Unfortunately the decision didn't mention this at all even though it is important. If it was even as good as a md5 hash (which is broken) I think the search should be allowed without warrant because even though a accidental collision is possible odds are so strongly against it that the courts can safely assume there isn't (and of course if there is the police would close the case). However since this has is not that good the police cannot look at the image unless Google does.
> I think the search should be allowed without warrant because even though a accidental collision is possible odds are so strongly against it that the courts can safely assume there isn't
The footnote in the decision bakes this property into the definition of a hash:
A “hash” or “hash value” is “(usually) a short string of characters generated from a much larger string of data (say, an electronic image) using an algorithm—and calculated in a way that makes it highly unlikely another set of data will produce the same value.
(Importantly, this is NOT an accurate definition of a hash for anyone remotely technical... of course hashing algorithms with significant hash collisions exist, and is even a design criterion for some hashing algorithms...)
Just go to a law library.
Do you know that judges routinely make decisions based on confidential documents not in the public record? Is that also bad?
The closest with a copy of the Federal Appendix is ~2 hrs away from me (or on LN if I pay for a subscription). It should be free and online, because it probably can't be copyrighted and because simplifying public access to the law is an unambiguous public good.
> Do you know that judges routinely make decisions based on confidential documents not in the public record? Is that also bad?
Of course not; the particularities of a given case is a very different concern from a document whose content is critical to interpretation of precedent. Also, the copyright claims on confidential documents might be valid, whereas any copyright claims on cases in the Federal Appendix probably aren't valid; see how of the government edicts doctrine was applied in Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org.
My point is that a hash (granted, I'm assuming that we're talking about a cryptographic hash function, which is not clear) is much closer to "This is the file" than someone actually looking at it, and that it's definitely more proof of them having that sort of content than any other type of evidence.