Stage 2: "For consistency, we'll handle our second and third secrets just like that first secret. Or handle them through our existing configuration management system, with just some minor tweaks."
Stage 3: "If we mess up the credentials for these edge devices, the software update, monitoring and remote management features will break and we'll have to recall the devices. We should be very cautious about making any changes."
Stage 4: "Even with a secret manager, we'd have to protect the credential used to access the secret manager. Not to mention a long-lived credential to bootstrap new devices, or re-image broken devices in the field. The real solution here is Secure Boot and credentials tied into the TPM. If we want to do this, we'll need a team of six full-time developers and our own custom linux distro"
Stage 5: "End-user features and business value are our priority right now, credential rotation is on the schedule for Q3 next year"
The answer to this type of thing is full disk encryption (FDE). There’s zero reason not to have it on every device at the block level. Especially if you’re going to be processing highly sensitive data.
You can’t even trust disks to actually delete things anyway. So the only way to be sure that information is not leaked is to prevent it from ever being persisted to disk in plaintext.
This hash of 24 chars is my password for that account. I don't trust any of the online password managers. Is this actually safe or not?
Note: this is not used for any of my professional work
>view it as red flag and throw his resume away
>dude is Linus Torvalds
It's a phase we all go through, but some of us are stuck there forever.