Carriers are increasingly vulnerable against things like missiles and drones that are multiple orders of magnitude cheaper. Think about how a carrier group would defend itself against, say, a heterogenous attack of 100-200 combined simultaneous ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drones, and/or manned aircraft.
Obviously carrier groups have multiple layers of missile defense: CWIS, combat air patrols, etc. But you only need one missile to get through and that carrier is quite possibly going to be unable to launch planes for quite a while.
And even if you don't hit the carrier, the carrier is going to be undertaking evasive maneuvers during the attack. That means no planes taking off and landing. For a very early example of this, look at the Battle of Midway. The American air attacks were disorganized and sporadic. And yet, they largely kept the Japanese carriers from flying planes for much of the day, leading to a crushing American victory just as their window of opportunity closed.
None of this exactly means carriers are "obsolete." Against non-peers, that is still a whole lotta force projection.
It’s hard to find a specific ship in open seas. The Russian navy suffers from a lack of combined arms and force protection. A carrier battle group is far more capable of defense than the Russian navy in the Black Sea.
I don’t believe you are well versed in modern naval operations. I’m not either but the fact that France, UK, Brazil, India, and China have aircraft carriers suggests they aren’t obsolete. Carriers are well protected. Not invincible.
The reference to Midway is odd because without aircraft carriers the U.S. would have lost the battle. Likewise, without carriers the Japanese would not have stood a chance.
If all you want is defense against an enemy deploying an airfield (aka aircraft carrier) close to your border, I think you could build thousands of them for the price of an aircraft carrier.
A bit like a minefield with mines that can target ships passing by.
An attacker would have to use mine sweepers to destroy them, protecting them with their carrier further out, but, these things being mobile, you could keep replacing them. Not invincible, but I think it is something planners are looking at.
(No such animal as a country called Taiwan. However there is an island called Taiwan.)
China doesn't need to invade the Republic of China. They just need to blockade it, just like Britain blockaded Germany in WW1 and WW2. The island of Taiwan would be out of fuel and food within weeks.
China invading the Republic of China would be like the US invading Hawaii. Why would you blow up your own stuff? You'd only have to spend perfectly good money to replace it.
It's World War III that deters China, not a carrier group or two.
Neither the U.S. or China is going to engage in a nuclear confrontation with each other and any war over Taiwan between the two nations would be conventional (though China is waging a rather successful cyber war against the U.S.).
I believe carriers are essential to deterrence against China attacking Taiwan. I could be wrong though.
Today that position is held by China. How long do you think that the US could replace its lost materiel and men against a country that is four times larger in population and probably ten times larger in manufacturing capacity?
The WHOLE OF THE WEST (5 eyes, Europe, and Japan) is smaller than just China alone in population and in manufacturing capacity.
We in the West won't know what's hit us when WW3 comes along. It'll be a lot worse than Germany's disastrous war against the Soviets in WW2.
I'm saying that China would like to avoid WW3.
It would not be good for business, and it also might sort of end humanity via nuclear war.
The entire carriers are fast and will be where missiles will not misconception comes from people conflating carrier speed (slow), with adversary ability to plan/execute counter strike operations (typically even slower). The prior assumption is _most_ US adversaries lack ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) which would constrain mission planning to many hours which gives carriers room to move 100s of nautical miles, either outside of retaliatory missile ranges or simply adversary OODA loop, i.e. adversaries simply don't have hardware or software (as in processes) to plan a counter strike in time. It's not that carriers are fast, but adversaries are too slow in terms of operation planning to launch their fast hardware, giving carriers lots of time to slowly get to safety.
This is doesn't apply to high end adversaries with proper ISR (i.e. PRC who launched 100s of ISR satellites last few years) who pretty much knows where US carriers are at all times and have near persistent coverage of their operations, who can launch saturation strikes of mach 15+ missiles that can reach carriers within 30 minutes in indopac that can't be outrun and in salvo sizes that carrier groups does not have magazine depth to defend against.
PRC commercial sats can track individual fighters. PLA has enough ISR (look at all the Yaogan launches within just last few years) now for persistent IndoPac coverage, they don't need to pinpoint/loiter/luck etc, they essentially know where a carrier is within meter level accuracy at all times, including SAR to look through clouds. They're not spitting out spacex # of paylods but they've put up 100s of imaging satellites in last few years, with more coming, and likely have enough just commercial imaging now to track US carriers globally without losing sight of it.
This is not meant to condescend, but essentially your talking points are based on popular misunderstanding from online opinons that poorly regurgigated a series of online articles explaining why carriers are "not doomed" from Naval Gazing ~5 years ago, but even in those essays the author specifically carved out PRC nascent carrier kill chain at the time as the exception. It's 10 years later, PRC now has 100s times better ISR coverage missile capabilities, the talking points are even more out of date. The caveate of the articles was always, carriers are not doomed, except for maybe against 2015 PRC whose has XYZ (ISR, # of launchers / salvo sizes, level of informatization) that puts the fight pretty even. It's almost 10 years later, PRC has increased XYZs by magnitude, it's not level playing field anymore. i.e. PRC deliverable single salvo size went from, 2015 maybe a US CSG can successfully defend if dump missile defense into VLS and airwing to 2024 PRC who can launch enough to satutate any CSG loadout at ranges where they can't effectively operate.
E: this is not mentioning PLA system destruction warfare that will also degrade fixed targets like replenishment fleets who has to reload in port, the tldr is they can simply disable the entire carrier group (really all of USN) by limitting them to single deployment assets by denying airwing/escorts fuel. There are many ways to break USN carrier conops that are not designed against peer adversaries who can reach deep into USN logistics chain.
Thank you for this, new to me, information. Did they hit ships on a fixed course or hit ships doing evasive maneuvers?
are based on popular misunderstanding from online opinons that poorly regurgigated a series of online articles explaining why carriers are "not doomed" from Naval Gazing ~5 years ago
I've never heard of Naval Gazing. You don't know the sources of my information as I've not mentioned what they are.
Not trying to be presumptious about your sources, but basis of narrative that carriers are fast and hard to find traces back to those series of articles if you formed your opinion from readings within past 5 years - that's where it likely came from. It gots regurgitated and telephone gamed in various defense blogs and corrupted even more in online commentary. If knowledge is older than that, then it's obsolete.
Other thing to consider is US ASAT capability is limited - only like ~20 ASM135 which can reach high (~500km) LEO were produced (but we don't really know how many exists). SM3s which US has ~500, not all of which are ASAT capable and validated at ~250km. A lot of Yaogan constellation are at ~500km. Those SM3s may reach that, but they also double as ballistic interceptors for high end AShMs. TBF we don't know much about PRC ASAT inventory, we just know they have capbility with industrial base to build a lot of ordnances.
PRC also can launch satellites rapidly via road mobile TELs, and have long range, disposable, supersonic drones like WZ8 as backup/redundant kill chain. Of course US likely has ability to quickly put up space assets as well. There's also all sorts consideration like US launching an coordinated ASAT strike is basically shooting 100s of missiles without warning - if it doesn't accidentally trigger MAD it's going to trigger use-it or lose-it counter strike. Doing it gradually/piecemeal = PRC will have time to respond.
Really it comes down to attrition/numbers game, but when space assets in the multi 100s, there's a lot of build in redundancy against decapitation strikes, which inherently makes such strikes more difficult to pull off, i.e. is US going to disperse elements in theatre because just about anything in 1IC can still likely be hit with PRC missiles without GPS using INS/dsmac/tercom navigation. PRC going to know somethings up if Yokosuka gets emptied and adjust retaliation posture accordingly.
Things gets complicated vs adversaries with modern ISR in the ~100s. Caveate being that club is pretty much US+PRC. RU also has 100s but a lot of it legacy. Essentially everyone else US would consider adversary like IR or NK has single digits, and would get steam rolled. 2010s PRC borderline in this category, their ISR fleets was low/mid double digits then. Hence carriers are hard to find/kill holds true for that calibre of forces. But "neutralize enemies advantages" is apropos, and against most US adversaries, US primacy is based on US having ability in neutralizing those advantages. Difference vs PRC is PLA spent last 20 years of modernization specifically to neutralize US advantages - that's what their systems confrontation/destruction warfare doctorine is designed around - build enough redundancy to mitigate and defeat US advantages.
The less bloody route = PRC feels like it's ascending power, and they may think eventually correlation of forces in region will make it obvious US security architecture can't deal with PLA. Ask yourself how much hardware PRC can hypothetically put in Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Carribeans to really deter US. The answer is probably no amount, because US size + disproprotional military potential is in aggregate much larger. PRC 300x ship building advantage is result of casual PRC 2% GDP military build up, they haven't even began the industrial scale arms race i.e. PRC mass gigafactory scale defense procurement. I think in next medium/long term years it will be increasingly clear US posture in region is not going to be survivable or enough to deter PRC. Combine with PRC building out global strike that can conventionally hit CONUS strategic targets may force US to substantially reduce (not abandon) their security posture in East Asia to level that PRC finds tolerable.
I think PRC ability to take TW is almost forgone - can always blockade or raze TW like gaza with purely mainland platforms and grind for capitulation. But after US made PRC containment goal explicit, there's really no seperating a TW scenario with broader PRC/US+co scenario anymore. TLDR is it could end very badly, but I think unspoken is it could end as badly for US as it does for PRC. I think it will end _very_ badly for US partners in region.
If navies are obsolete then Taiwan’s best course of action is reconciliation with China with the best terms they can find. Likewise for all other countries near China.
There are no missiles capable of loitering.
Blatantly incorrect, and I'm not sure what you wrote that in response to? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loitering_munition The reference to Midway is odd because without aircraft
carriers the U.S. would have lost the battle.
Aircraft carriers were obviously the dominant force in the Pacific, almost a century ago. No argument there. There was really nothing to counter them, except fighters launched from other aircraft carriers.Whether we're talking about 1942 or 2024, aircraft carriers can't perform evasive maneuvers and launch/land fighters simultaneously. You pretty much can't land a non-VTOL plane on a carrier doing anything but traveling in a straight line into the wind.
During the Battle of Midway, the USN fortuitiously exploited this weakness more effectively than the IJN. It was a big factor in the US victory.
[Carriers] aren’t obsolete
As has been stated by myself and others multiple times: they're not entirely obsolete and still serve an important purpose. The vast majority of potential adversaries are not peers or near-peer capable of advanced missile attacks.But if you don't think a carrier group is extremely vulnerable to a superpower with advanced missile technology, you might literally be thinking in 1942 terms.
I don’t believe you are well versed in modern naval
operations. I’m not either
One of these statements is correct.There are no loitering missiles. If you read the wikipedia link you'd see this written:
Loitering munitions fit in the niche between cruise missiles and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs or combat drones), sharing characteristics with both.
Aircraft carriers matter greatly in peer to peer naval supremacy. China is building aircraft carriers to contest the seas around Taiwan against the U.S.
You are not well versed in modern naval operations. Neither am I.
Those that are big enough to do major damage
to an aircraft carrier can be intercepted by aircraft
Quite a few in this sentence alone.Hypersonic cruise missiles exist. These are as fast or faster than air to air missiles, making interception tricky to say the least: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypersonic_weapon#_China
Ballistic missiles are also generally going to be traveling at hypersonic speeds. As they descend at steep angles from space. Even tricker than cruise missiles traveling somewhat horizontally.
Third, a US carrier hosts about 40 fighters. During high tempo operations a single bird might be in the air up to 10 hours a day or so, but this tempo can't be sustained for long - it's not like you can have 40 simultaneous fighters in the air 24/7. Planes need maintainence, etc. Surely even you can understand that there is a limit to the number of simultaneous missiles these fighters and the rest of the fleet's defenses can intercept. There are a lot of variables that go into that number, and we're talking about classified and rapidly-evolving hardware, but I don't know that anybody thinks it's more than a near-peer could throw at a US carrier group.
China is building aircraft carriers to contest
the seas around Taiwan against the U.S.
This is all speculation, unless one of us literally has access to what China's military planners are thinking.But: no. I'd suggest looking at a map. Taiwan is less than a hundred miles from China's mainland. They certainly don't need aircraft carriers to fight a war in the seas around Taiwan. Come on.
They are, in all likelihood, primarily planning to use those carriers for force projection elsewhere in the world. (And/or for prestige purposes)
There are some informative answers from others in this thread; you would do well to learn about this topic if it interests you.