.lousy.gov/tempdir/nonce123456/taxes.pdf -- generated by a backend process on the server -- this could be an over-the-wire or cache issue
3) Assorted javascript injections. This would be a sweet malware attack vector, actually. Once you got people to download your .exe you could tend browser caches and update bank javascripts to download 1x1px images with encoded bank information from hostilesite.com
Long story short, just like with certificate warning issues, when the argument comes down to "this security error is too confusing for $target_audience, can't we just turn it off?" the answer is always no.
Changing an image on a button from "reply to this quip from your friend!" to "submit password to re-login" isn't a security risk?
Of course, it's easy to fix with an extension to HTML, something like hrefhash="DSKJsdfjsdfs234" so the browser can verify that the referenced resource hasn't been tampered with. Then you can have your non-private data served over HTTP, and cached by the browser and by proxies, and you don't need the extra server side computation of SSL.
If you want to be ultra-secure, get an extension for your browser that doesn't cache anything.
I assume most people have frameworks that generate their <script src=...> tags for them, so this shouldn't even require developers to think about it.
The idea is to add a signed hash of the content in the HTTP headers, along with a way of verifying the signature. The point of it all is to make it possible to verify the source and integrity of content served from non-HTTPS servers.
Feedback welcome!
From the URL it looks like may be getting pulled out of an svn repo or some other internal resource. Nonetheless, they need to get rid of this, because I certainly would have hestitation in using their software if they do not understand such fundamental aspects of security as this.
Quite apart from the dangerous notion of mixing SSL and non-SSL content, even the part about caching is just plain wrong. Recent browsers will cache SSL resources to disk if you send appropriate cache-control headers (this was one of the huge issues fixed in FF3.0).
myImage.src = "http://www.blah.com/foo.png?username="+username+"&password="+password;
The user is under the impression they are secure, and their data is protected from prying eyes, but then the website has gone and given their username and password out over a non secure channel.
So it's not just js/css that could cause leakage/security issues, but any http request.
This is of course the fault of the website for being sloppy with the users private data, but I can see the argument that says users should be made aware that there is a possibility of sensitive data being "leaked".
The issue is: Who do you want to be the authority on what data is "boring generic/doesn't matter", and what data is "sensitive"... The website? or the user?
No encryption (or technology even) of any kind could protect against that kind of stupidity.
Yes it's an extreme example, but there are likely other examples where the data isn't quite so sensitive.
Seriously. You can't just interpolate variables into URLs without escaping :)
Caching issues aside, few people know that the protocol is actually optional and is inherited from the base url (just like the origin/server name portion is). So if your entire site can be served by HTTPS, you can still use relative paths anchored at different server names. On
https://www.example.com/something
the following relative paths will also be requested via HTTPS: /somethingelse
//www.example.com/media/styles.css
//media.example.com/images/buybutton.gif
Wildcard certs come in handy here. Then it's up to your app code to make absolute _individual_ links and/or redirect (with or without https) when you want a page to be requested securely. Building URLs for internal resources is much more straight forward.As for the referrer, let's just remember that if you're using a SSN as a primary key AND exposing that primary key in links, you've got more serious issues than "mixed content warning".
I actually sent a bug report one time to some search engine that they were building URLs wrong and not properly inheriting the protocol and they fixed it.
How do you deal with this issue?
You're also probably completely underestimating how common these attacks are - believe me, phishers use these attacks. They also use attacks many times more sophisticated. No attack is ever 1 in a million. If there is a loophole then a whole network of phishers will just on it very quickly.
The cost of this fraud is massive and it costs individuals and economies a lot of money.