This was already tried, and failed (Hilbert). In the aftermath of the failure we learned that mathematics cannot be completely formalized. So this points to a fundamental problem with using AI to do math.
This was already tried, and failed (Hilbert). In the aftermath of the failure we learned that mathematics cannot be completely formalized. So this points to a fundamental problem with using AI to do math.
Nor is this in any way "a fundamental problem with using AI to do math".
You seem to be imagining that Gödel is just a small problem you can carve off and ignore, but it applies for everything powerful enough to do arithmetic.
Of course we can have the AI muddle along with intuition, but that's not actually an improvement, our mathematicians can already use intuition and they've got a lot more experience.
As you have stared, a lot of mathematics can be formalized. For me the problem for AI with math is going to be the generative part. Validating a proof or trying to come up with a proof for a given statement may be within reach. Coming up with meaningful/interesting statements to proof is another completely different story.
First, writing something down in English is very different from formalizing it. Natural language interacts with human brains in all kinds of complicated ways that we do not fully understand, so just because we can make a compelling-sounding argument in English doesn't mean that argument doesn't have holes somewhere.
Second, the incompleteness theorems apply only to given formal systems, not to formality in general. Given a system, you can produce a Godel sentence for that system. But any Godel sentence for a given system has a proof in some other more powerful system. This is trivially true because you can always add the Godel sentence for a system as an axiom.
This is a very common misconception about math even among mathematicians. Math produces only conditional truths, not absolute ones. All formal reasoning has to start with a set of axioms and deduction rules. Some sets of axioms and rules turn out to be more useful and interesting than others, but none of them are True in a Platonic sense, not even the Peano axioms. Natural numbers just happen to be a good model of certain physical phenomena (and less-good models of other physical phenomena). Irrational numbers and complex numbers and quaternions etc. etc. turn out to be good models of other physical phenomena, and other mathematical constructs turn out not to be good models of anything physical but rather just exhibit interesting and useful behavior in their own right (elliptic curves come to mind). None of these things are True. At best they are Useful or Interesting. But all of it is formalizable.
"You can't write everything in safe rust, therefore rust is worthless." vs "You must throw away all C code, or the whole industry will collapse"
except we have thousands of years of "unsafe" math, only a few decades of C.
That's a misleading way of expressing that.
Math can be formalized as completely as we want, if we concede that some true statements will exist without a possible proof.
In cases where the Hilbert machine applies, the mathematician writing down the semi-formal argument already has to state the new axioms, justify them, and reason about how they apply, and the proposal would just take that "reason about how they apply" step and write it in a computer-verifiable way.
No it doesn't, AI like an LLM has no issues with stating two inconsistent propositions, just like humans, which is why both AI and humans can reason about all of mathematics, eg. Godel theorems is that a formal system cannot simultaneously be complete and consistent.
Who likely underestimated how hard it would be.
And who didn't have a 2024 computer on hand.
I guess the Lean devs can all pack and go home then. Also: how could they possibly miss Gödel's theorem, how careless of them.