My experience from the airline industry is that the vast majority of systems classified as flight safety critical are not connected to the internet, or large networks at all. Which is good.
But unless we want to drastically change how airlines operate, the rest need to be online.
Today, you can purchase a ticket (or rebook an existing one) on your phone really close to the departure time. When that happens, a gazillion interconnected systems, across legal entity borders, need to cooperate to take you (and your luggage) to the destination.
To put all of this in a large non-internet network seems pretty pointless.
If we wanna go down that route, the only real "security improvement" I can think of is to dismantle the digital systems and go back to paper. Like Ryanair did during this incident. Handwritten boarding passess, verified against print-outs of passenger manifests.
But those couldn't have gone down due to Crowdstrike.
That's really only a secondary problem though, because disconnecting a network from the Internet isn't a replacement for security software or software updates, so you wouldn't even avoid the root cause of the issue here. I'm not saying CrowdStrike is essential software for Internet connected computers either, but if your business thinks it is, you should probably be running it on your "airgapped" computers too. And you should definitely be installing updates, so you can still fall victim to a bad updates regardless of which software you run. At best you perhaps increase the likelihood of hearing about a problem with an update before you deploy it on disconnected computers, but you can get a similar effect by delayed deployment of updates even on Internet connected networks.
Saying "run your own network" isn't exactly practical. Even imagining the very small airlines (that partner with big ones for the last leg) that only service a handful of rural airports, this doesn't seem practical.
The days of point to point updates over modems are overish with the amount of data that needs to be consistent transmitted and available.
I can imagine a modem at each airport and a phone bank of about 700 modems that are each getting or sending updates. The long distance calls to distant countries for that data could get expensive. Woe to the power outage in Texas that takes down the phone bank for a day or two or three or four.
Alternatively, there's a system that was developed to do this and it works pretty well most of the time. Combine this with having redundant systems there that are geographically separated. It isn't turnkey, but its probably better than other options that would involve home grown solutions.
Problem once again is humans. Humans need to interact with systems, either receive information from them or give it to them or use the systems to process it. And for efficiency in general it nowadays happens online. It could be offline, but that would be slow. Or it could be segregated networks but that would get really expensive. Imagine having own fiber line for your instant messaging and email? With different terminal...
In the end most of these affected computers are on Internet for very good reasons. And this model really is working vast majority of time generating lot of efficiency.
Having not done this just cost them billions. Now imagine the US at war or another nation state that just wants to cause havoc.
You're suggesting either that Crowdstrike itself will get used as a vessel for an attack, or that banks and airlines have firewall rules open for enemies.
The major airlines may not be "small time operations" but none of them are even in the top 100 US corporations by market cap. They simply don't have the level of IT resources or competence that we see at major tech companies.