Why would Sam let the board get so far out of his control?
The top org was a 501(c)3 and the directors were all effectively independent. The CEO of such an organisation would never have any control over the board, by design.
We've gotten very used to founders having controlling shareholdings and company boards basically being advisory rather than having a genuine fiduciary responsibility. Companies even go public with Potempkin boards. But this was never "normal" and does not represent good governance. Boards should represent the shareholders, who should be a broader group (especially post-IPO) than the founders.
The post asks how/why Sam ended up with a board full of directors so far out of alignment with his vision.
I think a big part of that is that the board was down several members, from 9 to 6. Perhaps the problem started with not replacing departing board members and this spiraled out of control as more board members left.
Here is a timeline of the board:
https://loeber.substack.com/p/a-timeline-of-the-openai-board
Even if we substitute "alignment" the problem is that the suggestion is still that Sam would have been "better protected" in some way. A 501(c)3 is just not supposed to function like that, and good corporate governance absolutely demands that the board be independent of the CEO and be aligned to the company goals not the CEO's goals.
CEOs and subordinate executives being on boards are not unusual, and no board (especially a small board) that the CEO (and/or subordinate executives) sits on is independent of the CEO.
But fundamentally, the CEO _reports to_ the board. That's the relationship. And in a 501(c)3 specifically, the board have a clear requirement to ensure the company is running in alignment with its stated charter.
Whether or not this board got that task right, I don't know, it doesn't seem likely (at least, in hindsight). But this type of board specifically is there for oversight of the CEO, that's precisely their role.