I'm skeptical of some of the claims about technological innovation being higher during periods of fragmentation. Correlation doesn't equal causation - there could be other factors at play. Still, an intriguing hypothesis worth exploring further.
Fragmented societies are less prone to bureaucracy, and more prone to not having enough people available to solve a problem. These factors absolutely help innovation.
Competition probably also played a part. If the emperor in China or Ancient Rome decided to ban or restrict certain fields/groups/ideas you were pretty screwed, innovation likely stopped, most progress was lost and the next generations had to start from scratch. In Europe you could just move to the next state or city. Same applies to major invasions and societal collapses, e.g. the Byzantine scholars fleeing to Italy during/after the Turkish invasions.
Did wars really have a positive impact on that though? I don't think the 30 years war etc. had such a positive impact, rather it probably slowed down progress by quite a bit.
The development of "smart bombs" like the Walleye television bomb happened about as soon as they were technologically feasible; the idea for a fire-and-forget television bomb came from an engineer who was playing around with a new model of commercial TV camera. Emboldened by these new weapons, American politicians started wars which previously they might have considered too politically costly if they had to be fought using older methods. Desert Storm particularly.
Originally, Ukraine had a few Bayraktars (nowadays hopelessly obsolete) and some observation drones. They couldn't even use drones against armor. The original losses of Russian armor in 2022 were mostly due to Javelins, NLAWs and similar specialized weapons.
Nowadays, the Ukrainians deploy jet-powered Palyanitsya drones to the deep rear of the enemy and regularly destroy heavy equipment with explosive drones.
That's not so obvious, at least in fields not directly related to warfarce e.g. Byzantine Empire was probably the most innovative, progressive and developed state in Europe (if not the world by ~1000 AD) constant endless warfare turned it into an empty shells by the 1400s.
Extreme instability, violence etc. rarely has a positive effect. Relatively peaceful primary economic competition (perhaps with some limited warfare) between multiple states might lead to very positive outcomes, though.
> I really want to push back against this view that automatically you have a Western ideological view because you emphasize diversity, freedom, and competition, and that somehow is ideology rather than fact. I’m telling that story from China’s own history. I do hope that I win some hearts from people who have an automatic immunity to Western ideas.
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> I aim to convey this message through Chinese history, hoping to persuade people to reconsider their aversion to diversity and competition.
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>"Too much autocratic stability is detrimental"
Gets challenged on Song innovation. No, no, I've rescaled importance of inventions, downplaying "four great inventions" that Chinese find significant, which conveniently illustrates Song is less innovative than Han-Sui interregnum, I hope the take away for PRC is that Chinese innovation the strongest when China most fragmented and mired in chaos. Get's challenged on commerce. No, no, historic/current Chinese commerce too restricted to launch industrial revolutions, see Jack Ma. NVM PRC explicitly did not want industrial revolution in unchecked financialization. Or PRC biasing scale in lieu of scope is pushing involution tier industrial revolution in many strategic sectors, i.e. PRC in a place to pick what revolution to scale. "In contrast, Western countries resolved this tension by embracing scope", except this came at the expense of scale, and one of PRC's biggest advantage is acknolwedging and pursuing quantity having quality of it's own. Funny how blob incentives map to imperial bureaucracy, think tanks another incarnation of posturing eunuchs vying for position (or not losing it) at the end of the day.