The trick is finding the people that can be compromised.
The trick is finding the people that can be compromised.
For instance, this is the heartbleed bug: "memcpy(bp, pl, payload);". You're copying (horrible naming conventions) payload bytes from pl to bp, without ensuring that the size of pl is >= payload, so an attacker can trivially get random bytes from memory. Somehow nobody caught one of the most blatant overflow vulnerabilities, even though memcpy calls are likely one of the very first places you'd check for this exact issue. Many people think it was intentional because of this, but obviously there's zero evidence, because it's basically impossible for evidence for this to exist. And so accordingly there were also 0 direct consequences, besides being in the spotlight for a few minutes and have a bunch of people ask him how it felt to be responsible for such a huge exploit. "It was a simple programming mistake" ad infinitum.
So, in this context - who's going to say no? If any group, criminal or national, wanted to corrupt people - I really don't think it'd be hard at all. Mixing the carrot and the stick really changes the dynamics vs a basic blackmail thing where it's exclusively a personal loss (and with no guarantee that the criminal won't come back in 3 months to do it again). To me, the fact we've basically never had anybody come forward claiming they were a victim of such an effort means that no agency (or criminal organization) anywhere has ever tried this, or that it works essentially 100% of the time.
[1] - https://www.openculture.com/2015/12/simple-sabotage-field-ma...
If the target knows or suspects what you’re asking them to do is nefarious then you still run the same risks that they talk before your operation is complete. It’s still far less risky to avoid tipping anyone else off and just slip a trusted asset into a project.