Boeing management should read this so they can maybe understand the nature of their quality problems is systemic and not the result of a few little oopses.
They so desperately needed it to remain a 737 so it wouldn’t be a new type and therefore wouldn’t need a new type rating was mostly because the airlines demanded a better 737.
Yes, Boeing is at fault for the MCAS disaster (no redundancies, holy fucking hell), but in reality it was the entire industry.
My point is, had nothing changed, it would have happened anyway, and perhaps with Airbus and not Boeing.
The one big oopsie is “we want a better plane and we also don’t want to retrain our pilots”, which is an oopsie that absolutely was not Boeing’s fault.
Do you have further reading on this? First time I’ve seen someone suggest that Airbus has similar structural issues to Boeing when it comes to safety
I suggested that had nothing changed, it might have been Airbus that was low-key blackmailed into making a new plane that’s of the same type, with similar issues that would become evident only after a couple of crashes.
The very root cause of the issue was that Boeing was simply allowed to say “trust me bro, this is just a 737, it’s like any other 737, no retraining of any kind needed”, when, in fact, it wasn’t just the same old 737. Now this can’t happen anymore.
Of course it is. Customers always ask for the impossible. Responsible firms say no to unreasonable requests.
That would have meant the MAX engines could have sat more like on the legacy 737. Which perhaps would have been a lesser change to the system overall than the changes made on the MAX? (larger engines, different engine placement, systems to counter the behavior coming from the new engine placement and so on and so forth). I'm not sure what the solution would be here, but it seems like any time a set of regulations is rigid-yet-full-of-holes it's almost better if it isn't so rigid.