The tragedy of the canon; or, path dependence in the history of science (2021)
sciencedirect.com
sciencedirect.com
It could well be a useful concept, but even an amateur like me can see some obvious pitfalls. A canon among historians and philosophers of science can, and will, only be based on the paradigms of the day, paradigms that ultimately get thrown out the window in light of new developments in society (see Kuhn and others). So philosophy is, and should, primarily be critical of it's assumptions, not elevate them into canonical truths, with which to crush the critics.
We actually need to get away from the trend of reducing everything down to the "true/false" dichotomy currently so popular among media factcheckers and others, that draws inspiration from falsifiable physical science hypothesis. Statements, narratives and opinions are so much more.
With reservations stemming from not being able to read the whole paper - I'm not sure if the authors want to improve the "canon" as a useful concept, or ultimately want to disprove it.
The problem with this way of looking into things is it runs into the relativity of wrong fallacy, the shortest version of which is:
>When people thought the Earth was flat, they were wrong. When people thought the Earth was spherical, they were wrong. But if you think that thinking the Earth is spherical is just as wrong as thinking the Earth is flat, then your view is wronger than both of them put together.
And while it's popular to cite Kuhn just by name and move on, Kuhn himself would be the first to say his legacy was terribly misunderstood, and if I recall he analogized it to trying to hold on to the tail of an elephant that eventually escapes.
The trouble is taking Kuhn's contributions and not turning them into an unconditional global skepticism of any and all knowledge, and so conversations tend to go in circles negotiating those boundaries (and those are the good ones! The worst ones uncritically cite Kuhn as if the very invocation of his name singlehandedly dismantles any concept of objective knowledge). The best updated, comprehensive assessment of conceptual change I would say is Paul Thagard's Conceptual Revolutions, which is at pains to integrate Kuhn with a notion of explanatory coherence that takes theory change seriously as more than a mere relativity of wrong issue.
There is no doubt room for a nuanced discussion about Kuhn and paradigms here. I admittedly painted with a broad brush. But your objections doesn't seem to directly address the problem at hand: would you say that there is indeed a use for a "canon" in history and philosophy of science? and how would you in that case avoid the problem of paradigms that necessarily would tend to inform such a canon?
Regarding the notion of a canon, it's good to have a notion of history of conceptual change that identifies a series of major advances that we hold up as exhibiting our highest standards. I would say though that I completely agree with the premise advanced by this article that it would benefit from establishing some consistent norms. I can't see the full paper, but it seems to be building out a great theory on how this happens in philosophy of science, and I think the history of Kuhn and post-Kuhn philosophers of science have exhibited how messy and all-over-the-map it can be and how, perhaps culminating in its most extreme expression in Against Method. Which I think testifies to the need for building out the kind of norms that the paper is advocating.
Those are interesting topics in their own right, although neither are applicable to my position, if I may say so myself (even if I lean towards Asimov, if anything). We may or may not find occasion to discuss this and related stuff, some other time.