But that's too easy to sue for so the manufacturers of the systems press to blame the dead crew.
This is standard corporate culture.
But that's too easy to sue for so the manufacturers of the systems press to blame the dead crew.
This is standard corporate culture.
> The fact that the pilot ignored the continuous "Stall! Stall! Stall!" alarm
> and kept the control stick pulled fully back
The fact is that the black boxes recorded this behavior. Can we be 100% certain that the copilot actually did this? My concern is that we're still trusting the output of a system that has proven to be suspect. * The stall warning deactivates by design when the angle of attack measurements
are considered invalid and this is the case when the airspeed drops
below a certain limit.
* In consequence, the stall warning stopped and came back on several times
during the stall; in particular, it came on whenever the pilot pushed forward
on the stick and then stopped when he pulled back; this may have
confused the pilots.
* Despite the fact that they were aware that altitude was declining rapidly,
the pilots were unable to determine which instruments to trust: it may have
appeared to them that all values were incoherent.
Personally, I'm not sure whether to believe that the copilot simply made an amateur mistake .The instruments actually could not have done much better, without any external reference points there are some situations that are indistinguishable from air speed, pressure, and g-forces alone. Sadly, the stall profile they were in was one such situation.
Frequently true! :D Although my personal mantra is "the same problem couldn't occur in a sailplane" ;)
Let he who has flown in the soup with flaky instrumentation cast the first stone.
If that alarm was functional and activated before they entered that stall profile, it was, in my opinion, some serious misjudgement by the pilots not to turn the pitot heat on.
But then again, I've only flown a PA-38 on storm conditions, so take this with a huge grain of salt.