The real mitigation is the memory encryption feature of modern CPUs. Being on-die means tweezers won't reach, and being just a key means the wipe is instant and very difficult to mess with even if it survived a power cycle.
The real mitigation is the memory encryption feature of modern CPUs. Being on-die means tweezers won't reach, and being just a key means the wipe is instant and very difficult to mess with even if it survived a power cycle.
I'm surprised given that the article mentions stepping into the boot process and `SymCryptSessionDestroy` that they didn't look more deeply into this; it's not how I really intended to spend my new years but I might have a new debugging project now...
I really only did this so I could verify when/whereish the key ends up in memory, so I didn't follow along every single step of the way. I can tell you that SymCrypt succeeds in zeroing out the key multiple times in several places. Thats why I was shocked to find the key left over completely intact in ExAllocatePool allocations, but what I'm guessing is that Microsoft is not accounting for every possible place the key can end up when they're destroying secrets.
Based on previous attacks like this I suspect that Microsoft also employs some "security through obscurity" tactics when they modify BitLocker. What I mean by that is I think there is a lot of just moving the key around so its a little harder to find...
What if Windows forgot to wipe a spot after having relocated a page? What happens if the firmware's boot flow is interrupted by, say, a hardware fault prompt, a low battery prompt, etc.? There's a lot of places where that approach can go wrong.
The key approach is simpler and comparatively bullet proof: If the machine is rebooted, clean or not, the key will be lost and no memory that was previously used will be readable. All it takes is the OS initializing a single CPU feature on boot, with the only downside being that it requires support for a quite modern CPU feature.