Deductive Verification for Chain-of-Thought Reasoning in LLMs
arxiv.org
arxiv.org
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facilitated_communication
A long discredited intervention where a "facilitator" guides the hand of a non-verbal human to help them write down their thoughts and experiences. Experiments that blinded the facilitator to the observations of the subject, where the written message matched the facilitator's, rather than the subject's, observations, have convincingly proved that it was so much bunkum. It's the Clever Hans Effect all by another name, and with non-verbal humans rather than horses.
Chain of Thought works like that: without hand-holding by a human who understands how to answer a question, the LLM's performance drops, or drops off a cliff even. Of course this is much harder to prove for LLMs than it was for facilitated communication because LLMs don't really do anything without a prompt in the first place. Which should be a very big hint of what's really going on with CoT.
I benefit greatly from talking to colleagues which helped me understand things by not saying much of the answer but by asking the right questions and "thinking together".
The current chat interface where each sentence gets an immediate response and the model always has to say something feels unnatural. But OTOH it's not easy to find the right balance, so I didn't make much progress. Probably I need to talk with somebody :-)
Anyway. Being senior naming engineer myself I already have the name for the product:
Robert Duck
"That's interesting, tell me more"
"And why do you think that is?"
"And how does that make you feel?"
The end game is a brain-sized network where each neuron is an agent sending a 1M token prompt to a 10T parameter model to update their "weights".
There does seem to be quite a lot of independent ad-hoc efforts making custom notations for C-O-T. I feel like we're in a period similar to just after the first programming languages and compilers were invented but regular expressions were yet to come. In a way that's quite exciting, its another little Cambrian explosion.
I don't think it will be a panacea though. In my observations of failures of reasoning in LLMs, a lot of the problem isn't that they fail to follow logical steps but that they fail to notice the presence of implied premises completely. Chain of Thought is good for spotting the wrong reasoning, but not for spotting that the problem is not the one that it appears at first glance.
Could you please explain more clearly what you noticed? Can you find an example?
E.g. an oversimple example is:
It’s going to rain tomorrow so you should take an umbrella.
If someone doesn’t understand the relationship between an umbrella and keeping dry — the implied premise — they won’t understand why they should bring one and the statement would be puzzling.
We talk about this often as someone or something “not knowing what an x is” where in this case “knowing” means in a spatial or logical sense, not just a linguistic sense.
LLMs do not have this layer of understanding but they can fake it in short interactions.
There's no indication that LLMs possess anything like it, so there is no "knowing". I'm also not sure we can ever imbue an LLM with qualia without rethinking how we build LLMs and how they interact and learn from their environment.
No doubt LLMs do not have qualia as humans do, but I also think that the diversity of qualia present in humans is generally unqualified and underestimated at present.
There is often this attempt to draw a bright line on one feature or characteristic between humans and animals, or humans and AI, but I think that is a mistake based on an attempt to simplify the argument through reduction.
There are three killers in a room, someone enters the room and kills one of them, how many killers are now in the room?
Apart from the basic reasoning errors of small models (where they come up with all sorts of numbers), larger models that fail, do so because they fail to take into account that killing makes a killer. Some models succeed at this but it is unclear if this is because they are familiar with this specific problem.
The model has to make the distinction between that and
There are three fish in a room, someone enters the room and kills one of them, how many fish are now in the room?
or
There are three fish in a room, someone enters the room and kills one of them, how many killers are now in the room?
In these examples the word kills is pushed in one direction or another, but when it serves double duty in the original problem it can notice one premise and miss the other.
It's interesting task in frustration to try and get a model that gets it wrong to COT out of that particular error.