Or a code audit in Bitwarden has no bearing on vaultwarden?
Or a code audit in Bitwarden has no bearing on vaultwarden?
My Vaultwarden instance is "hidden" on a subdomain that probably nobody would ever guess (or scan for), so at least there is some added security by obscurity. If someone would know my credentials and master password, they probably won't find where to use them. In this case the reverse proxy in front of it also serves other content, just be hitting the IP nobody would ever know there is a Vaultwarden running on this server.
Edit: the subdomain is behind a wildcard DNS, so it's also not listed in the zone file. Although it will show in DNS logs of the ISP when I'm using it.
The bitwarden windows app and the browser extension are more or less just the web app inside a webview.
2. If they can figure out your domain name, they can check crt.sh for "mysecrectvaultwarden.domain.tld". If that only reveals wildcard certs and they're really interested in you or your company, they could try bruteforcing the DNS name.
3. If they breach the vaultwarden server and in case you're using the web UI, they can try to inject some JS to steal the credentials.
What I do to mitigate this: 1. Vaultwarden only reachable via VPN (e.g. wireguard on OpnSense) 2. Custom CA on all devices (e.g. step-ca with name constraints and local ACME [careful to put DHCP clients on a subdomain!]) 3. DNS for my LAN+VPN is not public. This massively reduces the external attack surface, compared to having a bunch of services available behind traefik.
A VPN would provide better security for sure. But also make it harder to use (VPN needed on all devices).
As for CT logs, this leak is avoided by using a wildcard certificate, which Let’s Encrypt supports.