The government buys technology from wherever, and until recently they never really cared where they got it from. If they need a USB Emulator, they buy the same Chinese Gotek from Ebay that you or I buy, and they get the same "Driver CD" full of buggy, broken English software, written by one person for $27 over the course of about 7 hours. Same thing with DVR systems, access controls, network appliances, access points. I've worked on government projects that were using 20 year old, broken, encryption libraries on active web servers. And when brought to their attention the people who use it don't care, and the people who are capable of doing something about it will never find out because it's too much work to replace and nobody wants to take that Zoom call.
I think the author is getting a little over-excited about Rust. Granted, they are a Rust developer. I'd love it if we could build everything in my favorite language. But the government doesn't want to replace everything with Rust. The government wants results. Period. It is the DOD, NSA, and CISA who need to become experts on how to realize those results. And they will probably release guidance that says "if you can't program securely in a memory unsafe language, don't use a memory unsafe language". The thing I think the author is missing is that nobody is going to mistaken "Made with RUST!" for "Impossible to cause undefined behavior!"
You can be a terrible programmer and still create undefined behavior, insecure code, data leaks, or any number of other problems in a memory safe language.
What the government is going to do is implement strict code import controls, similar to the export controls we already have. Purchasing departments will have to get software purchases signed off multiple times by qualified parties, and department leaders will have to prove that the technology they procure is adequately safe. In some situations I anticipate that means re-writing a bunch of code in Rust, and in other situations I'm sure that means hardening existing C. The majority of the government's security holes that need to be patched are coming from low quality unvetted imported technology, low quality self-written code, and code that should have been replaced 20 years ago. While it's exciting to think that this could mean a renaissance for the author's technology of choice, I just don't see it working out that way. If the government could write memory safe code, it would have. Rust isn't safe ENOUGH to save the government from itself alone.