Price fixing by algorithm is still price fixing
ftc.gov
ftc.gov
"To arrive at a recommended rent, the software deploys an algorithm — a set of mathematical rules — to analyze a trove of data RealPage gathers from clients, including private information on what nearby competitors charge.
For tenants, the system upends the practice of negotiating with apartment building staff. RealPage discourages bargaining with renters and has even recommended that landlords in some cases accept a lower occupancy rate in order to raise rents and make more money.
One of the algorithm’s developers told ProPublica that leasing agents had “too much empathy” compared to computer generated pricing."
I would assume this is not illegal because it's using public information and not colluding with any competitors on price.
But subscribing to a service that uses an algorithm that does basically the same thing is (might be) illegal? Does it cross the line when I explicitly agree with competitors that we'll all use the same algorithm? Or if we're all just independently using the popular pricing service could that become illegal? Or if the service agreement requires me to not rent for less than their algorithm calculates?
I think there has to be some intentional and provable link that you and I agreed (colluded) to use a particular value and set a floor below which we wouldn't sell.
That book doesn't price individual cars, only types and the price of the actual car is open to interpretation and usually negotiation.
It has to be that there's some threat of punishment from the cartel against those who would lower their price from the agreed one. For example, the explicit agreement by the landlord to keep the price at the algorithmicaly calculated one, even so far as to leave vacancy (where as there wouldn't have been a vacancy if the price was lowered).
> RealPage discourages bargaining with renters and has even recommended that landlords in some cases accept a lower occupancy rate in order to raise rents and make more money.
This is the key to why it's price fixing. Everyone playing ball and means that the raising rent rates increases everyone's take home even if a few operate with lower occupancy.
The software calculates rent rates that make sure occupancy isn't too low to keep everyone in line. It removes bargaining with the promise that "if you play ball, you'll be rich".
Tenants can negotiate prices just like you can theoretically haggle with amazon.
Of course they would discourage them from deviating from Realpage's recommendation. Why are you paying for a software that recommends the most profitable rent if you aren't going to follow it? Realpage doesn't want property managers to complain that the software isn't working when they're ignoring the software's recommendations.
I have yet to see any evidence that there are any actual consequences of ignoring the recommendations. I'm assuming that Realpage will always accept payment for their services. This suggests that price fixing is unlikely. In the case of a cartel, members are incentivized to sell more than their quota allows, and you need active enforcement to maintain compliance. See the history of OPEC.
It's the same thing as if I were to call for a meeting of all landlords in my area to discuss rents. Anyone who owns property in the area is invited. At the meeting, I would propose that we all keep rents above 1000$ per room. People would argue and finally there'd be some broad agreement that 900-1100$ dollars per room is a better idea. We don't sign anything and don't imply any repercussions for those who ignore it. Then, 90% of those present would undercut the agreed numbers and offer their rooms for 800$. The end result is that rooms in the area go for 750-900$, so we utterly failed.
What everyone present at that meeting did, even those who undercut the agreed prices, is illegal price fixing. Competitors are simply not allowed to discuss and agree on prices in any way.
If we replace the meeting with a third party offering a recommendation algorithm that everyone independently follows, knowing that others do the same, nothing materially changes. The algorithm need not be binding, and need not be adopted fully, for this to be illegal to do.
Monopolies can extract massive wealth from a market, they perfectly optimize profit as long as they are not exceedingly incompetent. Price fixing is just a less organized monopoly.
The problem is that they do this at the cost of all other market participants. But markets can't correct for powerful enough monopolies or cartels. Only outside intervention (riots, government intervention, disruption of the whole sector) can dissolve a monopoly. There is no example in history of a monopoly losing its position in a market without this, since they can always just buy out incumbent competitors.
Price fixing in the market doesnt work, because rival landlords cant call the government to airstrike their competitors when they get undercut.
And again, we don't have to guess. Cartels need to be broken up from the outside, they just don't dissolve naturally. This is basic economics, and a well understood weakness of markets. The idea that monopolies and cartels are too weak to resist in a market is not born out by either economic theory nor history.
These two are completely contradictory statements. "Regular market actors" are the same as "defectors." Fracking companies, for example would not be able to exist without OPEC driving up the price of oil because it would be too expensive.
iraq invasion has nothing to do with opec. And no opec country has made military moves to enforce the cartel.
And in fact, a lot of opec countries tries to skirt the quotas for personal gain!
If RealPage had the effect that all advertised rents in some area were 1000$ but 90% of renters actually negotiated that down to 800$, it would still be price fixing.
Conversely, if landlords in some area all independently decide not to budge from advertised prices and as a result occupancy rates are 10%, that would not be illegal price fixing. Most markets for consumers don't allow any kind of price negotiation, and yet they are not guilty of price fixing.
The key problem is that RealPage facilitates and even encourages explicit collusion between competitors, by showing the same non-public price recommendations to competing lamdlords. Whether that's successful or not and whether they try to make it contractually binding or not is ultimately irrelevant. As the FTC says, unsuccessfully trying to do price fixing is still illegal price fixing.
The software isn't really doing anything. It's simply the means of communication by which the prices are fixed amongst the suppliers.
The software literally includes the algorithm that says "this week, you will set the rate for this apartment at $X" based on its data. And if you want to deviate from that, without being kicked off, and losing your substantial fee payment, you will do that rate (and they will check), or you can "request an override" from RealPage, that they may allow or deny at their discretion (and RP agents are formally trained that override approvals may not exceed 5% of requests).
It also implies that all of the landlords using it are idiots. Not only is price fixing illegal, joining the cartel is optional and costs you money for no personal advantage because you'd have to leave your units vacant instead of immediately renting them out at the higher price induced by the "selfless" idiots in the cartel.
This really is collusion as a service.
If everything here is true [price fixing] but the number of units is small 20%, it still won't work. Consumers will go to the 80% where the actual market lives.
Now maybe someone better at economics can tell me how many units does it take to shift the market? 50%?
So naturally there's a market for a product that helps landlords make data-driven pricing decisions. I'm sure the big landlords know exactly what they're doing, but I suspect that the smaller landlords don't even realize they are participating in a price-fixing cartel.
As an interesting point of comparison, consider that the Zillow "zestimate" is also an algorithmic price recommendation, shared by all market participants. What's the difference there? Is it that buyers and sellers can both use the same algorithm freely?
I want to make very clear that I think price-fixing is bad and that I believe extremely high real estate prices are at the root of a large and growing amount of misery in Western economies and societies. But I'm also cautious of pursuing thoughtless regulation that hurts small businesses, to the advantage of the big businesses that are causing all the problems in the first place.
Why not? It's what they did just fine for thousands of years. What fundamentally changed in the last 20 years that makes it impossible for landlords to determine their own price?
Yes indeed setting prices is difficult. If you use a service to do it for you, it should be quite illegal, and arguably already is.
Also the “big” businesses clearly outsource this too, having lived in many large apartment complexes where it was obvious a third party algorithm was doing it.
The only way this could work is if you give individualized pricing recommendations based solely on public information + the information of the specific landlord, and if your marketing and contractual agreements and so on make it very clear that different landlords will see completely unrelated prices.
Otherwise, even agreeing on the same pricing formula is an illegal form of price fixing (say, if everyone agrees to sell at public average price + 10%, dropping down to public average price + 5% if unoccupied for one month), per the FTC briefs.
And it’s not reasonable for every business to succeed. Good businesses get good at being a business and learn skills necessary to succeed. I had a corporate landlord where the leasing agents would go on tours of neighboring buildings in their spare time to build comps. You don’t need a price fixing algorithm or a pay-rolled data analyst.
I think Americans have a soft spot for landlords because it’s a common business for the middle class to use to move up in the world. Which is nice, but most Americans also have stories of parasitic landlords that left them in terribly unmaintained homes with big rent increases. Regulation will absolutely hurt middle-class landlords but will increase the average sophistication of the industry.
Would it be illegal to hire a human "price consultant" who was very popular among your landlord friends? Does it matter if the price consultant only serves 5% of the landlords in an area? What if they serve 20%? 50%? Where does the line get drawn between "seeking advice from an expert" and "engaging in price-fixing"?
I wouldn't be surprised if that was tried at some point in the past, so there might already be legal precedent for the non-algorithmic variant of this.
> Regulation will absolutely hurt middle-class landlords but will increase the average sophistication of the industry.
Sophistication is a tool used deliberately and maliciously by large incumbents to suppress competition and to crush smaller firms. And I'm not convinced that middle-class landlords who own a handful of units are the big bad guy we should be going after here. I can only hope that the FTC agrees and is willing to focus their attention to where it will actually help people.
The answer is most likely that it would be illegal, yes, at least if your friends are offering properties in the same area. Even discussing pricing decisions with your friends is likely illegal.
Imagine it like this: Coca Cola and Pepsi executives are not going to meet for brunch and casually start discussing what margins they think are reasonable and how they set pricing in different markets and how low they are willing to go with their price. These are some of the most closely guarded secrets of a company. Decision makers who are aware of these aren't even easily allowed to leave one company and join the other, because of the risks of leaking this information. And if they do discuss this things, they would easily be seen as guilty of collusion to fix prices.
The fact that two landlords who happen to be friends are not the CEOs of multi-billion dollar companies doesn't fundamentally change the law. You are not allowed to discuss pricing decisions with your competitors. If you want to collobrate, you need to incorporate and pool your resources into a common enterprise.
And you can hire a price consultant, but that price consultant can't be working for other landlords in the same area. You could hire different consultants from the same firm, but the firm would have to be very careful to ensure that the consultants don't discuss their clients with each other in any way.
This seems like a weird argument.
For some companies their pricing is super secret because it's often negotiated and they don't want Customer A to know that Customer B is getting a bigger discount, and if a competitor knew Customer A was overpaying they'd send them an offer.
But for others the price is just the price. Nobody is going to Walmart to haggle. All of Walmart's competitors know exactly what Walmart's customers are paying because it's written right there on the sign. So how could it be illegal to tell them?
And this information is important, because if Whole Foods knew it, they could either (a) try to undercut Walmart to steal their customers, but also could (b) safely increase their price knowing that Walmart plans to do the same, and so not fear losing tomato customers to Walmart.
In contrast, landlords working with RealPage know that at least a large percentage of other landlords follow the exact same pricing strategy, and thus be secure that, if they also refuse to lower prices as the algorithm is recommending, they won't lose tenants to other landlords. Of course, some of them might chose option (a), undercutting all the others, but that's not a real problem in a cartel with so many small members (one cheating member won't significantly affect prices).
So, it's not illegal to say "you know, Walmart charges 2$ for a tomato". But it is illegal to say "you know, I'm in talks with Walmart to convince them to charge 2.5$ per tomato starting tomorrow".
This is often not that much of a secret either. In many cases it's as simple as: Look at what competitors are charging, set your price the same or slightly lower, and if that price isn't profitable then don't carry it.
Which is why concentrated markets are basically as bad as a monopoly. If all you have is Walmart and Whole Foods then Walmart can raise prices, Whole Foods sees this and raises theirs too, and then they both leave it there because that's better for both of them than the lower price. Doubling their margins is more profitable than increasing their market share from 50% to 75%. Tripling their sales isn't on the table because they each started with 50% and you can't have 150% of the market.
Whereas if there are a hundred stores, even if 80 of them try to match Walmart's price increase, 20 of them notice that they now can triple their sales or more by keeping the lower price, and that's more profitable than doubling their margins. At which point others get tired of losing most of their sales and lower their prices again.
And the latter is the kind of market Walmart actually operates in, which is why their marketing slogan is "low prices" and not "it's for your own good".
> Of course, some of them might chose option (a), undercutting all the others, but that's not a real problem in a cartel with so many small members (one cheating member won't significantly affect prices).
That's exactly when it's a problem, because they all have the same incentive: Let the members of the cartel increase the market price by withholding their units, while renting out all of yours. And then it's not just one landlord doing it because the only ones not doing it are "selfless" idiots who could be making more money by defecting against the cartel.
Any individual can go out there and build a model for the rent price, the issue comes in when that model is able to coordinate everyone to keep the prices high and discourage competition/undercutting.
Showing that the average rent is this, the min and max are that, and the percentiles look like this is probably legal. Showing historical trends is also legal. Recommending a certain rent based on a single shared algorithm used by all the players begins to cross that line.
Colluding with other sellers to fix prices is illegal. That is the issue here.
Is it based on intent (you literally are training your model to be cooperative), or is it based on effect (your company is having this effect regardless of their intent -- e.g. Zillow might also be offending). Both of these will be hard to show in practice.
At least where I live, there are landlords who operate reasonably (reasonable rents, with safe and maintained properties, that respond quickly to issues), but there's so much demand relative to supply that it doesn't really affect the ones who are just trying to extract maximum profit.
Should have been obvious...
As long as there are financial speculators, price bubbles will happen. A massive recession can clear out speculators and burst price bubbles, whom will have in the meantime, fleeced the public for billions, as will as made many be homeless.
In commodities markets, the CFTC has different rules about what speculators can do vs real market participants (real producers and consumers). There are very few rules/laws that disincentivize real estate speculation and many forces that incentivize it. These algorithms are additional tools that help speculators maximize profit.
Housing has very limited supply and very inelastic demand. Prices will not come down unless there is another 2008 style recession. Speculators will continue to pile in and fleece renters maximally.
You might say well that’s just business, but the algorithmic price collusion is really not my biggest issue. I think there’s a different moral question we should ask. What is the number of single family properties a single company should own in a given market. Should they be allowed to own 100%? My silly libertarian friend would say why not? The market will correct. A stronger thinker would probably see that a legal limit probably makes sense.
If you want to know where bubbles came from, you should have just asked, its called monetary policy and is set by the federal reserve; sure, there was the great tulip mania of - no one gives a fuck it was a short lived commodity bubble that would look miniscule accounting for any amount of inflation you are willing to admit; today, the "bubble" is called debt, the purchasing power of your dollar must decrease, because the very existence of dollars necessarily implies there is a corresponding debt with interest, it turns out to that a pretty significant amount of the money being printed is being injected intravenously into the housing sector unlike the median wage, and you guys are always mystified that housing costs so much money, incentives matter.
If you want to regard this in a moral context, name your world religion and I will agree this second to obey their economic practices. There are many immoral philosphical ideas regarding economics that many regard as moral; religion is no exception, but I find that conceptually grounded in principles that have worked for thousands of years to keep people ethically bound despite ethnic differences and geographical seperation. There is far less to fear from islamic lending practices than whatever people "feel is right" in the heat of the moment.
Individually, without speaking, every landlord decides that it's in their best interest to charge the highest (per square foot) price that a nearby property is charging. They also all individually understand that if they leave units vacant instead of undercutting eachother, the market impact in favor of their interests will be sufficiently positive to justify the lost immediate revenue, and they trust (blindly) that no landlords will defect from this prisoner's dilemma. There's no communication at all; they all just understand game theory and have blind trust in their fellow landlords.
This would have the exact same material impact on renters. The only difference is that it's slightly harder to pull off. Is it illegal, and should it be illegal?
All it takes is one landlord to have a slightly different concern to change their strategy. They need money fast, so they drop the price to get a tenant, boom competition.
This algorithm, unlike a single person, ends up taking over entire cities, which means now there is no supply & demand. There is supply, and all that supply is effectively the same number.
Demand has no other choice other than meet the supply where they are. It's either that or being without a house.
Then each vendor’s customers may constitute a small price fixing conspiracy, which is still illegal (price fixing doesn’t have a market threshold before it is illegal) but also a lot less effective, so it probably would be a transitory condition even if it didn’t get punished.
2. I'm not going to deviate from what it tells me.
3. I know everyone else (who matters) is using this service in the same way.
And the collusion doesn't stop with this information hoarding; the pricing recommendations are as profitable as they are precisely because many property owners in a market are enacting them with the knowledge that a known quantity of their peers have no intent to undercut. Sure, someone can renege on that, but collusion doesn't require that you have an airtight legal contract to bind all parties; after all, such contracts are inherently illegal!
can you recommend a link that this describes this in detail?
Contains links to an investigation and lawsuits where you can read DOJ complaints
https://www.propublica.org/article/yieldstar-rent-increase-r...
All I see is this: "A company representative said in an email that RealPage “uses aggregated market data from a variety of sources in a legally compliant manner.”"
The only non-public data are it's own customers. But if I'm a massive landlord with multiple units, I have the same advantage?
The entire point is that monopolization confers the same advantage that this scheme does.
Another illegal option is collusion. That is a group of competitors get together and set a price that they will all use, again independent of actual Market value, just because the colluders have sufficient control of a market that when they set a price people have no choice but to pay it. This is super effective when the market it not fundamentally “free” like housing, gas, power, healthcare, etc.
What these companies are doing is providing a tool to launder the collusion between competitors in a market, by having every “competitor” in the market get an “algorithmic” price that is fundamentally tied to the “algorithmic” price they provide every other “competitor”.
If these landlords got together in a room and decided the prices as is happening here, it would be more or less immediately subjected to scrutiny. By doing the same thing via a third party and calling it an “algorithm” it is somehow not subject to the same restrictions.
Because it certainly works over decades-term.
Standard still had 70% market share when it was charged, and 64% by the time it was broken up.
Over the ~40 years it existed, it was incredibly profitable.
Apple has, what, 20% smartphone market share?
And look at the margins they're able to run. Granted, boosted by platform lock-in.
I offer that if you get to fix prices for a good chunk of 40 years, and then still end up with 64% market share... it does work.
In the sense that your company will have made obscene amounts of money, by price fixing, while the above played out.
If your rebuttal is that in the end they lost market share, true. But they made enough money before that happened that it's still a win.
If you're interested in the subject, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power by Daniel Yergin is a fascinating read.
How do I square that with the lesson that I learned from the Bible? While price fixing is not mentioned in it it is pretty clear that it says that price fixing works
"While you may put whatever prices you wish on the goods and services you provide, those prices will become economic realities only if others are willing to pay them, and that depends not on whatever prices you have chosen, but on how much consumers want what you offer, and on what other producers charge for the same goods and services."
So, maybe the 6th edition could be better equipped for ctrl+f economists, with all the communist propaganda words indexed to subsections.
I’m not really sure why you would impugn my mind for economics but perhaps since “read a book” qualifies as an argument, I might recommend that you try out The Living Bible? It is written in a plain English for those that may struggle with the vocabulary of the King James Version. There is no shame in not being able to get the clear and obvious message here, but thankfully the Good Book has versions for every level of reader :)
I look forward to hearing your thoughts after reading it!
Yeah you're gonna need some pretty strong support to make a claim like that - and not just an anecdote from the internet. Do you have any new proof upending long solidified economics?
> One advantage RealPage’s data warehouse had was its access to actual lease transactions — giving it the true rents paid, instead of simply those a landlord advertised, RealPage said.
The above quote is the most substantive description of info sharing I could find in the section "Who Uses the Software and How It Work" in the article you linked. Is the claim that the secretive info being shared is the actual rents tenants are paying? Are companies and people not normally allowed to share that?
Companies and people generally do not share this information publicly and most companies consider it extremely proprietary.
So yes, that what's these lawsuits are about. All these companies share this extremely sensitive data (Vacancy data, actual rent and length of rental contract) with RealPage, Realpage algorithms use it to price rent.
(1) That sellers are exchanging pricing information among each other without also revealing that info to buyers.
(2) That the shared pricing information is unusually comprehensive.
(3) That sellers are tacitly coordinating through the algorithmically suggested prices.
As far as I can tell, the legal issue is #3, you are (I think) suggesting the important feature is #2, and my tentative opinion is that #1 is probably the most influential in distorting the market to shift surplus from buyers to sellers.
And no, these are not routinely shared publicly. Landlords are allowed to open their books, but for-profit businesses generally do not do so without specific incentive, because it is more profitable to keep trade secrets. Even if they wanted to, how would they do so? I'm not aware of a nonprofit data hub for them to dump all of this for public consumption (and if I don't know, I'm confident random slumlords in Cincinnati also don't). Maybe RealPage can make a free and open one if they are so committed to just making good honest tools for well-informed market participants.
The publicly scrapable data is: advertisements to prospective new tenants for the buildings who have tenants that recently announced their intent to move (or were evicted). They frequently won't even have specific unit numbers attached to them. They only have to be accurate enough to solicit inquiries and not get the landlord sued, an extremely low bar, especially in a hot market (where RealPage reaps its profits). The data availability is night and day.
Armas v RealPage (ND California)
https://ia801506.us.archive.org/35/items/gov.uscourts.cand.4...
Boelens v RealPage (WD Washington)
https://ia801504.us.archive.org/27/items/gov.uscourts.wawd.3...
Cherry v RealPage (WD Washington)
https://ia601403.us.archive.org/33/items/gov.uscourts.wawd.3...
Corradino v RealPage (SD Florida)
https://ia804709.us.archive.org/0/items/gov.uscourts.flsd.62...
Haynes v RealPage (ND Georgia)
https://ia801203.us.archive.org/14/items/gov.uscourts.gand.3...
Kramer v RealPage (DC)
https://ia904705.us.archive.org/0/items/gov.uscourts.dcd.250...
Lazarte v RealPage (ND California)
https://ia804701.us.archive.org/20/items/gov.uscourts.cand.4...
Marchetti v RealPage (SD Florida)
https://ia801602.us.archive.org/27/items/gov.uscourts.flsd.6...
Morgan v RealPage (WD Washington)
https://ia804709.us.archive.org/25/items/gov.uscourts.wawd.3...
Navarro v RealPage (WD Washington)
https://ia601407.us.archive.org/5/items/gov.uscourts.wawd.31...
Parker v RealPage (SD Florida)
https://ia804709.us.archive.org/15/items/gov.uscourts.flsd.6...
Schmidig v RealPage (ED California)
https://ia601603.us.archive.org/30/items/gov.uscourts.caed.4...
Silverman v RealPage (SD New York)
https://ia601506.us.archive.org/19/items/gov.uscourts.nysd.5...
White v RealPage (Massachusetts)
https://ia601603.us.archive.org/30/items/gov.uscourts.caed.4...
Duffy v Yardi Systems (WD Washington)
https://ia800508.us.archive.org/30/items/gov.uscourts.wawd.3...
Chirino v Yardi Systems (ED Virginia)
https://ia801307.us.archive.org/3/items/gov.uscourts.vaed.54...
White v RealPage (Massachusetts)
https://ia801500.us.archive.org/14/items/gov.uscourts.mad.25...
According to the complaints, it is more than only the rents paid.
Note that "secret" is not the adjective used to describe the data/info being exchanged bwteeen the defendants. The term used is "non-public".
To bring suit against RealPage, precise descriptions of the non-public data/info are not necessary. Examples of this data/info may be found later, during discovery. As such, the initial complaints do not contain specific examples of data/info, only general desciptions. Below are some excerpts showing how the data/info is described generally.
Cherry v RealPage (WD Washington)
4. ... rents charged for each unit and each floor plan, lease terms, amenities, move-in and move-out dates.
4. ... the rents recorded in signed new leases ...
Lai-Cheong v RealPage (ED Virginia)
3. ... real time lease transaction data, including prospect, renter, and property data ...
3. ... non-public information about pricing (including unpublished starting rents and renewal rent increases), inventory, occupancy rates, length of leases, units and unit types that are or will be coming available to rent, and other confidential information about each of the apartments they manage.
45. ... real time lease transaction data, including prospect, renter, and property data ...
46. ... non-public competitively sensitive information ... including about pricing (featuring unpublished starting rents and renewal rent increases), inventory, occupancy rates, length of lease, units and unit types that are or will be coming available to rent, and other confidential information about each of the apartments they manage.
Sillverman v RealPage (SD New York)
65. ... specific, non-public pricing information on important factors such as concessions that are given at the time of lease that are individually negotiated and not otherwise publicly available.
Schmidig v RealPage (ED California)
46. ... detailed real-time non-public information on a daily basis about pricing (including unpublished starting rents and renewal rent increases), inventory, occupancy rates, length of lease, units and unit types that are or will be coming available to rent, and other confidential information about each of the apartments they manage.
Duffy v Yardi Systems (WD Washgington)
123. ... detailed, competitively sensitive, and non-public information about current supply, production, and pricing plans regarding leasing.
Haynes v RealPage (ND Georgia)
5. ... nonpublic proprietary data, including their lease transactions, rent prices, and occupancy and inventory levels.
94. ... detailed, real-time, and non-public information concerning pricing, inventory, occupancy rates, as well as their units and unit types available, or that will soon be available for rent.
White v RealPage (Massachusetts)
3. ... non-public data from its client property managers regarding lease transactions, rent prices, occupancy levels, and virtually every other possible data point that drives rent.
47. ... nonpublic lease transaction data ...
Boelens v RealPage (WD Washington)
3. ... non-public data from its client property managers regarding lease transactions, rent prices, occupancy levels, and virtually every other possible data point that drives rent.
47. Figure 1, below, is a diagram from an eBook published by Defendant RealPage on its website.32 It demonstrates how RealPage aggregates the data (including nonpublic lease transaction data) which enables RealPage to coordinate pricing among its clients.
Armas v RealPage (ND California)
2. ... non-public data from its client property managers regarding lease transactions, rent prices, occupancy levels, and virtually every other possible data point relevant to rent prices.
55. ... nonpublic lease transaction data ...
Marchetti v RealPage (SD Florida)
45. ... detailed real-time non-public information on a daily basis about pricing (including unpublished starting rents and renewal rent increases), inventory, occupancy rates, length of lease, units and unit types that are or will be coming available to rent, and other confidential information about each of the apartments they manage.
Corradino v RealPage (SD Florida)
3. ... non-public data from its client property managers regarding lease transactions, rent prices, occupancy levels, and virtually every other possible data point that drives rent.
53. ... nonpublic lease transaction data ...
Parker v RealPage (SD Florida)
3. ... non-public data from its client property managers regarding lease transactions, rent prices, occupancy levels, and virtually every other possible data point that drives rent.
54. ... nonpublic lease transaction data ...
Kramer v RealPage (District of Columbia)
3. ... non-public data from its client property managers regarding lease transactions, rent prices, occupancy levels, and virtually every other possible data point that drives rent.
48. ... nonpublic lease transaction data ...
Kramer v RealPage (DC) actually has: REALPAGE, INC.; ALLIED ORION GROUP, LLC; AVALONBAY COMMUNITIES, INC.; AVENUE5 RESIDENTIAL, LLC; BELL PARTNERS, INC.; BOZZUTO MANAGEMENT COMPANY; CAMDEN PROPERTY TRUST; CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, INC.; EQUITY RESIDENTIAL; GREYSTAR REAL ESTATE PARTNERS, LLC; HIGHMARK RESIDENTIAL, LLC; and UDR, INC.
Thank you for the links though, they're very informative of what's actually moving through the court system.
Allied Orion Group
AvalonBay Communities, Inc.
Avenue5 Residential, LLC
BH Management Services, LLC
Bozzuto Management Company
CA Ventures Global Services, LLC
Camden Property Trust
Campus Advantage, Inc.
Cardinal Group Holdings LLC
ConAm Management Corporation
Cortland Partners LLC
Cushman & Wakefield, Inc.
Pinnacle Property Management Services
D.P. Preiss Company, Inc.
Equity Residential
Essex Property Trust, Inc.
Essex Management Corporation
FPI Management, Inc.
Greystar Real Estate Partners, LLC
Highmark Residential, LLC
Lincoln Property Co.
MidAmerica Apartment Communities, Inc.
Mission Rock Residential, LLC
Morgan Group, Inc.
Prometheus Real Estate Group
RealPage, Inc.
RPM Living, LLC
Security Properties Inc.
Sherman Associates, Inc.
The Michaels Organization, LLC
Interstate Realty Management Company
Thrive Communities Management, LLC
UDR, Inc.
Windsor Property Management
ZRS Management, LLC
Small nitpick, collusion in a general sense is not illegal, but a price-fixing contract/conspiracy would be a crime under the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Just individually comparing prices isn’t an issue.
What does become an issue is if (at least) all of the following are met.
- You use an algorithm service does automates all of this
- This algorithm uses both public and private data
- The algorithm is ubiquitous and widely used by almost every relevant market player
- The algorithm tells all users to not negotiate and the users abide by this recommendation
- All of the above has a noticeable effect on the market to the detriment of a big demographic of market participants
It doesn't matter how the algorithm operates. If all landlords in an area publically agree that they will set rent prices at 400xx the price of a coke can, they are only using public information, but still engaged in price fixing.
It doesn't matter how many people actually use the algorithm. If you try to start a cartel to do price fixing and only succeed in convincing two of your 50 competitors to participate, you've still engaged in illegal price fixing.
It doesn't matter if individual price negotiation happens or not. If a bunch of companies agree to set the same list price, but also agree that they can offer deals to their customers, they are still engaging in illegal price fixing.
It doesn't matter if the scheme actually succeeds in changing the prices. If two companies meet and agree to set prices at a certain value, but then they backstabber each other and undercut the agreed price, or simply other companies in the space who were not part of the scheme have too much market power to allow prices to change, the original companies still agreed to an illegal price fixing scheme and are guilty.
All of the above will probably have a massive impact on the amount of damages and so on. But they have no bearing on the verdict, as the FTC lays out at length in the filing they link from the article. And this is not speculation, it is established case law.
so the question becomes what it means to "meet and agree".
If these companies never communicated, and all came to the same conclusion of a price floor (that happens to all be the same), then how can it be price fixing?
To me, price fixing require that the parties agree (explicitly, or implicitly with punishment) to _not_ lower the price regardless of the lack of sales. It is not enough to have the same price (however that price comes about is irrelevant).
But if they are using the same third party that is telling explicitly telling them "your price should be this", then it's quite clear that they have agreed on the same price. Doing so indirectly doesn't make it any better.
that is the only relevant part that makes it price fixing.
Or, Say I own and house, and I want to rent it out. I would calculate how much I would have to charge for rent for it to be worthwhile to me. Why would I care what anyone else is charging?
Then you probably shouldn't be participating in this discussion.
I added /s because dear lord this thread is full of people who think its true. Housing shouldnt be an investment venue when we have millions unhoused.
You want to make more money in housing? Build more housing.
If you just charge what you need to cover costs you may find yourself with a vacant apartment.
But, if the price you calculate this way is too large, no one will rent your house.
And, if the price you set this way is too low, you're leaving money on the table, which you may or may not be fine with. If the difference is high enough, someone might even pay you the rent you asked for, but then rent it out themselves to someone else for the higher price, and pocket the difference, which you may feel cheated by.
RealPage says if you have a portfolio of apartments, that following their recommendations will generate you more overall, regardless of occupancy. Their algorithm literally is "it is better to rent out 19 units at $X, when the demand will drop to 0.94X if there's 20 available". And it can do so because it happens to know that the other 80 units on the market with other landlords will be following the same rule.
Colluding to fix prices, by any means, is illegal. It is still illegal even if the scheme is only followed by a handful of those who "agreed" to it. It is still illegal if it utterly fails to control the price and thus has no material impact.
It's like trying to scam people. You're not allowed to try to defraud people. It doesn't matter if your scam is so bad that it would cost you more money to execute than you would get out of it, and it doesn't matter if no one engages with your scam at all: what you were doing is still illegal.
This is impossible. If all the units are rented then by definition the market clearing price is being charged. The collusion comes when landlords start leaving units vacant.
The law isn’t code and it is open to interpretation and intent and outcomes matter, sometimes more than the methods.
Using data feed to guide pricing and set initial figures: legal.
Agreeing, either implicitly or explicitly, to let the pricing data feed set the price floor: collusion.
Leaving units unsold and refusing to lower the price despite insufficient demand: usually a bad business decision, possibly indicator of a market failure.
Leaving units unsold to maintain agreed-upon price floor despite insufficient demand: collusion, market manipulation. Congratulations, you are a cartel.
What is the value of subscribing to a pricing service where you have no idea how your competitors are using the numbers (over-, match-, under-price)?
Versus what is the value of same, if you know your competitors never under-price?
That value difference is the value of running a cartel.
> Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal
It is written in a general way to catch all problems going into the future. The problem is translating this to case law. Often judges ask the question "Is this bad for the consumer?" If rents are rising faster than inflation with more consumers becoming homeless citing cost of rent while vacancy rates are increasing, the market is bad for the consumer and the country.
You both agree to follow the recommendations of an unbiased Amasoft Price Calculator tool. This tool uses an advanced algorithm looking at thousands of data points and always returns the same price, $10000 per month.
You both follow this independent tool and end up pricing it the same. Is this a fair system? You’re both subscribing to an algorithm.
That's true by definition. What's shocking is that the developers want to replace leasing agents with a sociopath.
So the FTC says "price fixing by algorithm is still price fixing". If I scrap rental data from a website and then determine my own rental price, is that price fixing? Doesn't seem to me.
The only thing that's legal is doing your own pricing research, using your own methods. You can hire a consultant to do this for you, but this burden then transfers to them: they can't consult for multiple competing businesses.
But it's not the only indicator, and likely is insufficient on its own if you don't have significant enough share of the local market for changes in the prices you make to ripple outwards to smaller players. It's hard enough to get them to go after the big players, so they won't go after you.
Usually price fixing requires multiple indicators. The law doesn't have to prove that Bob is talking with Alice and prove that they're discussing how to raise rents with each other. Prosecutors just need to demonstrate that Bob and Alice are both doing the same things, around the same time, which contribute towards artificial increases.
As players get larger, their policies and procedures have greater impact over an area. Their practices get more scrutiny because of this greater impact. That's one (of many) reasons we see large companies spread themselves to multiple cities. While nobody bothers when someone who rents a dozen units uses algorithms to set their prices, they start to notice more when it's thousands of units all concentrated in a single area.
When you get to a position where 4-5 companies can significantly inflate prices for a city with millions of people, how they behave is important.
There are other tricks they use beyond third party algorithmic engagement.
Consider this:
If only 30% of the rental market engage in a laddered renewal scheme where they push renters towards always renewing within the same 2 month period of the year (via 10 or 14 month renewals that are more financially viable than 12 month renewals, or are simply the only option for renewal until the renter is within that two month period) and also add significant lease penalties for breaking out of that schedule, it takes less than a decade to reach a point where 90+% of rentals are renewing within the same two months every year.
And what does that do? It artificially constricts supply (nobody releases their lease until they've found a new apartment, so many units are not displayed as available or need to be accepted sight-unseen) and artificially inflates demand (everybody is looking during this same time period).
The result is artificially increased rent. Which has a side effect of inflating bubbles in the housing market. That may _seem_ good for property owners, as they can sell their houses for more. For a time, until the next pop that everyone blames on lenders with dodgy loan acceptance criteria or other criteria. Until then, homeowners pay inflated property taxes. They might overextend their mortgage with the new perceived value of their home that may eventually drop, etc.
The point is: rental price fixing is real and deliberate, large players with greater impact know better but do it anyway, and this is not the only trick they use. It's just the one they've currently stepped far enough over the line on to get caught at.
While you're right about how regulators typically approach this, it's also important to note that the converse is also true. That is, if they happen to get clear proof that Alice and Bob agreed together to raise rents, then it doesn't matter if they actually succeeded in increasing rents in the area, and it doesn't even matter if they didn't follow through with the agreement: the agreement itself was illegal, and they would get an easy win in court (though damages may be low if the material impact was low, so the case may still not be worth pursuing).
It is typically very rare for such direct evidence of collusion to exist, and thus indirect evidence like you suggest is normally how this is investigated.
However, RealPage and the others here have provided this evidence directly: the way their price recommendation service is structured, the terms and conditions and so on, constitute direct evidence of an explicit attempt at price fixing. So, even if it turned out that all of landlords participating in this scheme actually "cheated" the price recommendation algorithm, and even if it turned out that rents went down or stayed the same when RealPage moved in, they would still be guilty of price fixing, per the FTC.
It's more than 'discourage'.
RealPage considers (their own words) landlords to be "cheating" when they deviate from the recommended rates.
Landlords are contractually obligated to follow RP recommendations 95%+ of the time:
> Consistent with their agreement to impose rents generated by RealPage RM Software nearly all the time, Defendants agreed to limit overrides. For example, a RealPage LRO training document states: “Overrides should be few and far between.” Similarly, internal RealPage LRO training documents teach cartel members’ regional managers to beware of “Override Overload” or “rogue” leasing agents who too frequently override the LRO-generated pricing.
> An internal presentation created by Defendant Greystar explicitly acknowledges that RealPage RM Software users should each seek to accept at least 95% of the RealPage-generated prices, emphasizing that “Discipline [o]f using revenue management increases more consistent outcomes.”
> Former Greystar employees have similarly confirmed that negotiating rents other than those set by the RealPage RM Software was unacceptable.
> Even where Participating Landlords do not enable auto-accept, most landlords cannot, on their own, charge rents other than those generated by RealPage’s RM Software— landlords can only “propose an override.” The landlord must then provide a written business justification for why they wish to depart from the RealPage-generated rent.
RealPage is simple fucking cartel software.
For example - Tenant 1 of racial profile X walks through the door and is a good negotiator. Tenant 2 of racial profile Y walks through the door and doesn’t negotiate. Tenant 2 finds out about Tenant 1 and opens a discrimination case under FHA.
At least the culture at my smaller company was to do everything to steer the rental property away from potential Fair Housing incidents. However, we did learn while working on the competing YieldStar product that the simple act of removing the negotiations caused a big knock-on effect of creating a revenue increase. That kind of put a bad taste in our mouths, because we didn’t like the fact that it wasn’t the software that was causing the increase so much as the pre-requisite of stopping negotiations. We started experimenting with how to improve the algorithm even more and if it could create bigger gains that drove more product value than simply the “don’t negotiate” effect. But we were then acquired by Realpage.
There are other ways these algorithms discriminate indirectly. For example, these algorithms tend to dial up prices around holidays like Christmas. And they do that because anyone who wants to sign a lease around the holidays has a much higher percentage chance of having some sort of life turmoil. (like maybe a family fight broke out or abuse happened on Christmas that caused someone to move out) From a business standpoint, the rental property would argue, “Someone in a bad way has a statistically more significant chance of also causing undo cost increases or breaking leases early.” — so the algorithm cranks up the prices to make up for potential costs.
Dialed up at the level and scope of industry control that Realpage has gained over the years, then you encounter all kinds of other issues.
The other perspective that these products take is they look at the short term rental industry like hotels and AirBnB. The business approaches by wondering, “Why can’t long term rentals be as technologically sophisticated as the short term rental industry. Let’s create a product that brings long term rentals automation into this decade” and the issue you run into is that short term rentals have 30x-100x the data points that you have. So it creates a gravity towards reaching into as many data points as you possibly can in order to make the product half as compelling, which includes reaching into your own internal data.
From the outside, i couldn't possibly imagine any person who's ever had trouble making rent playing along while their company was unnecessarily inflicting that pain on large numbers of other people. Yes, when a company is running things they'll do what they can to avoid lawsuits, even if that is "become a soulless algorithmic profit extractor". But businesses are made of people. Was there anyone in the company that had a problem with it?
Most products centered on whether you actually got a lease or not in the first place (and it was mainly crime related). Once you got into a lease and were struggling to pay rent, anything else would have moved to a manual action taken by the landlord if they wanted to be a soulless jerk. (Not sure about whether Realpage has some kind of automated product for that but we didn’t)
As for competing YieldStar product. Our main objection was that if we were to build price projection software, it’d better reflect the actual market. The algorithm and heuristics like “raise rent on Christmas” didn’t sit well, so we raised the conversation and stalled the project for a few weeks. Eventually we were told we’d get to revisit our concerns in the V2 but we’d be overruled for the time being “just to get out this MVP”.
Another thing they did was to offer lower rent if you moved into a unit that was vacant. They ”incentivized” people to move every year instead of just increasing the rent a reasonable amount. I’m talking rent going up $500-$1,000/month unless you moved into the identical unit next door. Most of the people in the build paid the increases but we were young so we moved.
Our first year we lived in a small 1br. When the lease came up they wanted to increase our rent by $600/month. We opted to move into a huge 2br with limited light that had been vacant for a year or two. When our lease on that one came up they wanted to more than double our rent because there was such high demand for the unit.
We were the demand.
this price fixing is partially about units not even for rent which is a different problem you don't want. (but you want some units not for rent while they remodel)
[1] https://www.faegredrinker.com/en/insights/publications/2024/...
In many cases the ownership has been traced to government funding. The suspicion is that these are just the tip of the iceberg.
So, at least in the eyes of the US Congress, based on some damning evidence, China is doing something to the US.
That said, "black money" is also a problem. But I suspect that's the case in China as well. There's no way to eliminate all corruption, even in China.
At least in regards to the US, no one can really know that. The Chinese government technically doesn't own anything in the US anymore. The alarm is being raised because supposedly private Chinese enterprise includes ownership of significant American food production (e.g. largest pork manufacturer), farm land, homes near military facilities, etc. Those are strategically sound holdings for national defense in both countries. Suburbs are built on farm land, etc. It's very difficult to decouple real estate from national defense, really.
That said, "Chinese people" don't own all that much in the US overall when compared with other countries. China is being singled out because they have been caught spying repeatedly. They stood and burned their embassy and refused to allow firefighters in. There is military posturing. They are invading American airspace over the US mainland. All these combined paint such purchases in a suspicious light at the very least.
There's enough evidence to know that the Chinese government is funding at least some of the purchases. It could be most of these purchases. No one can know for sure, not even the individual buyers themselves. Only the Chinese government knows.
I think the same applies in Europe?
You know if they did things by the books the rent will increase? (probably by 20-30%)
Real Estate will stop being a free money machine when the government stops artificially restricting housing supply with single-use, single-family zoning.
The investor class is simply insatiable and you can't just satisfy the demand because it's always growing beyond all reason.
You need to curb investors interest in real estate.
So basically ban buying residential real estate on credit. That's a start.
It would have interesting sideffects. One of them would showing clearly to the masses how unaffordable houses actually already are. Unfortunately rents would go up in the short term from increased demand from people who'd otherwise get a loan. So the rich people would keep buying them raising the prices till the new equilibrium is reached.
Eventually rents would settle at how much people who rent can pay without starving and house prices would settle at whatever's the price of whatever asset that yields similar returns.
I don't think it would be at 10% of today's prices
People's idea of what is appropriate housing have changed.
A land value tax that ignores the value of improvements on the land would make a dent. Freeloaders who buy a lot just to sell it later would see their gains evaporate. So land holders would seek to actually improve their land.
Currently another big driver of land value is zoning. But it isn't the only one. And until society starts degrading hard, the other drivers aren't going to slow down either. maybe with an exception for suburbia where the roads will need replacement even though the area doesn't raise enough tax revenue to pay for the replacement roads.
The power is simply way too skewed in favor of gigantic companies with coffers that are infinitely deep when you compare them to any individual looking for housing. They can buy dozens of building at a time and completely eek out individuals looking for a home for themselves and their families, and what can anyone do about it?
Imo corporations should be legally barred from owning residential property of any kind, and there should be limits to what an individual can own for themselves as well, be it at the neighbourhood/district/city/state/country level. The overwhelmingly large majority of people need no more than a single home, the only people this kind of rule would affect negatively are the ones that aren't struggling in the first place.
Are you aware that the government is the entity preventing housing from being built in many cities?
I don't think zoning should be abolished or anything but clearly the regulations the US has now, at least, are incorrect and restrict supply far too much.
On the contrary, the skyrocketing homelessness rates around the country are showing that demand for housing is more elastic than people thought.
I lived in floor 30 of a “luxury” skyscraper in Seattle built after ~2015. We had an algorithm for pricing according to the landlord and the class action letter we received. Amazing water views and city views. Clearly desirable housing in a city flush with rich people and a massive housing shortage. I was the only occupant on the floor and the only tenant at the time ever to live in that unit. They tried to raise my rent like $1000/m when lease was up. We paid it since we had just gotten a raise. Next lease renewal was about $1000 again and we moved out because $2k extra was just too far above comparable units nearby. They literally offered us a Starbucks gift card to stay. We could see the other vacant units listed on the buildings website and they were always priced way above comparable units in neighboring buildings.
Oh and to directly answer your question, I’m guessing the building was never more than half full. The mail room was never full, and the parking garage had about 20/100 spots in use.
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RHVRUSQ156N
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/EVACANTUSQ176N (estimated absolute number)
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/EOFFMARUSQ176N (held off the market)
The data you showed says there were 7 million units held off-market. My building had only a few hundred tops.
I wonder if there is more to the story though. I think that the building would be less desirable if it was full. Skyscrapers already have long lines for elevators, and common spaces get a lot of wear and tear from so many people in small areas. I wonder if they keep it below capacity while they can charge a “newness premium”, and once that fades they add extra units to the market to increase revenue.
and just natural turnover - people moving, outgrowing their home (or on the other end when someone leaves the home, or pass away) - leads to a vacancy of millions of homes. people usually harp about this a lot, and I also think it would be good to get people into homes, even if temporary, faster. but the effective solution is land value tax, and high density. everything else is just bad and worse trade-offs (like rent control and various machinations with 'affordable' units, and so on).
regarding highrises, I noticed that they mostly look the worst when they are new. everyone is moving in, elevators are full of scratches. there's a lot of ongoing construction (inevitably there will be someone from a hundred tenants, who wants to change something). and then eventually it settles into some steady state. ... so this forced cycling or whatever this management company did is just 120% WTF to me.
Unless you're talking about a tax on vacant properties.
This is a solid in-depth explanation, if you're interested: https://www.gameofrent.com/content/can-lvt-be-passed-on-to-t...
If it becomes impossible to rent properties profitably, then eventually there would just be fewer rentals available.
This is true ...
> If it becomes impossible to rent properties profitably, then eventually there would just be fewer rentals available.
But this is a leap that doesn't apply to the Georgist scheme. A key feature of the scheme is that taxes on buildings (possibly among other taxes) are removed in favor of the land value tax. It's true that if the tax on some piece of land increases sufficiently, it will eventually become impossible to profitably charge rents on existing buildings on that land--but improving existing buildings or building some superior building (for example, a new building with more units than a pre-existing building) allows landlords to continue profiting.
If the current landlords don't want to improve buildings there, they can sell the land to someone who will. And it's clear that someone will, because if there's enough demand for the land that the land value tax makes it unprofitable to sit on it without improving it, someone is going to want to do something more with it.
The reason we don't already have a Georgist-style economy is quite obvious, of course: the homo sapiens landlordicus is a very soft, squishy, vulnerable subspecies. If they had incentives to improve their properties and thereby possibly even work as hard as the rest of the human species, they might well go extinct. And no one wants that.
But here's the rub: if you remove those restrictions, you don't need to change the taxes. Even with current taxes, people will build more housing units, if they're allowed to and they can make money from it.
That's the point. They'd be forced to sell instead of hoarding increasing supply of houses on the market tremendously.
You wouldn't rent. You'd just buy.
This literally sounds fraudulent
I have a hypothesis, that the reason for many ailments in Western economies is that in the past 20-30 years we have created a lot of parasitic, highly-sophisticated economic fraud, and regulators have not caught up to it yet.
Any other way to describe darlings like Uber, AirBNB, what Amazon became, many SaaS (looking at you MSFT Office) is simply disingenuous
Well, it's more than an hypothesis, there are books about it:
https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/451795/technofeudalism-by-va...
When I was just out of school I did this in a large complex with my wife more than once (we had different last names and used her parents address for mail).
The first time, we didn't even have to move, because she got the pick of open apartments... one of which was ours. We worried they would want to paint it, but I guess since I'd only had a it a year, they didn't bother. The Sales person was happy because they got commission anyway, and we got a free months rent rather than paying an extra month's rent in increases.
In Denmark we have "Bopælspligt" meaning that an owner of an apartment is obligated to have someone living in the apartment. While i know this is detrimental to the US mentality is forces a free market on real estate and is, IMHO, the only way you can ensure a fair rental market without rent control.
As a result real estate in Copenhagen is cheap enough that most working people in Denmark are able to buy (albeit that being a small apartment).
What happens if no one is living? Can't find a tenant or simply takes a really long holiday or goes abroad to to work for a few years?
I'm under impression that Americans freak out because they tend to go full technical on laws, that is, they don't care much what the governments are trying to achieve with the laws but work within the limits of strict technicality. So a lot of Americans were freaking out here on HN when GDPR was introduced, some shutting down personal projects because were afraid to get in trouble with the EU laws and find themselves in huge and expensive lawsuits.
if you are on a long holiday, you still legally live in the unit.
if you cannot rent it out you, well, lower the rent until you can. easy as that. or you put the unit up for sale, which suspends the rule.
GDPR essentially makes companies mindful about how they store and transfer data and if something goes wrong, it is useful to tell what went wrong and who is responsible about it. There's no EU police going around and nocking on the doors, taking people in for the smallest violation.
There must be more GDPR enforcement. Not just against the primary culprits.
Isn't the ideal vacancy rate always one unit? Any more than 1 unit and you could be collecting more money. Any less than 1 unit and you may be underpricing.
In a lot of European countries, the landlord cannot raise the rent as he wants, there’s a maximum per year (usually a bit lower than official inflation).
Ignoring all other considerations, the current incumbent political party in the US presidency on average tends to produce effective & functioning federal agencies, and the other party on average tends to produce corrupt & dysfunctional federal agencies.
I try to point this out frequently because voters tend to ignore this kind of thing until it affects them personally, or they read about some isolated grievance in the news. But it really should be considered a more important topic.
voters tend to ignore this kind of thing until it affects them personally
And when it finally becomes a problem that cannot be ignored, scapegoats will be found and used, even if they have to be invented in a fairy tale (internet conspiracy).the federal agencies are mostly employees have been there through many administrations. How do they suddenly become corrupt and dysfunctional besides these employees (90% of the current incumbent political party) suddenly becoming corrupt and dysfunctional?
That means leadership can change the course of an organization by ruthlessly making them do other things until people internalize those things as the right thing, or leave.
That only explains decay though, not the magical idea that under the right party things spring back. The best to hope for is a democratic president to slow down the decay. But it is simply so much easier to tear things down than to build things up, that it will take a lot of democrats to see actual improvement.
However, they've learned. At the end of his term, Trump created a new classification of employment, Schedule F. Schedule F employees did not have civil-service protections and could be fired on a whim. Fortunately, he lost the election before he could use it. Biden removed it.
Now, Trump-aligned groups like the Heritage Foundation are running programs to recruit Trump loyalists whose main and almost sole qualifications is loyalty to Trump (see Project 2025). They don't want a repition of last time where federal employees had the gall to actually follow the law instead of the dictator.
With housing, everybody has to live _somewhere_.
Price fixing in buying/hiring is not monopoly btw, it's monopsony.
My brother studied tacit collusion as part of his econ PhD (and new lawyers was one of the markets he looked at) but it would be a hard thing to actually legislate against and isn't illegal. You can't just be like "you guys can't pay the same".
https://abovethelaw.com/2024/01/latham-salary-2023/
What's missing is the pressure on other firms to match. This is more like the leader raising pay and other firms chasing them.
Obviously law firms colluding on prices isn't good but how they are colluding is completely different.
Unfortunately, I think the genie is out of the bottle, and the actions by the ftc will be reduced to whack-a-mole attempts to bust transgressors who make the effort to have plausible deniability while still using price-fixing algos.
There is no limit to Price fixing for inelastic good like food, housing and medicine.
Without the price fixing though, apartment complexes will actually have to compete against each other on rent.
Public information doesn't tell you if competitors will underprice to sink you, or if they are likely to hold a high price even against lower occupancy. This software tells you and your competitors whether or not to do that, and bases that guidance on its inside knowledge of its own customer base. That is what the FTC and DoJ are calling collusion, based on my reading of the article.
It baffles me, that this is not a general rule as it forces fair market prices for a illiquid supply (it takes time to build new housing, if it is even possible).
In this case you'd just complain that a company keeps units vacant to the municipality who would fine the company until it is brought in order.
But having rules like this removes some speculation.
Isn’t this also price fixing?
The issue with the rent thing is that the algorithm sets a price, so collusion could easily be offloaded onto the algorithm. Something similar should also happen with salaries before this becomes a real problem right?
They can solve the problem by making the data public, thus giving the same competitive negotiation advantage to the employee. The publicness is the key part -- it's price fixing when They trade information with Each Other, information that is unavailable to You and is essentially valuable to both sides in negotiating an employment offer
Enjoyable to watch norms about language (IRL) change.
I think it’s refreshingly well written and accessible. Not an 800 page blob of legalese.
Nice job to the authors.
It's not the only example of bad writing.
> And even if some of the conspirators cheat by starting with lower prices than those the algorithm recommended, that doesn’t necessarily change things. Being bad at breaking the law isn’t a defense.
Breaking the law less or not at all is indeed a defense, possibly a successful one. It also doesn't constitute being "bad" at breaking the law.
Lots of people who work in government agencies feel that it is okay to lie to the public to try to achieve greater goods. They are wrong.
Is it collusion when a gas station manager drives around the neighborhood, looks at the competitors posted price for gas, and sets his prices the same?
You have to use a third party that is setting a price and stick to that, knowing others are doing the same. You're describing individuals determining their own price using their own judgement.
Where as if individuals are assessing the prices they are in a sort of prisoners dilemma, if they leave a property vacant someone may lower the average price meaning they can't recoup the lost earnings when it is occupied. So their best bet is to keep a property occupied as much as possible.
I'm just not aware of any markets where these guys are dominant. You STILL have the prisoners dilemma issue, as there are tons of smaller landlords out there that definitely aren't playing in this game no matter what you're doing.
And I don't see how this is THAT much different from just doing a search for rental properties in your area on zillow and setting your rent prices accordingly. If THAT is price fixing, then how does anyone expect a market to work at all?
If you were the cheapest gas station in the neighborhood with prices appropriate to your operation but one day decide to align your price to your competitors and keep adjusting your price to whatever they set while nothing changed for you, that feels like the very definition of price fixing.
Who isn't going to set their prices relative to their competitors in a market? And also try to have as low a cost as possible, so they have as good a profit margin as possible? It's basic business 101.
If THAT is price fixing, then literally every business ever in the history of business has done price fixing.
That also isn't colluding with anyone, near as I can tell. Maybe if you did a wink-wink-nod-nod to each other while driving by? Typically when I've heard of price fixing, there was some explicit cartel or industry assoc or meeting between folks or whatever where they could actually agree to something, punish 'non compliance', etc.
This feels like the Google Antitrust case, where no one can even seem to say what they would have reasonably expected Google to do instead that would make any sense, and the issue is more that there are as-yet-unresolved structural components that no one is able to articulate a rule that would prevent whatever problem everyone is getting worked up about.
The text book behavior would be to price yourself lower than the competitors and try to get market share from them.
In our current paradigm, if you have low costs while keeping your price as high as the incumbent, there should be other players entering the market and disrupting it by going for lower margins. That mechanism not happening even as there's a variety of actors in the market is where it's qualified as "price fixing" IMHO.
PS: about Google's antitrust case, are you refering to them stopping other stores from getting installed on android phones ?
In this kind of business, in the short-medium term (aka when setting rents), they're usually looking to reduce vacancy rates (aka achieve the highest utilization of their assets), so they'd set their rents to be relative to the market (same, lower, higher) as necessary to achieve their target vacancy rate. Notably, the market itself usually has highly variable seasonal demand and relatively low volume, so it can take months to figure out if you're high/low/just right unless you're managing a LOT of units.
For landlords, vacancies can practically never be zero for very long without problems, for similar reasons why unemployment at zero for very long creates problems - there needs to be some downtime to do things like unit maintenance and upgrades, adjust timing to have availability during peak times for good tenants, etc.
Zero would be ideal from a ROI perspective though.
Attempting to corner the market - in all but the smallest markets - can be VERY expensive and high risk, due to high capital and cashflow costs for housing stock, high workforce (and household) mobility in the US, and a very diverse set of competitors.
After all, anyone who actually owns housing in the area is a potential competitor if rents get too high, let alone all the small/medium landlords which don't have nearly enough cushion to attempt that kind of maneuver without going almost immediately bankrupt.
So even if all the big corp apartment complexes or whatever were in on it (and the big property management companies too), all the smaller/medium landlords would be unable to even attempt to participate and folks would end up moving to subletting SFH pretty quick.
This was, e.g., the case in the major ebook price fixing case where Apple was the common intermediary between the publishers.
> In one news release, Realpage offered its property management clients the ability to outsource daily rent-setting and revenue oversight. “We believe in overseeing properties as though we own them ourselves,” the company said in a presentation that plaintiffs’ lawyers referenced in the lawsuit.
> The lawsuit quoted one unnamed witness, a RealPage pricing advisor, saying that some pricing advisors told property management employees that they had to follow the software’s recommendations. A leasing manager at a RealPage client said, “I knew [RealPage’s prices] were way too high, but [RealPage] barely budged” when the manager asked to deviate from the suggested rent.
> An update to the software tracked not only clients’ acceptance rate, but also the identity of the landlords’ staff members who had requested a deviation from RealPage’s price, the lawsuit said. Compensation for some property management personnel was even tied to compliance with the company’s recommendations, it said.
So if this is true, this also means that managers are being compelled to adopt the recommendations more than as mere suggestions.
https://www.propublica.org/article/doj-backs-tenants-price-f...
But yeah, your latter case sounds easy to fall into gray territory, since it seems illegal to agree on prices even if intermediary makes it unclear with whom exactly you're agreeing with
If you use the same algorithm it's not necessarily illegal, but it will be if it results in price fixing. If you take into account competitors prices its not necessarily illegal, but it will be if it results in price fixing.
To keep things simple, let's say a city has two landlords, Alice and Bob, who each own around half of the residential rental properties in the city.
Textbook definition of price fixing is if Bob and Alice agree to never rent for less than $5 per square foot.
Next scenario: Instead of a minimum price, let's say that Bob and Alice agree a formula on how to price their properties based on vacancies. The formula can be as simple or as complicated as you like. But in this scenario, if the formula never gives them a result less than $5/square foot, it has the exact same outcome as the textbook scenario. And since there is direct coordination between Bob and Alice, this is definitely price fixing. In fact, it's even worse than the textbook scenario, because now they're coordinating on exact prices, and not just a minimum.
Forgetting formulas for a minute, let's say Charlie, who is unrelated to Alice and Bob, approached them separately and offered to sell them information on how to set their prices. In this case, there's no algorithm involved. They each pay Charlie a small fee per month, and he tells them not to rent for less than $5 per square foot. There's no direct communication between Bob and Alice, but because they both know that the other is acting on the same advice from Charlie, the result is the same as the textbook scenario. You could even argue that there is indirect communication between them, and that Charlie is running some kind of price laundering service.
Finally, you can combine the two. Bob and Alice both tell Charlie how many vacancies, delinquent payments, etc. they have. Charlie feeds all the data into his computer, which contains a really complicated formula, and that computer tells them how much to charge. And wouldn't you know it, that formula never produces a result less than $5/square foot. Again, because Bob and Alice know that the other is using this service, and because they have an exact price, rather than a minimum, they know they don't have to negotiate with potential customers. The other landlord won't give that customer a better deal.
One of the cases specifically being looked at in this investigation is Washington D.C. Google tells me that around 60% of rentals in D.C. are in large apartment buildings, but that's just a quick search so take that with a grain of salt. ProPublica says that 90% of these apartments are using the software. If we accept these numbers are close, and knowing that 90% of buildings doesn't necessarily mean 90% of all apartments, we can guess that means somewhere around 50% of all rental properties in D.C. are priced using this software. The number might be higher, since I don't know if any non-apartment buildings are using this software, or it might be lower if the data is inaccurate.
So yes, the remaining 50% of the market could undercut the 50% using the software. However, it's still possible for 50% to have an effect on the housing market. This is because the housing market is generally considered to be inelastic and because it is difficult to increase supply quickly.
Compare it to, for example, soda, which is an elastic market with a lot of production. If Coke and Pepsi lost their minds and started charging $100 for an 8 oz can, they're creating a lot of potential for other companies to undercut them at, say $2 a can. As long as $2/can is profitable, they can win Coke and Pepsi's market from them overnight.
If 50% of rental properties started renting for $1 million/week, obviously, very few people can afford that, and I doubt anyone would pay it. But what could the other 50% of the market do? They could keep their rates lower, but all the rentals will fill up. Again, numbers are hard to find, but vacancies in D.C. are probably around 6%, so prospective renters will play musical chairs for the 50% of rental properties that have more reasonable rents. There's a potential here for companies to build new properties and undercut the 50%, but building is lengthy, expensive, requires permitting, etc. The market can't respond very quickly, and because new construction tends to be expensive, rents from new buildings tend to be higher.
The challenge though is that at least the Fed data doesn’t seem to support it across the industry, at least as far as I can tell. Rents seem to be moving in almost lockstep with inflation (and fed rates?), and have been since before COVID started. Which is odd in itself, actually, and I think might support the case of ‘have to raise rents or our financing will collapse and we’ll go insolvent’. I’m wondering if these large complex vacancies are inversely correlated? If so, seems like an opportunity to short something somewhere.
I’d argue there is a third market option here too. While someone can quit drinking soda, they can’t quit having a roof over their heads.
Well, technically they can and increasing homelessness is proof of that - but that is a very extreme option with incredibly high costs, so we’ll ignore that for now.
But if remote work is an option, or if the local salaries don’t support the higher rents, people can and will move, or double up, or sublet, etc. Or just go bankrupt, and be out of the ‘renter’ pool that way.
The inflexibility of real estate does mean it takes time for all this to play out, but in your $1 million/wk option, the inevitable outcomes here seem to be:
1) the apartments keep that crazy price, have zero (or near zero - until the few crazy renters went bankrupt) renters, and eventually go bankrupt themselves. Since even if they have a cash cushion, that cushion will run out eventually. High financing costs mean they’ll even be unable to get business loans to cover cashflow issues, which would typically give them more breathing room.
And since local renters don’t make enough to pay that rent anyway ($52/mil a year on rent is hard to pay), and even hotels or SFH rentals would be dramatically cheaper. Why would Jeff Bezos want to rent one of these, after all, and he’d be one of the few would could?
or
2) have legislation passed which outlaws what they are doing by setting rent caps or the like (and there would be plenty of support).
or
3) have their properties burned to the ground by pitchfork wielding mobs.
Possibly all 3 at the same time?
Alternatively, what I think they’re all hoping for, is that income inflation for renters means renters will be willing and able to pay these higher rates, and they’ll be saved by a post-COVID boom and everyone will actually be - at worst - moderately grumpy.
Which may happen!
To be clear, the million dollar scenario was intended as one in which the landlords collectively lost their minds and plunged themselves into long-term economic doom. In a more realistic pricing scenario, they'd collude to determine the absolute maximum price they could charge and still get tenants.
And when you think about it, that's how markets are supposed to work. Landlords want to charge as much as the market can bear, no more, no less. Renters want to pay as little as possible, and in a perfect market, it would reach price equilibrium.
But from the federal government's point of view, it's not as simple. Housing must be profitable in order to encourage new investment in housing. We're currently playing musical chairs with too few residential units for too many residents because there hasn't been enough housing investment since the 2008 crash. At the same time, they want to keep rents low, since money spent on rent isn't going into productive areas of the economy. They also want to keep rents variable, because strictly stratifying locations based in income has bad effects in society. (E.g. police officers not being able to afford to live in the large cities they work in.) Retaining the ability for lower-income renters to negotiate rent is helpful in that regard, but obviously not a silver bullet.
One thing I would be careful of though, is comparing rental prices to inflation. Housing costs are the single largest factor in the CPI-U, so it's almost a tautology that rents rise at the same rate of inflation, because inflation is largely measuring the rate at which rents rise.
Comparing to fed rates is more interesting. If you're getting less of a return on your investment than the current fed rate, you'll make more money by divesting yourself of your properties and putting the money into bonds. (And I believe this is the biggest driver of recent mass layoffs.)
State competition laws may have separate rules for price fixing and other specific kinds of behavior or have similarly broad language to the Sherman Act.
The software cited, RENTMaximizer, offers aggregate price information for property managers with the aim of maximizing prices.
Would a RENTMinimizer product, given away for free to tenants, help? It would show aggregate rents that tenants pay, including minimum ones, with the hope that they can use this information for more confidence when negotiating rents.
It's collision when companies agree to not compete.
We thought that cars is answer, but cars only deferred the market saturation, plus we need more roads and parkings.
Remote work may be an answer, but people still need schools, shops and restaurants.
> Agreeing to use an algorithm is an agreement. In algorithmic collusion, a pricing algorithm combines competitor data and spits out the suggested “maximized” rent for a unit given local conditions.
This sounds exactly like what a compensation consultant does (collect competitor data, including data from other clients, and suggest a comp range)?
https://mcusercontent.com/cc1fad182b6d6f8b1e352e206/files/25...
I'm open to discussion of how to resolve that though, any ideas?
Doesn’t matter if a big landlord or little landlord are doing it.
Many players are not allowed to collude.
If a player gets too big it faces antitrust / monopoly issues.
NOTICE: The FTC website is currently unavailable. Thank you for your patience while
we work to restore service.When you lease a place to a tenant, there is a stamp duty ($100+) that the tenant pays. Then the landlord submits details about square footage, number of rooms, and the price it was rented at.
Then the government shares the data in an aggregate manner: https://www.ura.gov.sg/Corporate/Property/Property-Data/Priv...
Someone explain how this is different from pricing vehicles based on KBB or other data? Genuinely curious because I don’t know what these agreements look like.
If multiple seller/landlord parties all agree to have a single algorithm set prices I understand the FTC’s point. If however they all reference an algorithmic data point and freely choose to set prices I don’t see how that’s collusion.
If multiple seller/landlord parties all agree to have a single algorithm set prices I understand the FTC’s point. If however they all reference an algorithmic data point and freely choose to set prices I don’t see how that’s collusion.
You've hit the nail on the head. It's the former, which is why it's collusion.https://www.propublica.org/article/yieldstar-rent-increase-r...
>A genial, self-described “numbers nerd,” Jeffrey Roper was Alaska Airlines’ director of revenue management when it and other major airlines began developing price-setting software in the 1980s.
>Competing airlines began using common software to share planned routes and prices with each other before they became public. The technology helped head off price wars that would have lowered ticket prices, the Department of Justice said.
>The department said the arrangement may have artificially inflated airfares, estimating the cost to consumers at more than a billion dollars between 1988 and 1992. The government eventually reached settlements or consent decrees for price fixing with eight airlines, including Alaska Airlines, all of which agreed to change how they used the technology.
"Price deviations don’t immunize conspirators. Some things in life might require perfection, but price-fixing arrangements aren’t one of them. Just because a software recommends rather than determines a price doesn’t mean it’s legal. Setting initial starting prices or recommending initial starting prices can be illegal, even if conspirators deviate from recommended prices."
Would be better to see an argument from the FTC grounded in evidence and analysis, because I don't get what this is based on. Software recommends a price, sure, but so does any appraisal in any industry. For how long can I use an appraisal service before the FTC says I'm committing a crime? I just feel like the lines are not drawn very clearly with this argument.
Aside, if anyone from the FTC is here right now, for God's sake do not use "IRL" in official writing.
But based on the post, this really seems to not be the case?
I don't understand how you came to that conclusion. From the post: an agreement to use shared pricing recommendations, lists, calculations, or algorithms can still be unlawful even where co-conspirators retain some pricing discretion or cheat on the agreement.
Also from the post: The agencies filed a joint legal brief explaining...
From that legal brief (emphasis mine): ... when competitors *agree to fix* end prices, ... *the agreement* is the violation, and unsuccessful price-fixing schemes are as unlawful as successful ones.
Another commenter asked how this is different from car dealers using the KBB values. If a deal uses KBB values to inform themselves of the approximate value of a car, before deciding their opening bid/offer in a negotiation, that's fine. If they agree with a neighbouring dealer that they'll always start their negotiation with the KBB price, this is illegal price fixing. From the brief: In Plymouth Dealers’ Association, 279 F.2d 128, for instance, a defendant convicted of price fixing for agreeing with competing dealers on a “fixed uniform list price” for Plymouth cars argued that the conviction could not be upheld because the government’s case required “proof of something more—that [the uniform list price] was adhered to; that it was utilized to fix prices; or that it did actually fix prices.” Id. at 130. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that “the fact that the dealers used the fixed uniform list price in most instances only as a starting point[] is of no consequence.”
Pages 23-24 (PageID #6982 and PageID #6983) of the PDF explain how the collusion was orchestrated: https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/YardiSOI-filed%...That's the key. The problem is the agreement; that results in price fixing. Even if someone is allowed "some pricing discretion"(ie maybe they can deviate 8%) it can still be illegal.
Maintaining full pricing discretion is what referencing KBB on your own and making a determination outside a pricing agreement would be; not illegal.
From what I can tell. Not legal advice.
A second point that bothers me about the blog post. It's immaterial to the brief, but the blog says the rent is up 20% since 2020, citing CPI-U. But it fails to account for increasing incomes. Median household incomes, nationwide, have kept pace with rents.
If people are spending more real money to get the same housing, something has gone wrong.
What? Commodity futures are viciously competitive open markets, where do you see the connection?
This is no idle threat. Be sure to click on that link and find out that in 2018 the FTC stopped the greedy corporate profiteers in the wall poster industry from price fixing back in 2013. Algorithmic price fixers beware.
That one weird trick that doesn't work well under the law.
Based on the understanding of the post, I think both of those would be considered price colluding.
What’s described in the article is a bunch of estate agents agreeing to use a price recommended by 3rd party software and minimize cheating on that price, which is price fixing.
https://www.in2013dollars.com/us/inflation/2020?amount=1
$1 in 2020 is equivalent in purchasing power to about $1.19 today, an increase of $0.19 over 4 years. The dollar had an average inflation rate of 4.48% per year between 2020 and today, producing a cumulative price increase of 19.17%.
This means that today's prices are 1.19 times as high as average prices since 2020, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics consumer price index. A dollar today only buys 84.034% of what it could buy back then.
gas was $3.22 in 2020 but is 42.17% higher in 2024, so by that metric rent is proportionally lower (than the 20% increase in rent)
Things changed rather dramatically, theoretically,because of different presidential puppet-string-pulling in terms of the FTC: https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2021/06/lina-k...
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55738746
After less than 24 hours in office Biden signed 15 executive orders whereas Trump had signed 8 after two weeks (Obama had signed 9 after two weeks).
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55738746
information that comes from government agencies is almost always data that has been arranged in such a way as to make those in power look like they're the good guys.
> Such software can allow landlords to collude on pricing by using an algorithm—something the law doesn’t allow IRL.
"IRL"?
Search for "adherence to the agreed-upon Prices", "fix list price", and "Express delegation".
They argue that collusion through delegation counts as price fixing. They argue colluding to set list prices even when there isn't a price floor is price fixing. They argue that replacing the delegation with an algorithm is still price fixing. Most of their arguments are based on already settled cases.
I vent my frustration to a few agents about the yearly rate increase insanity and they all shrug, give their non-empathetic "I understand" telephone script and blame it on the "system" calculating the prices and make some useless excuse about inflation.
I've got a clean driving record, a fully paid-off cheap vehicle, in a reasonably responsible age bracket, and the cost of decent auto insurance these days is essentially another car payment. Within 5 years I'll have paid back the insurance company 60-70% the value of the vehicle. The Gov/FTC needs to take a look at these companies, especially if they're forcing us to hold the insurance to reasonably participate in society.
If that's true, I certainly couldn't find a table on allowable rate ranges when I did some basic research on pricing and what factors influence it. Certainly open to being schooled on how auto insurance works.
Filings are done through the SERFF system.
So Google SERFF and say "NY". (which will take you to https://filingaccess.serff.com/sfa/home/NY )
Then search by carrier, line of business etc. You want "rate" filings. You will find a report by an actuary, lots of justification explaining price changes, correspondence between the company and regulators asking/answering questions, details on how the rate changes will affect current customers, etc.
SInce most rate filings are to adjust current in force rates, they don't always repeat all the underlying details. With a little more effort you can look up initial rate filings, and they will walk through methodologies in more detail.
Once those prices are filed, they are locked in (for consumer types of insurance). Companies can't deviate in any way. (including giving unauthorized discounts).
> In 2019, there were 45,524 reported car accidents in Washington State. Although 32,106 resulted in no injuries, 325 were fatal and 973 resulted in serious injuries.
https://www.weierlaw.com/dealing-with-an-auto-accident-in-wa....
Going from $100k to $2m is often quite cheap, comparatively.
I would expect your insurance to ask the damaged party to release you from further liability as a condition of accepting settlement at the coverage limits, but if the damages are significantly over the coverage limits and it seems likely that they could significantly collect on a judgement beyond your coverage, it's a possibility.
Umbrella insurance can go up to much higher limits ($2M is maybe already be an umbrella policy), sometimes up to $10M is easy to get, and depending on your insurer, often the upper millions are much less expensive. The tail risk is pretty small. If you're worried about it, may as well ask for quotes at $5M and $10M.
This is what I dislike about insurance. If someone hits my (hypothetical) $100k car and ruins it, I win $100k, but if someone hits my $1k car, I only win $1k.
Yet the person that hit me did precisely the same action/error.
I specifically recall New Jersey letting poorer people drive “insured” by letting them purchase insurance for effectively fender benders, and if they caused more damage, good luck pursuing them.
It functions as one, regardless of intentions.
You could also look at this the other way: the person driving the rust-bucket with 0 functioning airbags might win more injury compensation than the individual driving something solid with 9 airbags and walks away.
If it did, you'd have more incentives for insurance fraud.
(Also it's the other guy's insurance that pays for it, and if the insurance industry disappeared overnight, and you had to sue for damages directly, no judge would award you more than the damages you sustained. (For an honest accident.))
As a result, I don't pay for coverage for my own vehicle in case I'm at fault. My jurisdiction now lets me opt-out of repair coverage others are at fault, but I couldn't stomach that. I think it's just for rental car cos that have their own repair facilities and to avoid ever getting a salvage title.
And this is reflected in your insurance premium. The cost to insure your own car is lower if you have a less expensive car.
I do, however, think it's a bit unfair if you have to pay more for liability insurance because other people have chosen to buy more expensive cars.
Yes, this. You can opt-out of insurance for your own vehicle if you want, but generally required to buy some minimum for everyone else's property that might be involved.
How is that justified? $50k is $50k.
If more expensive cars leads to more expensive claims on average, the price of insurance might reasonably go up even if the worst-case exposure is the same…
I guess underwriting is less a game of building an appropriate liability shield but undercutting that liability shield as much as is profitable without at the same time bringing the company into insolvency.
I had always wished the idea of "open source" would have translated to some of these industries. Particularly given the level of technology available, instead of making the system easier to use and more transparent, they've made the easier to manipulate while blinding the consumer to any part of the process.
Thing is, they're not wrong. The cost of accident coverage has gone up, actually way beyond inflation - assume you hit a Tesla and it sits around 9 months until Tesla can be arsed to get spare parts, your insurance will be billed for the damage itself as well as a loaner car for the counterparty. And damage repairs themselves have gotten more expensive as well: what used to be a simple bend that your everyday farmer neighbour could fix with the basic tools in his garage all while being drunk out of his mind isn't even possible with modern cars made from aluminium or carbon-fiber composite, not to mention all the tech like distance sensors that go into modern fenders which has to be replaced and carefully recalibrated.
On top of that come all the issues with regular inflation (e.g. labor cost, real estate rental for shops) and the aftereffects of the covid pandemic and its supply chain shocks (there's still a massive number of car carcasses that couldn't be completed and now get priority in parts delivery).
[1] https://www.carscoops.com/2023/11/tesla-owners-stuck-waiting...
Weren't all those sensors supposed to reduce collisions, your fault or by others'?
Still worth it, likely, because saving lives doesn’t really have a dollar amount (cue fight club) - but certainly there.
Old steel bumpered cars would have zero costs at 0-5 mph collision; plastic breaks even at nearly zero. But the newer car safety is much higher.
Also, not sure your state or credit score but if you’re not in CA you’ll need good credit to get good rates. The only way to change that is government regulation.
Also if you’re getting the same rates from different places, it sounds like you’re being quoted the same company not different companies. If you aren’t going directly to the actual insurance companies website, that’s what’s happening.
That doesn't sound right to me. That would mean only the liability component is increasing in cost, but aren't the percentages being applied across the board?
However, the numbers are not publicized because they don't want competitors to have that info.
Another fun fact, a lot of people wonder, "Why doesn't an AI startup just disrupt the insurance industry?" It's because the Departments of Insurance have to understand the price formulas. Neural networks are infamously hard to interpret, so we would have to reform regulations before we can use neural nets.
Also insurance requires that the insurer discriminate a good driver from a poor driver. However they should not discriminate against a protected status.
Good luck setting up a system that can only discriminate using some signals and not others.
It is a good mental exercise trying to think of ways to set up a startup that can discriminate without being obvious about it.
This is the current system.
This kind of stuff is easy to catch. A single person typing some different parameters into an insurance quote webpage can catch it.
I'd like to know that the methodology is understandable and defensable and correctable, and having "an AI startup" disrupt with neural networks isn't going to do that. At best it will just be another excuse used to justify the state of the industry, "the computer said it so it must be right". Reforming regulations so it can be made even less transparent is not the way to go.
More than this, it's a fundamental misunderstanding of what AI is and what it can do to ask this sort of question.
Best thing I've seen come on the market was Root, based in Columbus and founded by a former Finance director from Nationwide insurance. It used your cell phone to send telemetry signal to classify your driving behavior.
Also, things like machine learning for image recognition in claim photos, satellite data, etc. has also been in use for at least the same amount of time.
I believe the Lemonade renters insurance product also does some kind of "AI" claims processing. I wouldn't know what that looks like, my focus when I was in insurance was solely in underwriting.
What do you mean? Pricing is all publically available (sometimes not all the details that feed into the model that create the pricing tables.) You can search SERFF by carrier, by line, by State, and read the actuarial filings.
Most of the time, pricing is refined by looking at prior year(s) losses, and adjusting. You go to the State, explain how much you've been losing, and they review. All that correspondence is public as well.
Once your car is paid off, you can usually drop the collision damage on your own car - but don't be surprised if you are still paying thru the nose.
Curious though: what state are you in, and how much are you paying?
As comparison, we own three cars (2015, 2013 and 2011), for three drivers (youngest is 21) and have pretty decent level of coverage, including coverage for damage to our cars even though they are paid off - and only pay ~$1600/year in total for all three cars/drivers in Mass, which to me seems pretty reasonable.
Great. Socialize healthcare as the current non-single-payor market is forcing all sorts of market distortions in unrelated markets, AND fix the price fixing. Win win win.
ED: adding clarity for the call for socializing healthcare to dampen the massive price distortions in other markets.
I don't understand how you come to this conclusion. Can you explain?
> Socialize healthcare as it is forcing all sorts of market distortions in unrelated markets
I interpreted that as a call to socialize healthcare, not a description of market effects that "socialized healthcare" has to the extent that exists in the US.
If you want even cheaper car insurance, you can even go beyond socialized healthcare. You can have socialized car insurance! Or in some cases a hybrid system where you insure your vehicle but not all trauma and damage to the other party. But I don't think Americans would be a-okay with seeing a government employed doctor when they make their injury claims. Even if outcomes are better than a purely private system.
Required insurance covers € 7.5 million for personal injury, € 2.5 million for property damages.
Edit: P.S. I am in favor of single-payer healthcare, I just don't think that is the particular cause of expensive liability car insurance - rather personal injury and property damages would seem a larger driver to me.
> Required insurance covers € 7.5 million for personal injury
So in Europe (or at least some parts of Europe with otherwise socialized healthcare?), if someone is injured in a car accident, their medical bills are paid for by the insurance of the person who hit them, and not that country's single-payer system?
The personal injury part is meant to compensate for personal injury, such as "compensation" for becoming unable to work, or live the same way as before.
Regardless, if I loose my leg through the negligence of someone else, paying for the amputation isn't going to make me 'whole' again.
you'd have to put a literal price on my leg.
It isn't perfect. It doesn't take into account missed career oportunities, inflation, the pain, or mental issues. But you can work besides the money they give you, and oftentime, you'll get the 10% for a long time, because paresthesias (whatever that thing is spelled in english) and small sequellas can stay for a long time (I know soemone who earn roughly 200€ per month, but she has trouble working in most kitchens now. She used the main check to get into academia though, and will probably end up with a master's degree for her troubles).
Still the insurance needs to cover loss of income, private care when NHS care is not fast enough, and "general damages" ("This covers the pain and suffering you have gone through and the [non financial] impact the injury or illness has had on your life")
England is an outlier. Average wage works out to 44,252.67 USD (£34,963/year) vs US is at 70,248.63.
Average car insurance in England is 710.06 USD (£561/year) vs 2,545 USD in United States.
Massachusetts is a severe outlier in terms of car insurance and your well below the norm. MA averages 1646/person/year vs 3950/person/year in Florida. https://www.bankrate.com/insurance/car/states/#average-car-i...
The significant increases in relatively irreparable high value cars on the road is presumably a driver of increasing insurance rates.
One solution would be to cap liability for damages to other people's cars to the median value of a car on the road. If you own a car worth more than the medium and want/need damage insurance for the full amount, you should take on that cost rather than saddling the public with it.
All the median-priced-cars from these brands, which are instantly totaled by anything other than cosmetic damage, are still driving up everybody else's rates.
The price of a car is trivial compared to the price of a person.
$5M is firmly in umbrella insurance or suing the at fault driver territory.
This needs to stop. We need change.
[1] https://www.wsj.com/finance/insurance-companies-profits-stoc...
I think the numbers accurately reflect what insurance companies will expect to pay out for claims. It’s partly due to the nature of vehicle design now and partly due to the cost of repair.
- the cost of the other person's car
- your healthcare
- the other person's healthcare, including passengers in each car
- damage to other property like buildings and equipment that people drive into
- lost wages if you're too injured to work
- and a lot more.
The cost of a crash can be many times higher than the cost of your car. Of course maybe you only have liability insurance, which frankly is not a great idea and I would recommend getting comprehensive coverage if you can.
That's the more likely reason for similar insurance prices from different providers.
You know how big-box retail stores will price match products? That's in order to keep tabs on competitors' prices, and to pose a credible threat of starting a price war. Keeping the peace means keeping prices elevated above marginal cost.
Insurance companies rolling out online rate comparison tools has a similar effect.
State Farm, for example, lost over $14 Billion last year, mostly from their Auto insurance line. Payments related to losses were 95.2% of the premium they collected, resulting in them having an overall -17% profit margin in that Line.
https://www.carriermanagement.com/news/2024/03/01/259296.htm
We need better rent stabilization laws. Not the ones we have in many big cities that result in perpetually skewed markets and $200/mo rents. But a more comprehensive approach including requiring multi-year lease options, 12-month or greater rent increase notice requirements, and rent increase caps that prevent catastrophic rent hikes but still allow units to align with market rates over longer timeframes.
Unfortunately, people prefer to strawman the entire concept by pretending that the only "rent control" laws that can exist are like those in NY or SF.
I’m not sure what model parent thinks will work. Maybe rent control light where price increases are limited but the limit is highish? I can see that working out, limiting increases to 1.5-2X inflation might keep the market fluid and provide some stability to renters without locking new tenants out.
My parents have seen a 4x increase in the value of their house in 20 years, is that unfair?
If we wanted to make the market fair, we would disallow home owners all together. This effectively happens for most people in some places in Europe. Also, I heard of some places in Europe where if you own your own home, you have to pay some extra tax vs. what you would have paid in rent. I think Switzerland? They also had some form of rent price control, although this just made it really hard to rent an apartment even if you were willing to pay more. These are fairly complex systems that all give advantages to existing residents (so moving to Europe for two years to do a post doc is much harder than it would be if you did that in the USA).
Still, capping increases to something like inflation+2%, and making leases continuous with long termination periods would be entirely sensible fixes.
And that doesn't seem like a good possibility.
But instead, if you can notice rent increase let's say 1 month before year is full, they might look at what are current cost and think oh, I could do with lower increase.
Also something like 2% above inflation does not lead to unreasonable increases. Until market rates are reached.
If the increase is too high, the tenant can push back by moving, or negotiating.
This only works, of course, if you actually have a supply of vacant housing. If there's a housing shortage, no amount of notice is going to fix the rental situation.
You cannot legislate away costs for an in demand product. It can't be done. Put strict rent increase laws in place and all you do is make it so people sit in their apartment for years to lock in that low rent.
Since that’s true you can use policy to decide who gets to keep the inevitable consumer surplus.
I live in a rental building in Vancouver, and without rent control it would be awful for everyone, as the demand has been insane in the past decade. Sure, for people like us who can pay 2x the rent wouldn’t exactly be a problem, but I have friends, and a lot of elderly in my neighbourhood who would have to move out right away. I can’t imagine a possible way for supply to catch up with the actual demand just because how the municipal governments function. And well, construction business isn’t known to be efficient here in North America.
It will have consequences. Some of those consequences might be negative.
But some won’t. It’s a policy choice, economists aren’t priests.
This is fixable by taxation or by limiting corporate ownership of homes.
Most societies do that sort of thing on the regular, but people pushing back against rent control rarely want open borders and welfare for non-citizens.
Not that I disagree with building more housing, or being more creative with rent control, but the fact that people in rent conrolled areas can afford to stay in one location isn't a bug. There may be other bugs, but that ain't one.
The properties people purchase as second and third homes aren't going to make a difference to the people struggling to afford 1 bedroom apartments.
Focusing on second and third homes is just a way to punish people wealthy enough to afford multiple homes. While punitive taxes against other classes are attractive to certain parts of the voter base, it doesn't actually improve the situation for people looking for cheap apartments at all.
They will. As fewer homes are allocated to current homeowners, they will be instead available to renters. With fewer renters on the market, the cost of renting will decrease.
It seems like if you add supply to one area of the housing market like the one above, there is a group of people ready to take advantage of that supply. 3bdroom apartment renters buy a home, then 2bdroom apartment renters get a bigger place that's affordable and meets their needs.
Assuming this works exactly like intended, that 1 family with two or three houses now only owns one and 2 other families get a house, then you're freeing up supply across the whole range of properties.
That won't fix anything. People with capital compete with people who have housing needs for the available houses. Increasing number of houses doesn't change this dynamics.
The people in need of housing will get priced out of available houses eventually.
What should be done is taxing housing heavily and progressively so that houses become a shitty asset that costs you more the more you have of it.
People with capital will drop it like hot potato and finally people who just want to live will be able to afford it again.
It's done, and in many places around the world. In NY and SF; in Vienna, the government owns a large proportion of the housing and keeps it affordable (iirc).
So yeah, if you were lucky enough to have a grandparent get one of those apartments, yes, it will be affordable.
I keep having to bump my wife's allowance while not getting bacon because it isn't in her budget.
You can always look at countries/cities where your "solution" has been tried and see if rents shifted.
Certainly in my city there are many more houses (infill and suburbs) and rents are not dropping - however we also have high immigration so demand is rising.
Then again, popular cities have huge demand. Increasing supply seems unlikely to fix the underlying issue.
> Increasing supply seems unlikely to fix the underlying issue.
The underlying issue is that the law of supply and demand applies to housing just as to any other market. Increasing the supply is the only way to lower prices.
It would help long term if houses were required to be built well.
It would also help if there were incentives to build more housing when the market was notably dysfunctional; as it has been for the past 40+ years.
In either case we're throwing the whole pricing part of the market away while still pretending we're engaged in capitalism. Unless you dedicate huge amount of resources to the problem you will likely harm more people than you help.
You could compete with the market through publicly owned housing that people of low income can apply for.
You could upset the market by vastly overhauling zoning laws to make them more open and less bureaucratic.
You could increase access to the market by introducing property tax brackets that are based on total property ownership in a county.
You could increase access to housing options by drastically improving high speed transport to new areas that are currently underdeveloped.
If people are being priced out of the market it's because not enough options exist, which in NYC and SFO is a real physical issue, but in most other places it seems like an entirely artificial issue.
I'd guess there's not a lot of demand for these as renters also want the flexibility to move.
If you require landlords to give 12 months notice of rent increase and cap the year-over-year increase, the outcome is entirely predictable:
Every 12 months, tenants will receive a notice of pending rent increase, and that rent increase will be the maximum allowed by law.
This game has already been tried before. Once you start tying people's hands, the optimal strategy is to become as aggressive with rent increases as the law will allow. The only time you back off is if you have a vacancy you can't fill, but that's unlikely because once a city starts controlling rents heavily (even with your proposed laws) it discourages more construction.
There's basically no difference between strict rent control and a rent control that limits rent increases to X% per year with 12-month notice period. They're the same thing because once you cap something, people feel compelled to chase the cap for fear of getting left behind.
I'd suggest having no maximum increase, and having the landlord be liable for moving costs if the tenant chooses to move and the landlord is not able to re-rent the unit within a short time period at the increased rent price.
That is roughly a 10% increase, way above inflation. Any sort of rent control would have the rent less than the cost of ownership in 2 or 3 years.
There are costs to both moving and to a lack of home stability that are ultimately born by society at large, but that are effectively negative externalities to the actions of landlords.
There are probably other things I should comment on first instead, but this usage of “IRL” made me laugh. I grew up with the initialism IRL while chatting online as a small kid so when I emailed a teacher where I accidentally wrote “IRL”, he quipped, “What? As opposed to us meeting ‘in fake life’?”
Now I feel jokingly vindicated against Mr. Teacher as this is the first time I read a government website use IRL. It would seem that algorithms and cyberspace aren’t part of real life to the government, even when it’s about housing price collusion, one of the realest real-life things I can imagine!
I joke that, given enough time, the “English future tense” they teach will be “to be gonna”.
As opposed to your dishonest opinion?
>I accidentally wrote “IRL”, he quipped, “What? As opposed to us meeting ‘in fake life’?”
So is the problem the “RENTmaximizer” software and other services that basically gather price information ?
Because if perfect price information is available, and yet there is no competition in the market driving prices down, well, that’s rentier markets for you.
There must be an economics PhD or two in that
From the brief: To participate in the service, landlords must share in “real-time” their “non-public,” “competitively sensitive” data, including actual rents paid, occupancy rates, and records of lease transactions. [Multifamily Compl. ¶¶ 227, 380.] RealPage then feeds “this data into a common algorithm.” [Student Compl. ¶ 5;] [Multifamily Compl. ¶ 380.] The common algorithm uses these common data for a single, common purpose: to generate “forward-looking, unit-specific pricing and supply recommendations” for all participating landlords. [Student Compl. ¶ 5.] To ensure that the landlords abide by these “recommendations,” RealPage puts significant “pressure” on them “to implement RealPage’s prices,” including by requiring clients to submit requests to deviate to the “corporate office” and tracking the “identity of the client’s staff that requested a deviation.” [Multifamily Compl. ¶¶ 17-20, 261-86.] As a result, landlords using RealPage adopt RealPage’s recommendations 80-90% of the time. [Id. ¶ 15.] The complaints allege that RealPage was clear about the purpose of its common pricing scheme: to increase prices above competitive levels through collaboration.
Doesn't sound like the natural ebb and flow of the market to me.
These algorithmic pricing systems extend that information advantage by pooling information across landlords (maybe not illegal by itself) and leveraging their position as market-wide price-setter to push rents higher, with the promise that so many units are following their recommendations that renters have ~no alternative (very illegal price fixing)
I could think of several advantageous moves like artificially inflating rents then favoring a well paying client by keeping their rents lower than the market. Investing in property spread out across shell companies and then have the algo favor them in a non-intuitive way.
[1] if they're both participating in the pool, clearly an institution seeing pricing signal from an alternative trading system (even if it's only their own cleared trades) has more information than someone observing only public market transactions.
I worked in legal higher-ed for a long time; I have absolutely no legal education, but my job involved reading lots of writing about the law, both for expert and non-expert audiences. Accurately conveying the importance of a topic without getting into the nitty gritty or running into collisions with colloquial and legal word usage is tough. Even that one paragraph I quoted had like 6 citations or something, and that's not just to satisfy technical requirements. There's just so much subtlety behind even very common words like may, must, shall, and will when used in a legal context that it seems like context switching is tough. The word count seems to grow logarithmically with the factual and conceptual detail, and even then you're leaving out a lot of padding beneficial to laypeople. We ran an open database of caselaw and we regularly got questions from well-meaning folks trying to inform themselves about some legal predicament by reading the cases, but it's just not feasible. Lots of folks argue that the whole thing is just based on shitty writing practices and gatekeeping legal knowledge, which might be true, but the difference is still consequential now. I actually think this is one area generative AI will be a huge boon, though I was skeptical until pretty recently.
Also, accessibility is a concern. Lawyers doing this sort of work are often very concerned with making their work useful to general audiences. Since subpar access to educational resources and cognitive disabilities are over-represented among low-income people, they're the most heavily affected by this. I wouldn't be surprised if they avoided a lot of nuance assuming curious people would just read the brief. I imagine they'd have written it differently specifically for a largely college-educated professional crowd, but I can definitely see why they didn't.
But the other comment says something about coercion. Now that's what price fixing is.
yup, puts them way over the bar here.
But there's a meaningful distinction between posting transactions, and recommending prices for new transactions. A public market does the former, but relies on participants to ultimately set prices. The latter is probably fine too, iff the prices represent some good-faith estimate of a 'fair' market price. However, recommending systematically inflated prices with the intention of raising the price level globally is probably price-fixing on its own, even if there's no coercive element.
If I were to have a rental property and a management company for it to be hands off, I’d probably want to defer rent setting to the people that understand that local rental market. Both parties have aligned incentives - they want to maximize rent. I guess the government just wants the low-information party to set the pricing? Are there any near-monopoly property management companies in any major metro in the US? Seems like they’re a dime a dozen with lots of competition — doesn’t seems very anti-trust-worthy to me, but what do I know?
If 60% of a city's major property companies sign on with RealPage and *also* agree that they will not undercut the prices RealPage chooses (eliminating economic competition between the property companies), that's not just being a high information party, it's collusion.
The problem is that housing in major cities has a relatively fixed supply, so the colluding landlords know that even if a competitor undercuts them eventually they will simply fill their units and cease to be competition for new renters.
From a ProPublica piece [1] about it, for example:
> In one neighborhood in Seattle, ProPublica found, 70% of apartments were overseen by just 10 property managers, every single one of which used pricing software sold by RealPage.
[1] https://www.propublica.org/article/yieldstar-rent-increase-r...
The collusion is the agreement to adhere to the pricing set by a central pricing authority, not basing your prices off shared information or recommendations. This makes a lot of sense now.
Edit: Well maybe it wasn't missing, but I missed it in any case. Cheers.
Vacancies kill returns.
Unless you can guarantee prices will rise, then you just recoup lost revenue when it's next occupied.
Vacancies kill returns, because you aren't actually getting paid - at all - for the thing that you make money off of.
Long term (very long term) more modest improvements could of course pay off - BUT, that shortly would require you be way outside the market rates if you had many vacancies, or doing completely impossible things like 100%+ increases in rent y/y to not lose money.
Now if you're able to corner the market, maybe. But good luck actually successfully doing that, since people are generally able to move, live with relatives, live in RVs, live in tent encampments, etc. if you try.
https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/03/23/key-facts...
And doesn't seem that unusual frankly looking at the chart? [https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/03/23/key-facts...]
Near as I can tell, it was inflation being exported from the cities into the rest of the country as remote work let people leave the highly congested area with their bigger city salaries. So what would have been higher than that rent in the cities became higher rent EVERYWHERE.
Which in some areas may indeed have also allowed realtors to do some of the pricing tricks, but none of the actual data seems to indicate it was anything but business as usual?
This seems like more 'make an article to draw clicks' than anything real?
Re: Google Antitrust - I'm talking about the search engine monopoly case [https://news.bloomberglaw.com/antitrust/dojs-google-monopoly...]
I can't find any followup on the case though, which is weird. Anyone know how it ended up going? Maybe still ongoing? [https://www.theverge.com/2024/2/23/24080493/google-doj-antit...]
This might be true for an individual that only owns one or two properties, but for a company that owns tens or hundreds of properties they can let stuff set empty to drive up prices on all of their other properties.
In some cases, they'll literally default if the number goes below a certain value. They already are in deep trouble with the cost of financing going up (3x in many cases) due to fed rate increases, as commercial loans aren't 30 year fixed like typical residential ones are. Think 5-7 year variable rate, or weirder, and often 3-5% higher than the nominal mortgage rate as commercial loans are riskier (not gov't backed).
Nobody (except individuals, maybe) wants the system to implode right now, including lenders, as everyone is hoping for a post-covid boom that will get everyone out of trouble.
It's also why they give so many 'incentives' in the form of free months rent on signing. They still get to claim the higher rent on their stats (keeping the overall nominal value of the complex high), put the incentive under a marketing cost, and voila.
Normally, these financing deals do 'gimmes' for high vacancy rates/ignore them because typically that is temporary - it impacts cash flow, but not 'value'. Everyone has gotten used to ignoring cash flow (to their detriment IMO) over the the last many years, and has been basing their portfolio on 'value'.
The units sitting empty thing 'works' until the cashflow becomes an actual problem, at which point they are bankrupt and the whole house of cards implodes anyway. But wil-e-coyote wise, that may never actually happen, which is why they keep doing it.
Personally, I'd be shorting all these ETFs if I was bored and had enough cash sitting around.
How would a management company force an owner to do anything they didn't want to do?
If you are an individual landlord, yes, as you are cash-flow sensitive.
However, a lot of these "landlords" are private equity companies and the complexes have financing agreements.
The issue is that "lower rent" can trigger a "recapitalization" clause on the financing agreement. When that happens, the PE company will have to cough up cash. "Missing" rent, however, is generally allowed to be tacked onto the end of the financing agreement. That creates a perverse incentive if the system is highly leveraged--nobody wants to cough up cash and everybody is willing to kick the can down the road. And the PE companies have enough cash flow from other properties that they can ride this out (until, obviously, they can't and everybody fails simultaneously--but then they'll whine to the government for a bailout ... that's a different rant).
The "solution" is occupancy taxes. An unoccupied residence or commercial spot should have to pay a significant amount of cash if it remains unoccupied for longer than 6 months to a year.
Notably, while individual landlords are much more cash flow sensitive (as in per-unit issues), even big companies will have issues if these problems happen 'at scale'. And those problems will be monstrously large when they happen.
Occupancy taxes will just make the bubble pop that no ones wants to pop, since the issue is dropping rents will trigger defaults due to financing issues because financing is still more expensive than it was, and that isn't going to change anytime soon. And said taxes would trigger high cashflow costs, which would just force companies into bankruptcy ASAP.
Same with the bond issues that took out a bunch of banks last year, and still are causing structural bad debt issues everyone is trying to ignore right now.
And that's fine.
Those who didn't stick their necks out should be able to buy the distressed assets at discount and force the financing agreements to unwind. Real estate doesn't go away. People still want houses. Businesses making products don't go away. Places to work--maybe not so much.
Unless you allow bad businesses to go bankrupt, you'll wind up like China.
Vacancy taxes force that decision much sooner--before everything goes belly up at scale. The landlord has to decide to rent lower or sell the property.
Entities which are held by retirement funds and 'mom and pop investors'.
Which no normal individual is going to be able to buy.
And when this happens, will result in massive layoffs of normal individuals.
And this is caused by feds raising rates - directly.
Remember '08? Remember who got screwed the most? It wasn't typically the rich.
Price fixing is a defined crime. So if your agreement is to fix prices between competitors in secret then you are "colluding."
The extension here is that if your agreement is to use similar pricing information sources, property availability lists, or algorithmic components, that this is a form of price fixing, and is thus also illegal, and so you "colluded" by forming this agreement.
The FTC's position is that the agreement itself is illegal. They additionally suggest that even if some of the competitors sometimes "cheat" on the agreement, that doesn't prevent the formation of the agreement itself from being a crime.
This all seems pretty straight forward. They committed a crime. There was no reason to form an agreement. Had they not done that, there would be no case, and no obvious intent. As it is, their intent was clear, to break the law at the public's expense.
This, by the way, is why we have ANSI and IEEE and ITU and all kinds of other "open" standards groups. If you don't do it in secret then much legal burden is immediately lifted from you.
By maximizing individual profit, the software rapidly finds the real fair market value of rentals. It turns out that the fair market value for rentals is much higher than people thought! This should make sense: housing supply is low, housing demand is high, and housing demand is extremely inelastic. It is a situation where egregious profits should be expected! Landlords simply hadn't realized that they could charge more.
There is one seemingly illogical result, which is that some units go vacant despite the huge demand. But unsold goods are a normal part price discovery, and we are not talking about a huge change: occupancy rates only drop a few percent.
It's a brutal result for tenants, but the alternative is incorrect pricing, which has its own negative implications for the whole market.
That's cool and all but the price should be somewhere between the supplier cost and the purchaser value, not pegged at the top.
> real fair market value
Only if there's strong competition.
It is — it just turns out that the purchaser value is quite high!
Which is an objectively bad price for housing.
If competing businesses agreed to use the tool and not deviate (or not deviate more than a set amount) from its suggested price, then yes, that's totally price fixing.
I believe that it's price fixing even if they merely agree to use it to inform their starting offering price.
In some other comment thread, folks mentioned that if a landlord outsources rent price investigation to a third party, that third party has to be __very__ careful about working with other landlords, so as to not even accidentally engage in price fixing by recommending prices to multiple competing landlords.