Articles about MaxEnt thermodynamics by E.T. Jaynes where he talks about the “anthropomorphic” nature of entropy date back to 1960s. How is that not right in physics?
Articles about MaxEnt thermodynamics by E.T. Jaynes where he talks about the “anthropomorphic” nature of entropy date back to 1960s. How is that not right in physics?
> How is that not right in physics?
Why would it be right? Was it used to make predictions that were subsequently verified?
https://www.amazon.com/Microphysics-Macrophysics-Application...
Where we should be careful is when we want to apply some reasoning verbatim to a different problem. Sometimes it works, and sometimes it does not. Entropy is a particularly good example. It is abstract enough to be mysterious for a vast majority of the population, hence why these terribly misleading vulgarisation articles pop up so often. Thinking of it in terms of information is sometimes useful, but going from information to knowledge is a leap, and then circling back to Physics is a bit adventurous.
For the record, this is the abstract of the “Information in statistical physics” article: “We review with a tutorial scope the information theory foundations of quantum statistical physics. Only a small proportion of the variables that characterize a system at the microscopic scale can be controlled, for both practical and theoretical reasons, and a probabilistic description involving the observers is required. The criterion of maximum von Neumann entropy is then used for making reasonable inferences. It means that no spurious information is introduced besides the known data. Its outcomes can be given a direct justification based on the principle of indifference of Laplace. We introduce the concept of relevant entropy associated with some set of relevant variables; it characterizes the information that is missing at the microscopic level when only these variables are known. For equilibrium problems, the relevant variables are the conserved ones, and the Second Law is recovered as a second step of the inference process. For non-equilibrium problems, the increase of the relevant entropy expresses an irretrievable loss of information from the relevant variables towards the irrelevant ones. Two examples illustrate the flexibility of the choice of relevant variables and the multiplicity of the associated entropies: the thermodynamic entropy (satisfying the Clausius–Duhem inequality) and the Boltzmann entropy (satisfying the H-theorem). The identification of entropy with missing information is also supported by the paradox of Maxwell’s demon. Spin-echo experiments show that irreversibility itself is not an absolute concept: use of hidden information may overcome the arrow of time.”
"It's [...] not right" (from your first comment), can you give/link a specific physical example? It would be very cool to have a clear counterexample.
About the lack of subjectivity of the states? If we consider any bit of matter (for example a crystal or an ideal gas), the macrostate is completely independent of the observer: it’s just the state in which the law of physics say that bit of matter should be. In an ideal gas it is entirely determined by the pressure and volume, which are anything but subjective. For a crystal it is more complex because we have to account for things like its shape but the reasoning is the same.
Then, the microstates are just accessible states, and this is also dictated by Physics. For example, it is quite easy to see that a crystal has fewer accessible states than a gas (the atoms’ positions are constrained and the velocities are limited to the crystal’s vibration modes). We can calculate the entropy in the experimental conditions within that framework, or in the case of correlated liquids, or amorphous solids, or whatever. But the fact that we can come up with different entropies if we make different hypotheses does not mean that any of these hypotheses is actually valid. If we measure the entropy directly we might have a value that is consistent with several models, or none. The actual entropy is what we observe, not the theoretical scaffolding we use to try to make sense of it. And again, this is not subjective.
Is there a concrete physical example where the information-theory definition of entropy conflicts with experiment?
Of course, the example I gave is arguable, since the two observers are not actually observing the same process. One is looking at enc(x), the other is looking at x. They would both agree that enc(x) has high entropy, and x has low entropy. But this same kind of phenomenon doesn't work with physical entropy. A gas is going to burn my hand or not regardless of how well I know its microstates.
Or perhaps that's the secret of the Shaolin monks!
If you already agree that the two are distinct measures, I believe there is no disagreement in the sub-thread.