Comment by ranger_danger | Hacker News Reader

Comment by ranger_danger | Hacker News Reader

Parent Full thread

> An editorial in the Washington Post argued that "smartphone users must accept that they cannot be above the law if there is a valid search warrant", and after claiming to agree that backdoors would be undesirable, then suggested implementing a "golden key" backdoor which would unlock the data with a warrant.

What if there WAS a golden key of sorts, but it was split up (like "Shamir secret sharing") among several entities so that all of them would be necessary to decrypt the data (while also allowing for due process in cases of disagreement)? Obviously great care would have to be used when choosing the right entities and whom do not have any conflicts of interest or ulterior motives, as well as finding a way to prevent all the keys or whatnot from ever being in the same place at the same time, so that the golden key could never be stolen in its entirety.

I know that's not ideal and could still likely be compromised, but what other options are there for "tech companies to do more" in assisting law enforcement? I know CALEA/FISA/etc. is a thing in the US, but I'm talking about a possible "accountable encryption" implementation, which while may be impossible to be bulletproof, might be "good enough"?

The problem is not a technologic one, it's societal.

It doesn't matter if you give a piece of the key to the ACLU, one to the EFF or whatever other entities one might think as "impartial" or "without conflict of interest".

As long as there is a law that allows the governnent to send Men With Guns® to these entities, they can and will be coerced.

FISA is the prime example. You can have all the laws you want, but as long as "they" have things like NSLs which prevent you from even having a lawyer without clearance to defend yourself, you are royally fscked.

(This case is in Australia so they might not have FISA or similar, but the point is the same)

https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/31/encryption-debate-i...

> In 2018, the heads of Australia’s law enforcement and intelligence agencies were given broad powers by the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018,1 or TOLA Act, to gain access to encrypted communications.

> ...

> The most controversial section of the TOLA Act amended the Telecommunications Act 1997 to create “frameworks for voluntary and mandatory [communications] industry assistance to law enforcement and intelligence agencies.”

> ...

> Three kinds of notices or requests sit at the core the TOLA Act framework:

> * Technical Assistance Requests (TARs), which are “voluntary” requests for a “designated communication provider” to use a decryption or other data access capability they already have;

> * Technical Assistance Notices (TANs), which are compulsory notices for a designated communication provider to use a capability they already have; and

> * Technical Capability Notices (TCNs), which are compulsory notices for a designated communication provider to build a new capability, so that it can fulfil subsequent Technical Assistance Notices and Requests.

> The definition of “designated communication provider” runs for three pages, and includes everyone from the major telecommunications carriers down to an entity that “provides an electronic service that has one or more end-users in Australia,” anyone who “develops, supplies or updates software used, for use, or likely to be used, in connection with” such a service, and “manufactures or supplies components for use, or likely to be used, in the manufacture of customer equipment for use, or likely to be used, in Australia.”

What entities would have those keys?

Different branches of the same government means there’s only a single entity with all the keys. Pretending otherwise is maliciously naive.

Every entity or group of entities I can think of you suggesting has a pretty well documented history of undermining the legal rights their countries ostensibly provide.

Before you of course get to the elephant in the room: governments are notoriously bad at keeping super critical shit like this under wraps, and once it inevitably leaks literally everyone is fucked.

My suggestion for any nonsense laws like this would be: if the keys are ever leaked, misused, shared with any other entity, the country shall be required to pay full cost of replacement of every impacted device. They shall be liable for all downstream costs. The management and directors of every agency that had access to the material are personally liable for costs as well, as is every elected official that supported or approved the legislation. Claiming that they can’t be responsible for the mistakes of others is not permitted as a defense: there is already a defense against mass invasion of privacy and these incompetent fuck ups are constantly trying to pass legislation like this that removes that defense.

100%.

A system like this is bound to be compromised and abused.

Well, this is government. Once these keys exist every year there will be new organizations that get access. Secret service, police, justice system, IRS, youth services, ... all will be added one after the other.

> My suggestion for any nonsense laws like this would be: if the keys are ever leaked, misused, shared with any other entity, the country shall be required to pay full cost of replacement of every impacted device. They shall be liable for all downstream costs.

Police in the USA routinely destroy houses and other property of innocent people by accident (they made a mistake about an address or person). In many cases courts decide that the victim receives no compensation.

If that's how it works for obvious cases of incompetence and obvious easily quantifiable damages of physical property, there is no chance they will do anything about digital.

This kinda already happened for Telcos, LE got convenient backdoors and portals they can access.

Surveillance capabilities are IMHO, absolutely a slipperly slope.

If you build this multi-key thing and there is capability for direct access without going through company legal and staff for each request, the next thing that happens is they write policy or legislation so access requires 2 keys, theirs and a judge or oversight officer - who rubber stamps every request.

You can't really trust them, because they can change the rules.

Reply on news.ycombinator.com