How to Disable a Nuclear Warhead in Midflight | Hacker News Reader

How to Disable a Nuclear Warhead in Midflight

spectrum.ieee.org

15-30 minutes is a long time to marinate in thoughts about what we've just unleashed. Under pressure it's possible that MAD would fail due to mutiny, confusion (determining who is still in charge and who is authorized to cancel strikes), conspiracy, or direct enemy intervention (assaulting a bunker where the un-launch codes are). If the decision theory behind MAD weakens due to those possibilities it makes a first strike more likely. Precommitments have to be irrevocable in order to work.

Mutual disarmament is the way to go. It just takes a long time and a lot of stability.

Mutual disarmament does not work, if you think it would then you might be best served studying human history in warfare and human nature in general.

The proverbial cat is out of the bag. the milk is spilled and you can't unspill it.

disarmament is one of the few ways you can guarantee a nuclear war.

in fact things would go the other way, with cheaper and smaller nuclear technology, newer, more precise and more efficient nuclear weapons are inevitable. Diplomatic deterrence, MAD doctrine and effective countermeasures against delivery systems are practical means of actually reducing the risk of nuclear war.

I'm not optimistic about mutual disarmament in my lifetime, but that's because there's perpetual unstable geopolitics.

I'm just saying the safest path away from MAD is mutual disarmament, not weakening the current precommitments to it.

let's say everyone in the world disarmed. it takes one unstable country or blood thirsty leader in one country to secretly build a nuke and use that dominate other countries. Is it unreasonable to anticipate that, given our species' history? When that happens, not only would it restart an arms race, other countries would be forced to use their newly developed nuke either in retaliation or preemptively. You also have to keep in mind the human prejudice, "a thief always suspects others are trying to steal from him." official stockpiles may be discarded with but secret and unofficial nukes will always be there because militaries and will always suspect other militaries to be as devious as they themselves are.

Lastly, look at the START treaty, after Putin got all war hungry, he suspended Russia's participation, because he realized even a smaller country like Ukraine can challenge Russia's ability to dominate geopolitics or even remain sovereign without nukes. North Korea rightfully anticipated that nukes were the only way they could preserve their government (for better or worse). The problem of war itself would need to be solved before nuclear disarmament can be a practical solution.

Nuclear disarmament will only occur when defensive mechanisms and new weapons make contemporary nuclear weapons obsolete. I think this will happen in approximately 40 years.

Once the codes are distributed to the stewards of the PALs, the confusion and mutiny won't matter, as at least some warheads will launch. Maybe there will be cancelations, but I find that to be a happy thought, not a practical one.

I agree with your thought process though. Stability, be it through superseding technology or civics is what will cause these weapons to be cast aside. Mutual disarmament will occur when stability is at its apex.

One would think that putting a kill switch on many but not all missiles would be the way to go. Say you have a missile field with 400 ICBMs and 300 of them, selected at random, are kill switched, and the selection changes every couple of months. You can respond to a limited first strike immediately and if it's a false alarm you avoid armageddon. If your kill switch is compromised you still have enough nukes to devastate a continent, and your adversary still needs to be able to counter the whole lot. In the case of an accidental or unauthorized launch, the odds that any of them will not be kill switched is low, and even if some are, the in flight detonation of those that aren't demonstrates a good faith effort to minimize damage.

The big downside would be the potential for increased nuclear brinkmanship, as a state might deliberately launch a few missiles and then destroy them to demonstrate just how on edge they are, or to test their opponent's resolve, but that's a reason to not want your adversaries to have a kill switch, not a reason to avoid a kill switch on your own missiles.

One would argue that armageddon is triggered the moment any nuclear warheads are detonated. The dual capability of many launch vehicles keeps things ambiguous until something explodes, but make no mistake that nuclear retaliation would be imminent if not immediate. World leaders love being alive, but the chain of command trends towards an inevitable outcome. Strike before all your arrows are broken.

In my experience, a limited-destruction but full-scale launch would not be supported by leadership. We already have vehicles designed to fail, they are called penetration aids. Once terminal descent is achieved the fate of the target is sealed.

PALs and intentional weak links are the fail-safes. If a warhead makes it into orbit, the die is cast and we are committed to that scenario. If a warhead is detected by the target, luck alone might prevent a full-scale exchange. This has happened before, but it wasn't a missile launch that triggered it.

Tangential but relevant: Modern doctrine is not centered around population centers, although some are certainly included due to proximity or extreme tactical value. If you know why the Black Hills in NC would be targeted then you understand. Military forces with occupational capacity are concerned with counter-force, not counter-value.

> Military forces with occupational capacity are concerned with counter-force, not counter-value. Indeed, that's why the french nuclear doctrine is counter-value.

There is a "European dimension" that I think you may not be considering. The state has maintained some ambiguity regarding doctrine, but it is largely regarded to be against strategic targets - including targets of mixed value. Geographic proximity limits their ability to lean one way or the other compared to say, the United States. A land invasion of France is a distinct possibility they must be prepared to counter.

Could you care to link a source for my edification?

If you know why the Black Hills in NC would be targeted...

By which I'm sure you mean the Black Hills of South Dakota:

https://www.blackhillsbadlands.com/parks-monuments/minuteman...

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