What protocol would you have recommended?
Windows natively provides the ability for executables to embed icons (known as resources) for the file manager to render them as. This, combined with the default of hiding file extensions for known types (e.g. .exe), is a recipe for a user eventually executing the malware instead of opening the file or directory they wanted.
This malware exploits that very fact by naming itself after the most-recently modified directory on the drive and embedding an icon that ensures that the file manager will render it as a directory.
If you ensured by policy that file extensions were never hidden, that resources were not rendered (every exe got the default icon [1]), and that every user received regular training to properly distinguish files from each other (and files from directories), this risk could be somewhat managed. Good luck; I don't even know if you can disable resource rendering.
https://www.nist.gov/itl/ssd/software-quality-group/computer...
This also tends to be a supply chain and insider threat.
Write block prevents transfer back to the USB which is the exfiltration mechanism.
See also: https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/#how-does-qubes-os-compare-to-u...
Read-only media or destroying the media after use is a reasonable mechanism to protect against data exfiltration.
I'm not sure how you protect against infiltration though. A computer system that cannot get data in is pretty useless methinks.
Such thing just MUST BE a helper for creating malwares, what else it could be ? Definitely for circumventing human users.
Good job Microsoft ! Autoexec.bat is proud of you ! /s