Hacker News Reader

If you're in AWS, you get credentials from the metadata service. If you're outside AWS, workloads assume roles using OIDC. If you still have access keys, generally speaking, you're doing it wrong.

https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/access-aws-using-a-goo...

View on HN

Both the metadata service and assuming a role with a “web identity” still give you an access key along with a session token.

Technically true, but in practice the role means you don't have to care about them. They're an implementation detail that's managed by AWS. Could be flying mice for all the app dev cares.

Sure, under the hood it is still access keys. Very temporarily defined access keys that going the normal happy path means you're not directly handling. What I'm really meaning by my above comment is you're not configuring your workload with ACCESS_KEY=abc123 SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=xyz789.

They aren't configured, but they're not as temporary as one might hope (i.e. they don't rotate on every read, for example), and it's pretty trivial set of exploits to leak them, especially in Kubernetes clusters with incorrectly configured worker nodes.

A much better solution would be for AWS to offer a domain socket or device inside VMs that will sign requests, such that the private material isn't even available to leak.

OIDC uses a client secret, for one.

Reply on news.ycombinator.com