CrowdStrike Timeline Mystery
bitsight.com
bitsight.com
> While we can not infer what the root cause of the change in traffic patterns on the 16th can be attributed to, it does warrant the foundational question of “Is there any correlation between the observations on the 16th and the outage on the 19th?”. As more details from the event emerge, Bitsight will continue investigating the data.
Interested to know how they're capturing sample data for IPs accessing Crowdstrike Falcon APIs and the corresponding packet data.
EDIT: Not to mention that they're able to distill their dataset to group IPs by their representative organizations. Since they have that info I feel a proper analysis would include actually analyzing which orgs (types, country of origin, etc) started dropping off starting on the 16th. Alas since this seems like just a marketing fluff piece we'll never get anything substantial :(
Just a random security company with a fluff piece with "CrowdStrike" in the title trying to get in the headlines.
I want my 10 minutes back.
The latter works better with organizations that release often and have reasonable surety that their updates are not going to cause disruption -- it becomes a normal part of the day, most commonly it causes no noticeable disruption at all, and thus it makes sense to not have to have eng / ops working late hours for the release. This surety can come from different ways, but the one I've seen is having a very methodical rollout with at least a smoke-test (affecting a very small subset of "production", not internal or lab machines, so in CRWD's case it would be customers' machines), and then rolling out to a random %age of machines starting with 1%, and depending on your level of confidence, some schedule that gets you to 100% before the end of business for your easternmost co-workers.
Some additional things to gain confidence can include a 1% rollout to a set of machines that is picked to ideally provide exposure to every type of machine in the fleet, and 100% rollout to customers who have agreed to be at the cutting edge (how you get them to accept that risk is an exercise for the reader, but maybe cut them a deal like 30% off their license).
The reason I'm curious about the distribution of channel file drops, for the case of Crowdstrike, is that if it's an atypically-timed release, that could indicate that it's a response to whatever caused the dip in traffic on the 16th mentioned in the Bitsight article.
Edit: From what I understand, Crowdstrike does have at least some segmentation of releases for the kernel extension, but it appears the configuration file / channel file updates seem to be "Oh well, fire ze missiles".
Not sure if that would make them more or less incompetent...
Collect evidence first, draw conclusions when you have enough evidence.
Makes a refreshing change from deciding what happened then collecting only the evidence that supports it.
Something happened, the nature of that something might be unrelated to the BSOD crash. Could just be another piece of software doing an update at a different frequency that sometimes changes the timing of the crowdstrike update.
You'd need a longer term view of data searching for beat patterns to detect that.
If the something was a one-off effect, like admins taking sick days to watch the Euro final, I'm not sure how you could positively identify the cause.
It's incredibly creepy that they A) are collecting this much data from customers B) are comfy drilling into it by IP/organization and C) have enough spare time to do so for a marketing blog post.
Also, for god's sake, you're a company, you're supposed to look professional. If you're going to use AI art for your blog at least don't be lazy: load up Photopea and either fix the broken text or magic wand it out. It'll take you 5 minutes.
Also kind of funny for BitSight to be claiming how much data they have to improve security. Yet, a massive change in traffic volumes is only surfaced in a hindsight analysis.