Does it still count as an "oopsie vulnerability" if Apple has publicly documented this behavior for years in their documentation?
https://support.apple.com/guide/security/airdrop-security-se...
> Apple did not deny helping the attacker TMK.
I can imagine many non-malicious alternative explanations for Apple not commenting on that particular vulnerability. For example, doing that here opens the door to a future in which every non-denial is seen as implicit admission of collaboration.
It's also possible that Apple themselves was compromised: It's a large company, and other types of leaks do happen.
I'd focus much more on the things Apple very publicly does not do, such as in this case not using private set intersection for AirDrop.
The best vulnerability is the one you don't even have to defend, because it's just the absence of a more secure (but also more complicated) alternative. There are countless historical examples of that: Unencrypted instant messaging, non-end-to-end encrypted cloud storage etc.