Who would have won the Simon-Ehrlich bet over different decades? | Hacker News Reader

Who would have won the Simon-Ehrlich bet over different decades?

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Not Paul Ehrlich's worse prediction. His most infamous was that "hundreds of millions of people are going to starve to death" in the 1970s[0]. It’s curious how he managed to remain influential despite a track record of such inaccurate forecasts.

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_R._Ehrlich#The_Population...

It depends on whether you are the sort of person who tries to account for recency bias or not. We're living through the most anomalously prosperous period in not just the history of history, but probably also including the unrecorded aeons before humans even existed on earth that there was no particular reason to anticipate at the time.

If you go with the gut, then sure everything was fine and dandy. But a more data-oriented approach will still get people to the conclusion that we're on the clock until billions of humans starve to death.

So on the one hand, the predictions were completely wrong. On the other, none of the underlying problems have really gone away and any analysis of the future will still conclude that population growth (even flat-lining at this point) is insanely risky in terms of how much human suffering it will eventually lead to. So the people pushing it still have influence. Although I've been a lot more chipper about the situation since it turns out that wealth leads to depopulation which is one of those wonderful and unexpectedly good things. Plus obviously the AI and presumably coming robotics revolution are just absurdly promising.

> But a more data-oriented approach will still get people to the conclusion that we're on the clock until billions of people starve to death.

You’ve piqued my interest, where can I read about this data oriented approach that leads to this conclusion?

Most people live in cities [0] and requires ~2,000 k/cal a day. The systems required to feed people are complex and energy demanding. There are 8 billion humans which is a large number relative to the amount of food we can store.

It is a matter of time until we have a multi-billion person famine. Hopefully multiple centuries away if the transition away from oil to something else works out. Something like the year without summer [1] could be even more catastrophic, for example. Or wars, particularly of the nuclear variety.

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urbanization

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Year_Without_a_Summer

The problem with such prediction is that it presumes that the population would grow at a accelerating pace, while the opposite is happening.

For me it's not about population growth so much as societal risk; our current population is only sustainable due to a complex web of interdependent systems.

How often do complex societies break down or decline in such a way that the complex systems which keep our urban populations alive are compromised?

The more people we have, also the more people we have available to keep these systems running and figure out new replacements. Assuming the caloric ‘profit margin’ stays positive anyway.

We seem to be so far past breakeven food/water/warmth that most of our efforts are spent getting all sorts of other stuff, though?

It's recent, I'll grant you that. I can't even think of when there was rationing in the west? Shortly after the war? At least the current grandparent generation seems to have childhood memories of that.

But to me, it looks like we've figured out those basic necessities to the point where at least ordinary variation in harvest won't be making us hungry. You could call that being noise proof.

The danger is that we systematically alter how the planet works, so that is not just bumps in annual crop yields, which we also seem to be doing, but it's not clear that we've messed up our basic necessities pipeline yet. It's also not clear that we'll inevitably do that.

One risk is that our systems are now extremely efficient, and one aspect of efficiency is that it tends to eliminate “unnecessary” buffers and stockpiles. Just-in-time manufacturing pulls supplies in response to demand. The global food supply chain still has buffers and stockpiles (e.g. grain bins) due to the seasonality of growing, but if hydroponics becomes the dominant method of agriculture (say, in a world with a more chaotic climate that needs to be kept at bay by greenhouses), then highly efficient farmers could optimize out all of their resiliency.

>I can't even think of when there was rationing in the west? Shortly after the war? At least the current grandparent generation seems to have childhood memories of that.

there was a pandemic a few years ago in which various western countries experienced shortages and in some cases rationing of some things.

There is rationing of water usage in many parts of the world, including parts of Western countries in which people live in water constrained areas, although that rationing is for garden usage - not drinking water.

I'm sure similar things can be thought of.

Obviously you don't mean those forms of rationing, you seem to mean large rationing of many different necessities and materials. But the fact that these rather minor forms of rationing exist in contrast to that in place during WWII does indicate that the system is not as able to handle all needs as well as you and a few other people in this thread seem to believe.

on edit: added word "exist"

The Netherlands managed to dramatically raise crop yields after WWII by intensive farming methods like building a massive amount of greenhouses. The crop yield per hectare is insane as a result. It was as a response to WWII that this system of farming was adopted.

So if we reach a point of mass starvation many counties will adopt similar strategies and drastically raise crop yields.

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33763087

It is a tradeoff though, crop yield is one thing, but most of the produce from the NL is bland, tasteless, full of chemicals, something that would have been considered unsuitable for human consumption earlier, and achieved at a cost of great environmental degradation.

That’s true, intensively farming in a small country will come with serious downsides. But if it’s a choice between starvation vs mass producing bland food and creating pollution, there is only one choice to make.

> most of the produce from the NL is bland

Credible Citation needed.

> full of chemicals

So what? You're also full of chemicals.

> something that would have been considered unsuitable for human consumption earlier

Actually our standards for consumption have gone up a lot. People used to eat all sorts of stuff when danger of starving was higher and population was poorer.

>> We're living through the most anomalously prosperous period

This. It's hard to make predictions precisely because the rate of change has been so rapid.

What is interesting to note though is the varied societal responses to the changes over the last 70 years or so. The US embraced materialism with some reluctant social movement (womens rights, civil rights etc). Europe embraced Socialism (in the sense of Social support, not Communism), the Middle East embraced materialism, but eschewed any form of social development (eg women's rights et al).

Right now we're in a bit of a rebound phase. Change has come too quickly (especially the last 40 years) so we're seeing pushback on rights (in the US) on social support (in Europe) and a general political swing to the right in lots of places.

There's a "looking back" element which seeks to slow found societal change even as technology accelerates.

Predicting what comes next is, well, tricky. But I expect in my lifetime to see global population maximum. I expect to see significant climate change. Both of those will be huge disruptions, and the knock-on effects could be anything

We are seeing swingback to the right because the threat of left revolution (instignated or supported by nuclear state out there) is less credible now

> The US embraced materialism with some reluctant social movement (womens rights, civil rights etc). Europe embraced Socialism (in the sense of Social support, not Communism), the Middle East embraced materialism, but eschewed any form of social development (eg women's rights et al).

The US is the most fundamentalist Christian country in the world. There is also a large degree of materialism, but still, only a fraction of the population of the USA even accepts the idea that atheism (a hallmark of materialism) is a legitimate religious position. What the USA has embraced more than anything is consumerism, not materialism.

What most of Europe has is called social democracy, socialism is a completely different ideology (workers having majority control of enterprises).

The Middle East embraced Islamic fundamentalism, not materialism. You could say that they also embraced consumerism, like the USA. But hardcore Islamic fundamentalism as we see it today in Iran, Saudi Arabia, or Afghanistan is a very recent phenomenon, born of the last fifty years or less (at any wide scale), and it is at a level that consumes entire societies. These Middle East countries didn't eschew progress on women's rights, they actively regressed women's rights to pre-medieval levels. Iran and Afghanistan had the right to vote for women before the USA: they lost it as fundamentalist forces gained power (actually, they still have it in Iran, but it's significantly affected by other lack of freedom).

> The US is the most fundamentalist Christian country in the world.

Due to a large population it leads as the country with the largest absolute number of Christians, sure.

In terms of percentage of Christians in the population as a whole, it doesn't even make the top ten list.

Vatican City, Timor Leste, American Samoa, Romania, Armenia, Grenada, Papua New Guinea, Greenland, Haiti, and Paraguay all have greater than 95% christian populations.

The US has perhaps a 65% Christian population albeit many of whom are in name without being particularly devout.

I remember reading about some people joining ISIS for economic reasons, I cannot find the article, but this one makes the same point (that among the other reasons, unemployment is also a factor):

https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2014/11/the-ultimate-fat...

My point being: being a religious fundamentalist country doesn't require an almost totality of the population to be religious, but just the people who have power (weapons, money, etc.) to be fundamentalist... and the rest of the country to not violently oppose them.

But what about fundamentalist Christians? Watching from Europe I have a hard time picking the more fundamentalist country between the south of the US and the Vatican.

Does the proportion of Samoan fundamentalists exceed that of the US?

Tough question to answer, I suspect it might, Pacific Islanders hold tight to Jesus ...

* https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-09-20/the-christian-convert...

The US wins by weight of numbers, of course, but having the most tongue talking snake handlers doesn't make the entire country the poster child for revival tents.

The Vatican doesn't interpret the Bible literally, and accepts the Theory of Evolution. Heck, the guy who first proposed the Big Bang theory was a Catholic priest! (Georges Lemaître)

I wasn't talking about percentages of the population, but about the impact that Christianity has in the public and legal spheres. Now, I may have exaggerated a little bit, as there are a few very small countries that are likely even more religious (the Vatican, Luxembourg), and perhaps one or two bigger ones (Poland does come to mind).

But overall, the prominence of Christianity in day to day American life and culture and the political sphere is off the charts. Things like saying Grace at family dinners as a common tradition, presidents and many other politicians ending their speeches with "God bless America", "In God we Trust" on dollar bills - these are virtually unheard of outside of the USA. Not to mention, the amount of times Biblical passages and teachings are brought up in political debates is staggering, even coming from a nominally "more Christian" country like Romania. Similarly, the amount of places and institutions named after religious figures or concepts is unprecedented.

I disagree that the prosperity we've experienced was truly "unexpected". Humans are self-regulating: fertility rates drop as resources become scarce (e.g. people are less likely to have children when struggling to meet basic needs), and markets innovate in response to scarcity (e.g. the Green Revolution). Technological progress, though unpredictable in its specifics, has consistently been a reliable force for adaptation. Ehrlich's predictions underestimated humanity's resilience, oversimplifying a highly complex system by reducing it to a linear regression.

This is that recency bias thing in action. Constant surprising technological progress of the sort we've seen for the last century or two is unprecedented and not at all the sort of thing that is suitable for long term planning. I usually wouldn't bother pointing that out, but there are two points I really want to emphasise as wildly optimistic:

> Humans are self-regulating: fertility rates drop as resources become scarce (e.g. people are less likely to have children when struggling to meet basic needs)

We didn't have birth control until the 20th century and it is mostly used by people who, historically speaking, are living with resources far in excess of their basic needs. Traditionally the self regulation was that people were born then the ones that couldn't eat enough to survive died.

And there is a pretty high risk of not finding stable equilibrium. The logistic map isn't a totally crazy model and displays some rather chaotic behaviour [0]. In practice that looks like a lot of famines.

> ... markets innovate in response to scarcity ...

Markets have existed forever, usually the innovative response to food scarcity was, once again, people starving to death. It is hard to underline just how weird the Green Revolution is. Obviously a great time to be alive but it is not a normal thing in the human experience.

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logistic_map#Behavior_dependen...

I’m not sure why you keep invoking "recency bias." When forecasting the near future, as Ehrlich was doing, it’s entirely reasonable to use recent trends as a baseline. Are you suggesting progress might slow to the levels seen in prehistory, antiquity, or the medieval period? That seems highly implausible, barring a catastrophic event that disrupts modern civilization.

If anything, you might be underestimating the ongoing momentum of technological progress, which is not just sustaining its pace but accelerating across many fields. Some experts predict AGI is right on the corner - a development that could drastically amplify innovation and potentially eliminate the challenge of food scarcity.

Additionally, birth control will only keep becoming increasingly accessible worldwide, enabling more effective regulation of fertility rates in response to resource constraints.

> Humans are self-regulating: fertility rates drop as resources become scarce (e.g. people are less likely to have children when struggling to meet basic needs)

The exact opposite is what we are observing: people in poorer parts of the world, and poor people in richer parts of the world have way more children than people who have all their basic needs met and then some.

The best known predictor of average number of children is infant mortality rate: without fail, as infant mortality decreases, average number of children per family decreases as well.

I didn't claim the relationship was linear. People in poorer countries still have relatively abundant food by historical standards and aren't at risk of starvation. However, when food availability drops below a certain threshold, reproduction rates tend to decrease - this is basic ecology. Historically, the most populated regions were also resource-rich, like the fertile river valleys. But we're now living in an era of abundance where even the poorer regions have access to plenty of food.

> people are less likely to have children when struggling to meet basic needs

Completely disproven by the baby boom era where people were poor in many countries for years after the war but still made a lot of babies. Reality bites hard.

> We're living through the most anomalously prosperous period in [History]

…on average - inequality has never been so high.

I think there’s a fairly reasonable argument to be made that the (super)majority people today are better off than they would have been 2-500 years ago, at least in most of the world.

Near as I can tell, folks have no idea (really) how bad it could be, since most of the really significant shifts have been in removing a lot of major problems.

For example, eradicating Smallpox. Controlling Measles, Polio, Tetanus. Synthetic fertilizers eliminating famines in all but the most dysfunctional areas, etc.

It used to be dying of disease or famine was a huge problem in much of the world. Now it is only in tiny, very broken areas, for relatively small portions of the population.

Then why average homeownership rate - at a same given age - is much lower for younger generations? Here's some actual data:

https://ifs.org.uk/data-items/average-homeownership-age-peop...

PS: Obviously my comment above was about contemporary generations: sure, we live better today than in the middle ages.

But how relevant is that?

People at every level of income are better off than their equivalent in the same country at every point in history. Once you get past 100 years or so it's not even close. Even the imperfect (to say the least) social safety nets in rich countries today are far above the level they were 100 years ago, and people are better off by almost every measure. Middle class people live like royalty a few hundreds years ago, when it comes to access to healthcare, food, travel, leisure (and that's before we talk about tech).

Never in history? Not in feudal Europe? Not in Egypt under the Pharaohs? Never?

I really doubt that...

True.

Just as the Industrial Revolution has reduced income inequalities within societies, it has increased them between societies. There lives now both the richest people who ever walked the earth, and the poorest. This divergence in regional and national fortunes since the Industrial Revolution has recently been labeled the Great Divergence.

Gregory Clark, A Farewell to Alms, (2006) pp 3--4.

<https://faculty.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/gclark/papers/FTA20...>

NB: Clark's book is from the Princeton University Press's "Economic History of the Western World" series edited by Joel Mokyr. It's an absolutely phenomenal treasury of books about economic history with a special focus on the immense transformation of the Industrial Revolution(s). Some may have heard of Robert J. Gordon's The Rise and Fall of American Growth, one of the 50+ books in the series. It's not all the books I'd recommend reading on the topic, but it's a dense treasury of quite good ones.

<https://press.princeton.edu/series/the-princeton-economic-hi...>

All that is to say that the Malthusians are not just wrong, they are not even wrong.

This isn’t anomalous or recency bias. You go back in history and everyone who makes predictions similar to Ehrlich about population crashes have been wrong. Malthus was saying the same things 150 years earlier and there were others before him and in between.

Every bacteria in the Petri dish doubles each generation, until it doesn’t.

It really doesn’t seem like a winning bet (other than fear mongering popularity), because you’re unlikely to be right, and when you are things seem to be falling apart. See also Peak Oil.

However, birth rates in most of the world (except Africa, SE Asia, and India by a bit) are falling below replacement. Many are looking at this as a good thing (exponentials can’t go on forever), and there are the contrarians, but being at the edge of a long term exponential transition is dangerous. There are many cultural and economic systems that have worked the way they do and grown to be dominant because of the exponential growth. People will continue to hope and believe long after things become obvious (see climate change). See also Moore’s Law.

Ehrlich didn't just make this claim in the abstract. He proposed specific and brutal (I'd even say genocidal) policies that he claimed were the only ways of mitigating this inevitable mass starvation.

"Oh, he's wrong in all the details but maybe his general themes are right" is not acceptable when the outcome of listening to him is mass murder.

From reading around, although I didn't find a definitive source worth sharing here, it seems like across several famines in the 1970s, somewhere in the low tens of millions died, while another several tens of millions came close to starvation.

So the prediction was off by an order of magnitude.

> It’s curious how he managed to remain influential despite a track record of such inaccurate forecasts.

1. Political expediency. Look to the institutions which celebrated his work.

2. Easy to understand. Scarcity doom can be sold easily. Simon's ideas require considering or observing second order effects at a minimum.

I'm not in the topic really. Apparently 9 million people die from starvation each year. This is recent data, I don't know the 70ies data (things to consider: A lot less people on the planet, on the other hand the problem was less tackled than it is today).

But just going with this number, since "the 70ies" refer to a time span of 10 years, that'd be 90m people, and I don't quite understand why his forecast is considered to be so wildly inaccurate then.

Because the 1970s was — uniquely — the decade in which global starvation deaths crashed by >80% due to technological and social advances around the world. [0]

Nobody could be that stupid by accident. Ehrlich is a ghoul who was excited about people dying because it would have justified his preferred political philosophy.

[0]: https://www.statista.com/statistics/259827/global-famine-dea...

It is true that the tide of the battle against hunger has changed for the better during the past three years. But tides have a way of flowing and then ebbing again. We may be at high tide now, but ebb tide could soon set in if we become complacent and relax our efforts. For we are dealing with two opposing forces, the scientific power of food production and the biologic power of human reproduction. Man has made amazing progress recently in his potential mastery of these two contending powers. Science, invention, and technology have given him materials and methods for increasing his food supplies substantially and sometimes spectacularly... Man also has acquired the means to reduce the rate of human reproduction effectively and humanely. He is using his powers for increasing the rate and amount of food production. But he is not yet using adequately his potential for decreasing the rate of human reproduction. The result is that the rate of population increase exceeds the rate of increase in food production in some areas. There can be no permanent progress in the battle against hunger until the agencies that fight for increased food production and those that fight for population control unite in a common effort.

The speaker is Nobel Peace Laureate Norman Borlaug, in his acceptance speech for that award. For those unfamiliar, it was his work developing high-output agricultural staple variants, the heart of the Green Revolution, which was the basis of that award.

<https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1970/borlaug/accepta...>

The 1960s and 1970s were a period in which concern over global population growth and the apparent insufficiency of the food supply were absolutely rampant. It's a depressingly common trope, and not only on HN, to deride such concerns as misguided and laughable, but the truth is that the trends at the time were quite dire. Concerning now, global margins of crop production and surplus suplies have been narrowing over the past decades, and it is in fact food supplies and their reflection in prices which have been fingered as major components of recent political upheaval: the Arab Spring (2010--2012) was motivated in large part by populations stressed by high food prices and reduced supplies. Food price inflation in the US, Canada, and Europe are behind much of the anti-incumbancy mood in those nations --- being part of the advanced world is no guarantee that even modest disruptions to basic human needs won't have political ramifications.

Food Price Index, US, 1968--2022:

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Food_prices#/media/File:Food_P...>

> The speaker is Nobel Peace Laureate Norman Borlaug, in his acceptance speech for that award. For those unfamiliar, it was his work developing high-output agricultural staple variants, the heart of the Green Revolution, which was the basis of that award.

Right so he went out and improved things.

> It's a depressingly common trope, and not only on HN, to deride such concerns as misguided and laughable, but the truth is that the trends at the time were quite dire

I'd say its sadly not common enough. If anything I'd say that the reason it can't be written off as laughable is not because they had a point but because it helped cause a lot of violations of peoples rights with not fully informed consent sterilization and the one child policy.

https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/book-incited-world...

Sure they didnt have knowledge we have now but we do. We know that birth rates fall when poverty falls and more women get educated and that coercive methods are not necessary. We also know that the capacity to grow food was much larger.

Ehrlichs predictions were wrong. He predicted

> “nothing can prevent a substantial increase in the world death rate.”

And from my understanding hasn't admitted being wrong (and trying to be figure out how he became so sure of something that was incorrect) implying that it may still happen someday(when he predicted it would have happened long ago).

Mass famine isn't exactly the same thing as expensive food although obviously it can lead to higher levels of starvation. Fundamentally famine and even high levels of starvation are due to bad government and or economic systems. Its no suprise the Arab spring started with a fruit seller who set himself on fire in response to corrupt policeman preventing him from making a living/stealing his wares.

My point in mentioning Borlaug specifically was that 1) he's the single person most responsible for the post-1950s population boom not ending in mass global famine and 2) he was scared fucking spitless himself. Which means that Ehrlich was far from the only person voicing such views and that the views were not some environmental fringe. I've spent quite a bit of time going through literature of the time, and strongly recommend William Ophuls book Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity (1977) for, if nothing else, its bibliography which is an excellent and largely balanced selection of the literature of its time.

<https://archive.org/details/ecologypoliticso0000ophu>

(Ophuls bibliographies and biblographic notes are in general absolute gold mines.)

Ehrlich himself rapidly learnt, and spent much of his career arguing, that coercive measures are hugely harmful and largely don't work. What does work best and foremost is women's education, along with social stability, medical and family planning services, and the like. Ehrlich wrote about 40 books as well as numerous papers and articles, he's remembered most for one of the earliest. A quite different thought process is evident in later ones, such as One With Niniveh (2004)

<https://archive.org/details/onewithninevehpo0000ehrl_z0h7/pa...>

Or this 2013 release:

"Equal rights, education for women key to avoiding civilization's collapse"

[T]he Ehrlichs offer a roadmap for avoiding society's total collapse, emphasizing that giving women equal rights worldwide is a critical first step.

<https://phys.org/news/2013-01-equal-rights-women-key-civiliz...>

Not a step, but a critical and first step.

In 1968 the situation appeared absolutely calamitous, Borlaug's Nobel speech came two years later, and concerns over overpopulation continued in the mainstream well through the 1970s and 1980s. That's 40 and 50 years ago now, beyond the ken of most reading this no doubt, but very much the spirit of the times. Influenced in part by Ehrlich, but also by many others. Drastic measures, as one possible tool, and proposed with grave concern, were among the possible interventions.

What ultimately did occur was that, despite several more famines (Sahel drought, 1968--1972, 1,000,000 dead; Ethiopia, 1972-1973, 60,000; Bangladesh, 1974, up to 1.5 million; Khmer Rouge, 1975--1979, 500,000; Ethiopia, 1983--1985, ~500,000; Sudan, 1988, 100,000; Somalia, 1991--1992, 300,000; North Korea, 1994--1998, up to 3.5 million, Congo, 1998--2004, 2.7 million; Somalia, 2011--2012, 285,000; Tigray, Ethiopia, 2020--present, up to 200,000; Gaza, 2023--present, 62,000, and many others <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_famines>), overall population growth has decreased markedly through much of the world, to the extent that low birth rates are a concern in Europe, Japan, and the United States, and most of the world, and quite notably the largest populations in India, China, and elsewhere aren't living with looming hunger. But that balance is delicate and precarious as we're constantly reminded.

And for those scanning my or Wikipedia's larger list and objecting "but most of those were political, civil war, or other conflicts", I ask preëmptively what the hell do you think drives most such conflict and unrest? Food insecurity (or its near peer, water insecurity) is a primary driver of social unrest around the world and throughout history:

See e.g., "Food Insecurity and Unrest: What You Need to Know" (2022)

<https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2022/07/12/food-insec...>

People arent dying of starvation due to overpopulation but due to messed up economic and political systems. He was wrong and remains wrong.

| If I were a gambler, I would take even money that England will not exist in the year 2000

I would love to know what it was about England that meant it's end was nigh, I mean what about France, Norway or Belgium ?

Also, when he said "England" was he actually referring to the United Kingdom (as Americans often are) or were Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland going to be spared in some way ?

Good article. I look forward to the day when Ehrlich’s bad ideas are no longer en vogue.

Interesting that many people take this as a further prof that Ehrlich was wrong, when actually he was unlucky. This "bet" doesn't further our understanding of how anything works, and the article probably should drive the point across more forcefully. The bet itself is useless to tell us anything about "the long run". In the "long run" everyone is dead, so your lifetime isn't enough to predict a trend. You could have seen all your life an indicator heading in one direction, die, getting revived 200 years later, and the trend vanish, because someone discovered a better way.

Fine maybe another 100 years we’re good. But what about 200, what about 1000. Copper is not water, there is no natural process that renews it. The question is, is it as ubiquitous as silicon that we will never run out of it compared to our demands or is it not.

If it is not, then we have a serious problem if we want human civilization to thrive and continue. The only solutions I can think of are, reaching a very high recycle rate, but we know from thermodynamics that chemical reactions are not reversible, but maybe we can build enough tech that we recycle everything very well and not just dump them in landfills.

Or we develop enough tech to be able to mine the asteroids, which can give us access to some minerals at amounts that would last us another 1000+ years. But not all minerals are found at asteroids, and it’s not clear if we can actually do this very hard task.

The final solution which seems to have fallen out of vogue but I’m in favor of is limiting human population. If everyone has 1 kid, human population halves in 1 generation. If we do this for 3-4 generations, we can reach a really good sustainable population, and then have 2 kids to maintain it.

I don't understand this insane to me belief that we want to constantly grow human population. It seems to come from the belief that each human is an innovation robot, and that with more innovation robots we get more innovation. A cursory glance at humanity shows this to be obviously false. Humans need to be trained, taught, led to be able to produce something new. We have 10x more researchers now and scientific progress has still slowed compared to 1900s. Throwing more researchers into the mix will not fix it. People who run companies intuitively know this. If Google could invent AGI, by hiring 100,000 more AI engineers, they would do it in a heartbeat. Instead you find that talent density is extremely important for innovation. Small groups of exceptional talent, outperform large groups of mediocre talent always. There is a cost to cultivating talent in human beings and obviously with more humans it becomes more competitive and harder to cultivate talent in every human. There is a cost to coordinating between different humans and sifting through to find talent, that again increases the more humans are thrown into the mix.

This whole more humans are undeniably good always, is insane enough that only academics and those with no experience in the real world can convince themselves of it. There is obviously an optimal number of humans, you may disagree that it is higher or lower than the current number, but the number must exist! I suspect we are way more than optimal, ymmv.

The problem with 1 child per family is that it cuts population too fast. You're going to end up with decreasing life expectancies because there simply aren't enough people to take care of the elderly. We're already seeing this in Japan, which had driven it's stagnating economy.

The main problem with this is that we're looking at the evolution of inflation-adjusted prices for common ressources. By definition, inflation-adjusted prices for common ressources must be constant, that's how we measure inflation. So it shouldn't come as a surprise that the prices do not change much in the long term.

That's obviously wrong. If one resource gets scarce but retains its use, it will get more expensive compared to other resources that remain plentiful.

All commodities together feed into inflation. So either some will become less expensive or some will outpace inflation.

What we're seeing here is that resource extraction can get better, so resources aren't really scarce. But there are certainly some commodities, not reflected here, that became much cheaper. E.g., corn or meat, so these metals might have become more expensive in relative terms.

I think you're right that the underlying problem is the economic theory and behaviour of nonrenewable resources. Or more accurately, the utter lack of correspondence between economic theory (Hotelling's Rule) and actual price behaviour.

This isn't a matter of inflation but of the lack of accounting for the fact that nonrenewable resource are, well, nonrenewable. Unlike (at a first blush) farming or labour, where utilisation currently doesn't mean that the same resource is unavailable in the future, once a nonrenewable resource is extracted and used, that production process cannot be run again.

Metals and ores can of course be recycled or reused, though in practice achieved rates are quite low (50% is exceptional, and that means that 1/32nd of the original resource is available after five cycles). Fuels which are combusted are a whole 'nother matter, as once burnt (or fissioned, in the case of nuclear power), the resource has been degraded and won't reform in anything less than geological time, if ever.

Once one comes to face with the fact that we're utilising fossil fuels at ~1--10 million times their rate of formation, the problem and inadequacy of economic pricing models becomes glaringly apparent.

Metal ores may recycle in less time, and some (e.g., iron) are massively abundant. But, again in the case of iron, when one considers that commercially viable ore deposits were formed 1--3 billion years ago, during the first phases of life on Earth, and driven by those biological processes.

> The loss or gain for each metal was then summed up to get the total. If the total basket of metals had increased in price, Ehrlich had to pay. If it decreased, Simon had to pay.

I think this is the wrong way around, as the price dropped and that’s why Ehrlich lost and had to pay, no?

For this stability one should consider the minerals are in fact setting the value of currency itself.

I'd be curious about the results over 1000 years and 10,000 years. In the case of the latter I wonder if the concept of prices as we understand them today will even still be a thing.

He was successful at marketing extreme FUD books in the late 60's and early 70's, kind of reminds me of "the impending catastrophe" doomer like Thom Hartmann. Heck, even Jim Morrison had an opinion on the subject.

The reality (WRT to bulk metals) is that we get some "free passes" due to mining technological advancements, and that increased scarcity -> increased costs -> curtails wastes, encourages recycling, and drives substitutes.

More generally, peak production isn't a problem itself, per se. There is concern when there are risks for sudden shocks or collapse. If we suddenly ran out of phosphorous, that would be bad.

I think there is still a lot of waste that could be captured with cleverer engineering, especially ag runoff, in industrial process, and failure to capture material going into landfills. Perhaps in 100 years, we will be mining old landfills for rare earth metals.

Love this. Ehrlich acted from good intent but with a bad case. I like this analysis saying the short term could have had Simons lose if the decade is chosen wrong, but the trend is with Simons.

A lot of battery related FUD recapitulates this, people mistake active mines for available reserves and available reserves for worldwide geology. We aren't running out of the inputs to make batteries we're in supply chain shock not resource limits.

Same with oil and peak oil. We'll never run out of oil.

things never really "run out", they just get expensive as availability becomes lower. But some people consider this the same as running out, because it is indistinguishable from running out if you could not afford it.

I think Simons point was that afford and need equipoise. There's also substitution going on all the time, and innovation. Battery chemistry has changed massively over the life of batteries for EV (the thing most often cited as a modern day Ehrlich/Simons bet)

Ehrlich thought need would exceed afford at scale. And that it would have massive societal repercussions. Well, it just didn't historically, and there's no reason to believe the (misnamed) rare earths and metallic ores are limiting things for any reason other than price motivation.

This last decade we had a temporary chip shortage affect car production rates worldwide. Localised supply chains for Diesel additive have been a problem. There were discussions about ring fencing nitrate fertiliser as a strategic supply. None of these are "limits to growth" stories. Capital investment followed.

That said, the price of copper spiked enough to make people start stealing it again worldwide.

Which diesel additive?

Likely diesel exhaust fluid, comprised largely of urea, used to mitigate NOx emissions which are a consequence of diesel engine's high compression and combustion temperatures.

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diesel_exhaust_fluid>

And some quick DDG'ing confirms:

"Australia’s shortage of diesel additive Adblue is serious, but we can stop it going critical" (December 12, 2021)

<https://theconversation.com/australias-shortage-of-diesel-ad...>

You’re veering onto a common misinterpretation of the debate which is that we don’t need to respond to resource shortages. Simon didn’t argue against peak oil, he argued that we as society would move away from oil as the prices rose in response to the resource becoming more scarce.

Not to dispute, could you post a link because I would love to see how he expressed this, and work out how I feel about it.

At one level it's a truism, if you wind up with price the main constraint on something, if it is substitutable you will go to a cheaper substitute, when price exceeds some threshold but that threshold is variant to circumstance, and the consequences of substitution also come to play.

Sure, we'll never run out of fossil fuels, because as they get more scarce, the price will go up and some reserves that used to be unprofitable will now be.

But then, we definitely don't want to burn all fossil fuels there are, because that would be catastrophic for the climate. Nevertheless, as long as it is profitable to do so we will. So we'll never run out of oil, and that is, in truth, unfortunate.

In the same manner, we'll never run out of minerals, which is also pretty unfortunate because mining is somewhat environmentally damaging.

This only works if you consider the "official inflation rate". We all know that the real inflation is often much higher so the charts would look very different over time.

How do we “know” this?

Paid for healthcare, housing, or schooling recently?

So no answer except an appeal to anecdotes?

‘Core’ inflation excludes most of this, explicitly.

[https://wolfstreet.com/2021/03/30/the-most-splendid-housing-...], [https://www.pgpf.org/article/why-are-americans-paying-more-f...]

Average Housing costs as a multiple of average salary are at 10x, and increasing. Roughly where they were in the 80’s during hyper inflation.

Healthcare spend has increasing from 5% of GDP in ‘62 to 17% of GDP in 2022.

Education cost data is similarly insane - [https://educationdata.org/average-cost-of-college#:~:text=Th....]

With an average 4 year degree (living on campus) costing > $100k.

If you need a study to tell you traffic is terrible right now, you might just have no idea what’s happening.

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