But they haven't actually said that. It also happens that people say things based on faulty or disputed beliefs of their own, or people willfully misrprepresent things, etc
Until they actually do say something as explicit as what you suggest, they haven't said anything of the sort.
I feel like that is explicitly what this is saying.
Yes if they only train say, classifiers, then the only thing that can leak is the classification outcome. But these things can be super subtle. Even a classifier could leak things if you can hack the context fed into it. They are really playing with fire here.
i'm not entirely convinced that classifiers and LLMs are disjoint to begin with
And this can leak: for instance, typing "a good business partner for foobars is" might not send that text upstream per se, but would be consulting a local model whose training data would have contained conversations that other Slack users are having about brands that provide foobars. How can Slack guarantee that the model won't incorporate proprietary insights on sourcing the best foobar producers into its choice of the next token? And sure, one could build an adversarial model that attempts to minimize this kind of leakage, but is Slack incentivized to create such a thing vs. just building an optimal autocomplete as quickly as possible?
Even if it were just creating classifiers, similar leakages could occur there, albeit requiring more effort and time from attackers to extract actionable data.
I can't blame Slack for wanting to improve their product, but I'd also encourage any users with proprietary conversations to encourage their admins to opt out as soon as possible.
This is explained literally in the next sentence after the one you quoted: "We protect data privacy by using rules to score the similarity between the typed text and suggestion in various ways, including only using the numerical scores and counts of past interactions in the algorithm."
If all the global model sees is {similarity: 0.93, past_interactions: 6, recommendation_accepted: true} then there is no way to leak tokens, because not only are the tokens not part of the output, they're not even part of the input. But such a simple model could still be very useful for sorting the best autocomplete result to the top.