Do you not notice that your inference is less accurate using this line of reasoning? Does that not suggest that it's simply wrong?
Do you not notice that your inference is less accurate using this line of reasoning? Does that not suggest that it's simply wrong?
They would not have different distributions of results on their first die roll.
They would have different distributions of results on their reported die roll.
If I am looking at their first die roll, the fact that they would have different reported die rolls doesn't matter!
Say you have a lazy researcher. They flip a coin, and if it comes up heads, they do the experiment. If it comes up tails, they just write down a random number.
If you _only get access_ to the final number, then you should discount what they wrote down – it’s 50% likely to be fake.
If you do 1,000,000 simulations of this, it’s useless 50% of the time.
But if you know the result of the coin flip, it doesn’t matter whether they would have generated a nonsense number in a different timeline, or that they’re not reliably accurate. _You know_ they’re reliably accurate in _this case_, so you can trust their data.
However, one could just move the argument up a level and manufacture a case of different intentions leading to the same distributions and then ask the same question.
The questions is whether we should draw different conclusions when the results are the same. I don’t think that anyone has any issues with drawing different conclusions when the results are different!