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>First, Okta should get credit for publicly acknowledging the compromise.

"In early October 2023, Okta was notified of a breach resulting in hackers stealing HTTP access tokens from Okra's support platform by BeyondTrust. Okta CTO Charlotte Wylie denied the incident for a number of weeks, but later recognized that a breach had occurred"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Okta,_Inc.#cite_note-33

"Okta’s Wylie declined to answer questions about how long the intruder may have had access to the company’s case management account"

https://krebsonsecurity.com/2023/10/hackers-stole-access-tok...

"First, Okta should get credit for publicly acknowledging the compromise"

What????

They would reasonably face civil suits if they didn't.

I strongly suspect a lot of organizations cover up security incidents. Also, remember that the worst organizations don’t even know they were hacked.

If you cover up security incidents you are facing some actual jail time not just civic suits. Look at what happened with former uber ciso for example of this [0]

[0] - https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/former-chief-security-o...

I think this was likely a case of a TA getting in with legitimate creds that they obtained from an outside source. How can that be stopped? Happens every day. As someone said earlier - scrub your HAR files and don't leave sensitive data out there. I don't see that this was much of a compromise of a system in that the TA likely got in with legit creds. Where these creds came from is the bigger question.

> don't leave sensitive data out there

Where "out there" is Okta. You are basically saying: Don't leave sensitive data with Okta.

I get it, I think what is really the egregious part is that they had the power to stop this two weeks prior and instead sat on the disclosure, didn't deal with the security issue, and then their inaction forced their client to act. Luckily CF has resources to detect and deal with this. Most of us probably do not.

This contains a lot of assumptions. Think of this in another context. How many reports do you think HR gets about a breach of company policy? Tons. They have to investigate each one to determine if a policy was actually broken, if the reporter is telling the truth, and what the scope of impact the policy breach had. Meanwhile the offender can continue to keep breaking policy. Now imagine you are an HR Services company managing HR for thousands of companies....Point is it takes time to investigate and validate. Imagine the disruption if they took each report as true on face value.

I would also suggest that each of the companies that publicly posted have something to gain from doing so. We also don't know if they are telling the full story. Using the "we told okta on X date" as assuming that starts the clock on okta not disclosing a breach to the public is a pretty ridiculous take.

We still don't know the full circumstances of how this happened and Okta has not yet publicly commented on their side of this story. Presumably because the investigation is ongoing. But reading the details in the cloudfare post, access for the breach stopped on the 18th and okta told customers on the 19th. Is okta supposed to alert customers of every single report of a breach, every report that might have some credibility, etc...? Maybe there are process improvements to be made in the review process, but we have no visibility into the current level of effort they are making.

Meanwhile, other companies have had known issues for months/years (keyword is KNOWN) before disclosing. I don't want to be a victim of this more than anyone else, but I think we need to be more reasonable in our "hot takes" to these situations even if we are calling for continued improvement.

It’s actually legally required to publicly acknowledge a compromise. I was surprised by that too. It’s a nice constraint.

Only if material. Then an SEC filing would be made. Hasn't happened so far https://www.sec.gov/edgar/browse/?CIK=1660134&owner=exclude

> Third, no one knows how to build secure software or services.

That is not an argument one would want to hear from a company whose only reason for existence is being good at security.

It’s true. Look at the number of security bugs in Android, iOS, Windows, Linux, Oracle, DB2, SQL Server, PostGre, MySQL, Nginx, Apache, Cisco routers, Intel chips, AMD chips, etc.

The security bugs are not there because of incompetence or stupidity. They are there because security is really hard and it is even harder to get every software engineer to care about security.

If the best organizations in the industry make security mistakes, what makes you think the rest don’t either?

Reality is often unpleasant. It is better to acknowledge it than to pretend it does not exist.

Again, security is important for all of those products, but unlike all of them, Okta has exactly one job.

Perfect security is impossible, but better than 50% odds of never getting critically compromised are reasonable to expect.

If their security is not good enough, their value quickly becomes negative. Not only are they already a gigantic target and a single point of failure, but by being visibly bad at security they are standing in the spotlight with "hack me" on their back.

What kind of argument is this? Sometimes, there are serious bugs in widely used products. So therefore shit vendors should get a pass when their 10 year old Apache instance gets owned? Because "security is hard, mkay"? No! It depends on the compromise.

(If Okta was zero-dayed, IMO we'd have heard about it. Great way to shift blame.)

You can't say they all make mistakes and equate them. How frequent and severe are the incidents? How sophisticated does the attacker have to be to exploit these bugs? After reading all this I'm not inclined to consider Okta.