https://heise.cloudimg.io/v7/_www-heise-de_/imgs/18/4/3/3/1/...
Once you've decided to send the actual password, whether wise or not, the best you can do is encrypt it, and TLS does that.
What else would you expect?
This is not at all comparable to other "store my passwords inside the cloud"-systems, where the passwords are encrypted and decrypted on the users' devices, without the encryption key going to the cloud provider - that's the way it's handled in Password Managers, Chrome Auto-Fill etc.
And I would expect Microsoft asking the user for explicit consent "May we take your IMAP password and transfer it and store it in our cloud?" in easy to understand wording so people understand the consequences (for example getting fired for having punched a gapping hole into your employers security policies like "Don't share this password with anyone")
That expectation would match the law in the EU.
And in addition, inside the EU it would also have to guarantee that the password will only be stored on servers inside the EU, and not end up, for example, with the NSA. And even then it still might not be legal.
And from a user's perspective: Certainly a big chunk of users that have been using email software for the last decades would assume that an email client installed on your PC is doing the IMAP access locally. There is no need for your IMAP credentials to go to Microsoft. Merging your local mail store from multiple sources inside the client is what email clients have been doing for the last 20 years. There is absolutely no need to move this to the cloud. Yes, my computer can handle merging email folders.
[1]: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/managed-hs...
But if they were to provide such a "service" I'd expect them to minimize exposure, including the steps I mentioned.
Still not a great solution but at least not passing the password around.
I would expect user credentials to not be uploaded without giving an extremely explicit explanation and receiving informed consent from the user.
This is actually standard security practice when you absolutely have to store a key in a way that you can use it later, such as a password or an API key.
Client certificates are supported by both Thunderbird and K9, would prevent this type of issues.
In the cloud first era, your value is derived from how much customer data is under your control. Not for resale primarily but for stickiness. It's like the dot com era, only for real this time.
How? Outlook could just ask you for your certificate (+ private key) and upload that.
But you haven't. Microsoft has decided that for you - without telling you.
The more I think about it - that's not even just a GDPR issue, it's blatant malware behavior.
I suppose they'd prefer it be not transferred at all, but if it were... to be bundled up safely [for storage] before exfiltration
I do understand the point that the article is making, but implying that TLS is equivalent to plaintext is just plain hyperbole. What else can Microsoft do (assuming they want to do this feature?). Encrypt it again on the client side, then put it in the TLS tunnel? It's just double encryption at that point. They need the password
FWIW the amount of users still using unencrypted IMAP is often pretty high in outlook or apple mail. Now that is a security issue. Try using a wifi packet analyzer at a large conference. I bet you'll see multiple or even dozens of plaintext IMAP passwords going thru the air.