This means that the user can't seamlessly transition between the old and new distribution methods without fully uninstalling the app and wiping the data contained theirin.
The enormous problem with that change is instead that indeed you're required to provide the keys to Google, which can thus replace your app with anything else (especially, something that a court orders them to use).
Anyway to switch to F-Droid you always had to reinstall the app, because they use their own signing keys (and indeed could be ordered to do the same thing as above, but it's less likely).
Although, I think there actually is a mechanism to switch signatures; but if I remember well it entails signing with the new signature a version signed with the old one, so it's complex.
>All the years before, F-Droid created a dedicated key for each app to sign the published APKs, but now with reproducible builds F-Droid ships APKs that are signed by the upstream developer
[0] https://f-droid.org/en/2023/09/03/reproducible-builds-signin...
By the way, these reproducible builds apps run a high risk of being signed with the same key that Google has
That's a great point. Someone should submit a request to add language to their docs[0] letting developers know about that if it doesn't exist already. I breifly looked through that page just now and didn't see it pointed out explicitly. There should also be a way to let users know.
Yeah I haven't followed much F-Droid lately, I wonder if they ever realized that...
I think that the project never settled on a specific security model, to be honest, and the current one is mostly the result of happenstance.
And I don't know what will happen to F-Droid now that some of the most important people left.
Wait no of course it's the opposite, specifically you sign the new certificate with the old key, if I understood it right (https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/apksigning...)
Hypothetically, Google might be compelled by a government to deploy a malicious update to an app for surveillance purposes. It might also be seen as anticompetitive, in the sense that Google is the only entity which can manage its own keys for new apps, making new non-Google apps inherently less secure.
The Play Store has system signature, so it could already do that. The mitigation is on the user's side to disable the Play Store, which is where it has always been.
> It might also be seen as anticompetitive, in the sense that Google is the only entity which can manage its own keys
Only if they distribute through the Play Store. The whole point of the recent lawsuit is to make it easier for anybody else to distribute apps under their own control.
So you can reach even people without the Play Store and with degoogled systems, unless they only use apps from other sources.
That's both a serious problem for not so few people, and a very useful attack avenue for law enforcement.
How would Google install the apps on the devices without the Play Store? Even if it somehow tricked the user into installing the app, it would require the user to approve any additional permissions that the subverted app requests.
It's the app updates that become an easy attack avenue if Google has their signing keys.
It's actually always been possible for Google to replace the initial installation packages (and if did, then also their future updates).
For this initial installation it might be a little easier for the user to verify that he has an untampered package. But most of all, in most cases, someone becomes the object of an investigation at a moment when he already has an app you'd like to subvert installed.
Anyhow, when Google wasn't provided the keys, if you initially received the real package, all successive updates were guaranteed to come from the developer (unless the developer itself got compromised).
For many apps it's already extremely interesting for law enforcement to provide a slightly modified version, with not even a need for additional permissions: for all E2EE apps, for example, it might well be that all you want is to exfiltrate their encryption keys.
By the way, at least if the Play Store is installed, Google is able to install updates surreptitiously:
"If it is determined, however, that the Update will fix a critical security vulnerability or critical operability issue related to the Content, or will prevent abuse, the Update may be completed irrespective of your Update settings in Google Play or your Device."