Hacker News Reader

Comment by hackinthebochs | Hacker News Reader

What's nonsensical about it? Determining that we can't rationally hold people responsible doesn't mean that society is powerless to defend itself against bad actors. What it does is undermines the justification for moral indignation and our retributive tendencies. If someone contracted a contagious illness, we would quarantine them despite the fact that they're not responsible for their illness. There's no contradiction in defensive behavior and recognizing a lack of moral responsibility.

View on HN

I am reminded of the phrase "The easiest way to prove a nihilist as a hypocrite is to point a shotgun at his head." You have reconstructed moral responsibility in no responsibility land, possibly only removing the judgement of character that comes with "defensive behavior".

Moral responsibility isn't the same as responsibility. Leprosy isn't a moral failing, although people still will discriminate against lepers.

Is discrimination against lepers a moral failing?

But the judgment of character is central to how our society conceptualizes its response to bad actors, and it informs the space of justifiable responses towards bad actors, that it matters whether the judgment of character is based on fact.

Moral responsibility as we currently conceive of it has been responsible for untold atrocities throughout human history. The problem is the concept has blanket justificatory power. People who are deemed to be moral degenerates by society become authorized targets of heinous behavior with a clear conscience of the perpetrators. Undermining the concept of moral responsibility breaks the connection between a bad actor and cruelty towards them. Taking a quarantine model limits the space of allowable behaviors; heinous reactions no longer have justification. So while the result can be similar in broad strokes between the two systems, the details can end up being very different.

Simply because something has been responsible for bad things does not make it worthy of doing away with motivated reasoning. Also, sometimes bad actors deserve cruelty.

>Also, sometimes bad actors deserve cruelty.

So you do recognize a substantive difference between a justice system based on the concept of moral responsibility and one without. But those of us that are against cruelty are motivated to look more closely at the justifications for it. Hence we get arguments like the one I presented.

A justice system without the concept of moral responsibility is one that has abolished itself. It is impossible for it to exist because justice is a concept that inherently requires morality to function. What you suggest is, again, a reconstruction of a justice system pretending it does not make moral judgement. "You were not in control of your actions, yet we have decided to lock you in a cell - for the greater good, of course".

the choice of a "quarantine model" vs cruelty is orthogonal to the question of free-will vs determinism. A cruel extermination model is just as rational of a response to bad actors with no choice.

The difference is not made by understanding of choice, but the values held by the one with power.

>A cruel extermination model is just as rational of a response to bad actors with no choice.

I don't think this can be supported. There is no contradiction in destroying an entity that gets in your way, but presumably there is more at stake when it comes to humans engaging with humans. We recognize that other humans, at least those in good standing in our social community, have interests that should not be interfered with without strong justification, enough to overcome their rights as members of the community. But given a lack of free will/moral responsibility, the interests of the bad actor cannot be completely disregarded. For example, their interest in their life isn't forfeited simply for being a nuisance.

>We recognize that other humans, at least those in good standing in our social community, have interests that should not be interfered with without strong justification, enough to overcome their rights as members of the community

This belief is the one that is impendent of free will. If you believe in minimizing suffering before refuting free will, you will believe it after. If you dont before, you wont after. The question is orthogonal.

The whole premise that free will is a justification for inflicting suffering seems like a strawman from Sapolsky.

I havent seen him or anyone else explain why the existence of free will provides rational support for inflicting suffering. Yet, people somehow claim that refuting free will refutes inflicting unnecessary suffering.

>The whole premise that free will is a justification for inflicting suffering seems like a strawman from Sapolsky.

It's definitely not something Sapolsky came up with. The connection between free will and moral responsibility has been a central focus of the debate about free will since philosophers took up the issue[1]. One then only needs to recognize the connection between moral responsibility, moral indignation, and cruelty towards bad actors to see the relationship go through. You can certainly question whether free will provides genuine rational support for cruelty, but it doesn't take much to notice that people have historically used free will as a rationalization for cruelty, whether legitimately or not.

I do agree that its unlikely any one person will be moved to change their behavior after accepting a lack of free will/moral responsibility. But we are in a much better position to construct society in a way that takes this knowledge into account, for example by greatly improving prison conditions, having a stronger focus on the conditions that give rise to criminal behavior, and so on.

[1] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/#FreeWillMoraRes...

I think I see where you are coming from, and where our differences lie. Putting the cards on the table, I basically agree that multiple future free-will doesnt exist, but dont agree with Sapolsky's conclusions or your optimism.

For one, I dont think there are impactful moral differences between what Sapolsky's determinism, and what is referred to in the OP as Actual-sequence free-will, So I dont think the rational case for compassion is any stronger.

Moreover, I am also a lot less optimistic that this puts society in a better position. I think it is a more dangerous and precarious position full of pitfalls. I think it likely provides less motivation for constructing a more compassionate society, and more for providing a less forgiving one, because our ability to actually change people is quite low. For example, it can bolster the argument for longer sentences or the death penalty, given the lack of rehabilitative capacity. e.g. we simply dont have much capacity to correct deep seated developmental and psychological errors.

From the social perspective, history is all full of determinism and causality being used as rationale for cruelty, ranging from eugenic extermination to Calvinist forsaken. Determinism also lies at the heart of racism and bigotry. It is a short steps from "this person cant help it" to "these people are the problem".

On an individual level, I also think the idea of determinism conflicts with views of self-agency and impact, and can be highly de-motivating.

I dont think it avoids the moral judgement, it just obfuscates it, or replaces it with a comparable concept.

You dont need free will to rationally have disgust, indignation, and retribution. You can rationally punish someone who contracted a contagious illness.

All you need for rationale is switching from the idea that someone makes bad choices to the idea that someone is a bad machine.

Would you "punish" your computer for crashing? Seems absurd. Presumably we don't want to engage in absurdities and irrational behavior. We want to do what is "right", for various conceptions of right. So getting clear on whether we have moral responsibility is important to getting things right.

Why do we punish anything?

I might punish my computer by replacing it because it crashes. I might punish it with a hammer after because it is cathartic. None of that relies on the computer having choice in the matter.

Free will is independent of moral responsibility. you can hold someone guilty of "being bad" just as easily as making "bad choices"

>None of that relies on the computer having choice in the matter.

Most normally functioning people would not feel the need to punish a tool for being a bad tool. Some may find catharsis in damaging some object that has frustrated them, but usually they later recognize the absurdity of their outburst. The point is that we all generally recognize that there are legitimate and illegitimate targets for "punishment". The question is whether people are actually legitimate targets for punishment despite our intuitions on the matter.

>you can hold someone guilty of "being bad" just as easily as making "bad choices"

Sure you can; nothing is going to stop you from smashing your PC to bits next time it crashes. The issue is whether it is the all things considered correct choice.

I think I make the point more clearly here [1], but the question of legitimate targets and if it is "correct" to damage my computer does not turn on it having on free will or not. There are questions of if it is satisfying. If it is a bad habit that could become maladaptive.

Nobody can seem to articulate how free will is central to the "legitimate target" question.

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38461744

Reply on news.ycombinator.com