Everyone I talked to wasn't that happy with management.
Wasted 2 years on that bitter, bitter lesson followed by prolonged depression.
After the Metrowerks based, tooling, there were two attempts with Eclipse, the first wasn't that great and I no longer remember the name, the second one was Carbide.
Which is when then eventually acquired Qt, introduced PIPS to ease the pain, and started to make Symbian C++ dialect more friendlier, and closer to common programming without those strange two phase constructors, handles, and special suffix names on member functions.
So the community was starting to see the light of transition that was several years in the making, and out of the sudden, that "we are going Windows Phone 7" on a company that was UNIX first for several years.
When I joined, all network software was originally targeting HP-UX, for example.
So there wasn't much Microsoft love on the corridors.
In a community that was largety anti-Microsoft, joking how bad Windows CE and Pocket PC used to be, versus Symbian handsets.
The majority of the Symbian community felt betrayed and went elsewhere, to Apple and Google.
>> No. You should re-read that memo, specifically starting at "In 2008, Apple's market share in the $300+ price range was 25 percent; by 2010 it escalated to 61 percent." paragraph.
>> In 2010 nobody was interested in Symbian, no one else made phones on Symbian, no one would do apps for Symbian[0] - who would bother with all the Symbian shenanigans when even Nokia itself said what it would move to MeeGo 'soon', along with ~10% of smartphone market? Money was in Apple and Android.
>> Should I remind you what Elop's memo was a month later, in February 2011?
And yes, the board as well had its own share to blame, including hiring Elop in first place, with a big bonus payment clause if he managed to sell Nokia Mobile business unit, which naturally he ended up doing as well, and created a huge scandal in Finland's press at the time.
>> I was on the Networks unit
By the time the board hired Elop Nokia-tanic was already with a giant hull breach.
Sure, you can claim what your personal experience of an unrelated unit in Nokia gives you a proper visibility to the circumstances, but what Nokia actually did before the memo is telling what were happening there way better than your experience.
And... HP-UX? In 2010? Sigh.
You have no idea of what visibility I actually had, how Networks worked with Mobile, which buildings we shared, common lunch talks, nor I am going to disclose most of the NDA stuff.
So think whatever you want out of it.
Yes.
But I have a very good idea of what products Nokia shipped before the memo and they were quite shit, compared to the other options on the market.
Just re-read the memo itself and explain with a honest heart how exactly Apple got to 61% in 2010? Was that the evil Elop doing things? Or that was Nokia and Nokia employees doing shit for years before 2010?
You are perfectly aware what to lose the market in 2010 you need to make shit products in 2007-2009, because you can't be totally fine all this time and at Dec 31 2010 BAM all the base belong to Apple.
> which buildings we shared, common lunch talks
Puhlease, lunch talks don't push a shitty products to the market. It's the internal bureaucracy, lack of the ability to take the responsibility and overall the bloated and entrenched corporate culture of Nokia what does that.