We also saw with DVD encryption that physical access to the device makes it tough to fully protect. Nuclear codes are protected significantly by “no one gets to tinker with the device without rapid lead poisoning”.
We also saw with DVD encryption that physical access to the device makes it tough to fully protect. Nuclear codes are protected significantly by “no one gets to tinker with the device without rapid lead poisoning”.
Physical access to a nuke does not let you disable the PAL. They are constructed so that they are embedded within the device, and cannot be disabled or altered without deconstructing significant parts of the warhead. (I suspect that the PAL is not actually a separate device that can be separated from the warhead, but a series of design choices for how the warhead is constructed that make it unable to fire without the input of a cryptographic code. But then, details on this are very highly classified for obvious reasons, so we'll never know for sure.)
The real reason they didn't and don't do this is because they don't want to end up an international pariah state like Iran and North Korea. It's very clear that the U.S. has a vested interest in nuclear non-proliferation; they were the ones who gave the PALs to all our adversaries in the first place, because in the game-theoretic calculus of MAD, a small number of enemies that you can bargain and reason with is better than a large number of nuclear states even if many of those states are on your side. We would not have supported Ukraine if they attempted to retain the nukes in the 1990s, and we wouldn't support them developing nukes now.
Sure. But standing up a program makes you an international pariah. “We’re keeping this” would have had a bit less uproar.
> Physical access to a nuke does not let you disable the PAL. They are constructed so that they are embedded within the device, and cannot be disabled or altered without deconstructing significant parts of the warhead.
People say this sort of thing, but it comes out that the US arsenal was set to 00000000 in fear that they couldn’t be used. I have… severe doubts on the uncrackable nature of Soviet nuclear cryptography.
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%203007/P...
Nothing in it says anything like "if broken, Ukraine can have a nuclear program".
Загроза силою чи її використання проти територіальної цілісності та недоторканності кордонів чи політичної незалежності України з боку будь-якої ядерної держави, так само, як і застосування економічного тиску, спрямованого на те, щоб підкорити своїм власним інтересам здійснення Україною прав, притаманних її суверенітету, розглядатимуться Україною як виняткові обставини, що поставили під загрозу її найвищі інтереси.
Цей Закон набирає чинності після надання Україні ядерними державами гарантій безпеки, оформлених шляхом підписання відповідного міжнародно-правового документа.
Machine translation (Gemma2):
Each Participant of this Treaty, in the exercise of its state sovereignty, has the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it determines that exceptional circumstances related to the content of this Treaty have threatened the supreme interests of its country. Such withdrawal shall be notified to all Participants of the Treaty and the Security Council of the United Nations three months in advance. The notification shall contain a statement on the exceptional circumstances which it considers to threaten its supreme interests.
Threat of force or its use against the territorial integrity and inviolability of borders or political independence of Ukraine by any nuclear state, as well as the application of economic pressure aimed at subjugating the exercise by Ukraine of rights inherent in its sovereignty to its own interests, shall be considered by Ukraine as exceptional circumstances that threaten its supreme interests.
This Act shall enter into force after Ukraine has received security assurances from nuclear states, formalized through the signing of a relevant international legal document.
It cannot be withdrawn mid-conflict:
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/tpnw-2017/art...
> Such withdrawal shall only take effect 12 months after the date of the receipt of the notification of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that 12-month period, the withdrawing State Party is a party to an armed conflict, the State Party shall continue to be bound by the obligations of this Treaty and of any additional protocols until it is no longer party to an armed conflict.
Ukraine also isn't a signatory to it. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_parties_to_the_Treaty_...
Which specific agreement are you trying to quote from, because it's not the Budapest Memorandom?
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/995_098#Text
Ukrainian law about joining the treaty:
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/248/94-%D0%B2%D1%80#Text
As with any treaty, it can be broken/withdrawn from.
The treaty does not establish a right/recourse to a nuclear weapons program to NPT members in Ukraine's scenario. Ukraine just, when agreeing to it, said they'd leave if they had to. They would be non-compliant with the treaty, as North Korea was/is. They would be similarly sanctioned for it.
The Budapest Memorandom was a separate agreement, predicated on acceptance of the NPT. Similarly, nothing in it says "you can have a nuclear weapons program in scenario x".
Moreover, Ukraine is post-nuclear country. We had nuclear weapons and we know how to produce more.
Sanctions and loss of Western support would be virtually guaranteed.
Talk about biting the hand that feeds.
Seriously, this whole nuclear idea you're onto, while no doubt well-intentioned, is infinitely untenable for a whole bunch of plainly obvious reasons.
> Sanctions and loss of Western support would be virtually guaranteed.
This will be a good case to support the claims. Moreover, this support will be unnecessary for a nuclear country, because war will be ended very fast.
But the simple fact is, it doesn't have unlimited control over its destiny in this particular regard, and pretending otherwise won't change that fact. It is entirely dependent on Western help at this point -- its benefactors are 1000 percent against any further nuclear proliferation, and are infinitely more concerned about that issue than they are about the borders of Ukraine, or Ukraine's survival in any other sense. They have no interest in the inevitable and far wider confrontation with Russia that would ensue from such recklessness -- and they just aren't going to allow it.
Exiting it would lead to consequences from their allies, which they can’t afford.
Ukraine does not automatically leave the NPT just because Russia violated the Budapest Memorandum; such a mechanism linking the two does not exist. Ukraine would have to explicitly leave the NPT, which they will not do.
Having nukes actually in-hand changes the calculus, a lot.
They'd have been sanctioned like crazy, but invaded? No one's taking the risk that they managed to arm a bomb.