None of the solutions offered address the risk that pinning tries to mitigate, namely that you have a client who trusts a misbehaving/rogue/malicious CA (perhaps you installed a VPN or AV or something that added a system-wide CA to your machine?) and their connection to your service gets mitm-d.
Shorter certificate lifetimes - does nothing to mitigate that risk.
CAA records - not checked by client, only ensures that if a malicious actor somehow gets a hold of your domain, they need to use a particular CA to issue their publicly-trusted malicious cert.
CT monitoring - yes, for WebPKI certs, but does not protect against the risk above, as the bad CA-s are likely not sending certs to CT log.
Distributed DCV checks - sure, this is something CA-s should be doing, not something you have control over.
ACME URI in CAA - operational issues quite likely, good if you can pull it off, but again, does not address the risk above.
What is an actual alternative to cert pinning? Your API should have an additional layer of encryption with keys that you have full control over.