> Apple did not have to sign a settlement with the EU, which Microsoft did in 2009.
Apple is also irrelevant in the corporate world, where the Crowdstrike shitshow happened, as they produce mostly consumer devices.
Apple is also irrelevant in the corporate world, where the Crowdstrike shitshow happened, as they produce mostly consumer devices.
MacOS endpoints are a prominent market as well. There's a reason CRWD, S1, Tanium, and others offer MacOS protection as well.
And anyhow, it seems you are ignoring my point - the settlement with the EU tied MS's hands.
Everything is an API. This means they cannot restrict access to the underlying kernel.
> They had the choice to give Windows APIs that allow to implement such software in a safer way
An indirect method would still inevitably have a potential issue. If a third-party vendor made a mistake, it's the third-party vendor's fault - in this case CRWD.
Sure, it's safer if only a single vendor is allowed to do this but it's also unfair.
> that are called on by Microsoft Security Software Products
Nothing says that Microsofts Security Software needs to be implemented in a way that runs in the kernel, which is inherently more vulnerable. Other platforms have APIs for security software to hook into kernel actions without directly running in kernel space (Windows does too, but to my understanding more limited to logging, not intercepting activity, and hence limited in usefulness).
Hence the claim that it was impossible for Microsoft to prevent this is false. That doesn't mean they take all the blame for someone elses mistake, but it still means that they made a choice leading to it: Deciding that security software, whoever made it, running in kernel modules was the way to do it.
No it doesn't. It just means they should restrict their own products from doing so, too.