> One example not relevant to this case but which came up in arguments was the hypothetical payment of a bribe in return for an ambassadorial appointment.
Under Monday’s decision, a former president could be prosecuted for accepting a bribe, but prosecutors could not mention the official act, the appointment, in their case.
So, imagine:
Prosecution: You took a bribe!
Defense: Bribe? No! It was just a gift.
Prosecution: It preceded the intended action, so it WAS a bribe.
Defense: What action?
Prosecution: Oops.
A mayor gave a large contract to a local business owner who then gave the mayor $13,000 in gifts and "advisory" fees. SCOTUS said that was okay, because the mayor didn't explicitly agree to a "quid pro quo" bribery deal before giving out the contract. They jumped through hoops to avoid the "rewards" part of the law.
So if you get your old public position back, you might be able to reap some SCOTUS-blessed rewards.
> JUSTICE BARRETT disagrees, arguing that in a bribery prosecution, for instance, excluding “any mention” of the official act associated with the bribe “would hamstring the prosecution.” But of course the prosecutor may point to the public record to show the fact that the President performed the official act. And the prosecutor may admit evidence of what the President allegedly demanded, received, accepted, or agreed to receive or accept in return for being influenced in the performance of the act. See 18 U. S. C. §201(b)(2). What the prosecutor may not do, however, is admit testimony or private records of the President or his advisers probing the official act itself. Allowing that sort of evidence would invite the jury to inspect the President’s motivations for his official actions and to second-guess their propriety.
It seems a little contradictory ("second-guess their propriety"? isn't that the point of a bribery indictment?), but the outline is clear, I think. Prosecutors are restricted from 'probing' the act (asking for records, testimony, etc. from the executive branch) but can use all evidence they otherwise would. The official act can be mentioned. Accepting the bribe is the prohibited, unofficial act for which the president enjoys no immunity from prosecution.
Nixon was never prosecuted because he was pardoned so the official acts stuff is moot. Crimes committed in war/putting down rebellion/etc are bad but more clearly within the scope of official acts than anything Trump is accused of.
Reagan, to the extent that he did/didn't coordinate with Iran to delay the hostage release, would be the closest parallel since it would have been a crime (Hatch act violation) in the direct pursuit of winning an election. But that was before he was president so this also wouldn't be relevant for today's ruling.
We don't prosecute ex presidents often because most of them either don't commit crimes or the ones they do are arguably part of the job. Trying to prevent the legitimate transfer of power is not close to a part of the job. The opposite in fact. Nixon only gets pardoned because he agrees to fuck off and spare the country the shitshow we currently have.
> The Constitution, of course, does not authorize a President to seek or accept bribes, so the Government may prosecute him if he does so. [... citations ...] Yet excluding from trial any mention of the official act connected to the bribe would hamstring the prosecution. To make sense of charges alleging a quid pro quo, the jury must be allowed to hear about both the quid and the quo, even if the quo, standing alone, could not be a basis for the President’s criminal liability.
(I wanted to quote Barrett since she's a Trump-appointed justice.)
Further reading...
https://harvardlawreview.org/forum/vol-136/the-imperial-supr...
Chevron deference has absolutely zero to do with this and never would have. I'd go deeper, but Brandolini's Law is real and I simply don't have the energy any more.
The short version is that Chevron was not a doctrine used in any and all cases where the law was ambiguous, it was always about whether an administrative agency's interpretation of the law was permissible. The subjects under consideration here do not fall under administrative law [0] and so Chevron would never have been relevant.
I think you are looking at this backwards. There was an unwritten agreement between the people and the Executive, namely, that we understand there are things that you might have done or had to do while President that to the ordinary person would be a crime and we will let you ride off into the sunset unbothered after you leave office, but in exchange for this, we expect there to be a peaceful transfer of power. We have entrusted this experiment in democracy to you, and when its time to go, you make sure it is passed on. Even Nixon did this.
There have always been contentious elections - some have ended up in the courts - but at the end of the day, a process was observed and followed. Donald Trump was the first President to not respect this unwritten agreement between the Office and the people. And now conservatives are doing what they always do: They are saying that we the people are not protected when the Executive doesn't hold up their end of the bargain, but that we are bound to uphold ours.
If a president discusses with his cabinet how to fight a war in a way that is possibly illegal (and then orders it), that is an official act, executing illegal actions, and is immune.
What is the difference between that and preventing the transfer of power to your political opponent?
Especially since now parts of your activity's are "official" and cannot be mentioned in court, and part of your activities are not official which are potentially prosecutable, see Barrett's arguments.
Got to love it when supreme court creates all these exiting new laws.