You raise a good point, and we try our best to say that Shufflecake is not a toy, that users must be conscious, etc. I think what is missing is a proper user manual as a central source of documentation, we'll need to work on that.

But we cannot save the users from themselves. We do our best to make things easy and secure, but at the end of the day plausible deniability is one of those things that are kind of "hardcore".

To be more clear, I don't think I can see a reasonable scenario where using Shufflecake would put you in trouble but using VeraCrypt would not. I'd be happy to talk with people at the "receiving end of the wrench" (lol) and this is also part of our ongoing outreach campaign, but so far all of the cases I've seen are either "we cannot prove you're a criminal so we release you" or "even if we're convinced that you gave us all you have, we will still kill/torture you just because". For me, it's either you go plausible deniability "all-in", or you don't bother at all. And of course you're right that one needs to consider many things and adopt all sort of other precautions on top of that, but still a solution like Shufflecake is sorely missing right now.

But, yes, you are absolutely right that we must continue to put a big disclaimer for the users, and help them to understand the risk of using this.